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ABSTRACT

The objectives of this study are first, to discover
the factors influencing voting behavior in Louisiana during
the period of 1812 to 1952 and in particular to analyse In
fluences inherent of the processes of social differentiation
and stratification; second, to inquire whether political ten
dencies present in certain "crucial" elections represent
deep-seated Interests and social cleavages; third, to charac
terise persistent "climates1* of political opinion through
demonstration of the relation between regional and class
factors in voting behavior; fourth, to ascertain whether
regularities in deviations from basic tendencies correlate
with stability of geographic patterns of voting behavior;
fifth, to search for continuity of basic political tendencies
in situations of change*
The method used is the ecological analysis and com
parison of election returns and sociological factors.

A

series of map diagrams are presented showing the geographical
distribution of the vote in gubernatorial and presidential
elections-

In some cases findings were tested by correla

tion methods.
The results show that analysis of Louisiana politics

x

through political ecology can be extremely useful.

Whereas

class factors were always important, basic cleavages appear
more striking when social groupings are studied In geographical distribution.

Groups of influence —

sugar and cotton

planters of south and north Louisiana, in alliance with com
mercial interests —

were opposed by groups of number —

farmers of hill parishes and bayou country and city laborers.
Despite Whig or Democrat labels, Louisiana politics before
the Civil War was dedicated to the furtherance of a planter
aristocracy.

In political struggles of Reconstruction this

basic pattern of voting cleavage remained, only now former
slaves voted in number.

White farmer joined Bourbon planter

and merchant in successful assertion of "White Supremacy"
through the Democratic Party.

Solidarity displayed in the

vote of the hill farmers on this issue was carried over to
more basic economic problems, but the Bourbon "climate" of
opinion disallowed deviation.

After the Populist movement

was frustrated, Negro and poor white alike were disenfran
chised in 1898 and Louisiana commenced the Twentieth Century
with minority representation and with an economically deprived
lower class.

Gne-party politics was in reality a dominating

"group" politics, upset only by the advent of Longism which
brought a balance to political forces.

Leading tendencies

and persistent opinion were found in the distribution of vot
ing support of pro and apt! Long factions, which in recent
xi

years have paralleled Democratic and Bepubltcan party expres
sions.

%

1952 Influences of industrialization and urbaniza

tion had created a new base for social stratification, and
with Negroes voting again, Louisiana politics was more
representative of all elements of society#

Two-party politics

existed in fact if not in name#
The significance of this study lies in systematic
analysis of election returns for over one hundred years#

It

has discovered political tendencies of long duration and has
presented an evaluation of factors motivating Louisiana
political behavior#

Such a study contributes to the empirical

foundations from which generalisations may be drawn in the
field of political sociology#

xll

CHAPTER I
POLITICAL ECOLOGY; METHODOLOGY AND CERTAIN PROBLEMS

If sociology be regarded as the study of social action,
then most certainly political action Is an Important field of
investigation for the sociologist.

And as in the general

field, it is essential that a methodology be developed, that
the scholar wed conceptual schemes with research tools.

For

political sociology, the techniques of political ecology have
been devised.
^One of the main concerns of political sociology Is
the study of the interrelationships between political tendon*
cles, movements, and parties, and social
tlon of political attitudes affords the opportunity for
answering the question of who votes for what and why.

Since

the utilization of quantitative methods is desirable, it has
been found fruitful to focus attention upon analysis of elec
tion returns.

We proceed on the assumption that in our

political system an analysis of the geographical distribution
of support for a party or candidate enables us to find out
what classes and categories of voters make up that support,

1B. Beberle, Social Movementst £n Introduction to
Political Sociology (New Yorks Appleton-Century-Crorts, Inc.
1951)7
1

2
It has also been suggested that such analysis leads to a more
complete understanding of the fundamental processes of social
integration or disintegration*2
She political ecologist attempts to explain the politic
cal behavior of the people in a given area through inquiry
into the factors which may Influence voting*

By correlating

significant indices of social characteristics with election
returns, we can ascertain the actual interests and predispositlons which are present in an area as well as the cleavages
which are reflected in the voting*
The method of political ecology consists primarily in
the comparison of election returns in small areas and in cor
relating the differences between voting behavior in these
areas to differences in the social stratification*

The geo

graphic characteristics of an area are influential in the
development of a particular economy which In turn determines
the objective class structure, and ultimately, political tenassumption is that people are influenced in
their political attitudes by their "life chances” in Max
Weber*s sense, or more precisely*

by their interpretation of

the conditions and Interests of their own social class*)
The continental scholar most influential in the devel
opment of the theory and techniques of political ecology, or

2r . Heberle, ”0n Political Ecology,” Social Forces*
Vol. 31t No. 1 (1952).
^Heberle, Social Movements, pp. 312-211*.

*i»t he calls the s a M X m M l B d£ 1» opinion polltlane. Is Andre
Siegfried.

His interest In the subject came from his obser-

rations of the astounding consistencies in political opinion
In areas of France, despite the well-known instability of
political parties*

He was moved to seek the geographic and

social factors which contribute to this apparently underlying
stability*

More recently, Kudolf Heberle has made a compre-

hensive study of a region in Germany applying the techniques
developed by Siegfried with the addition of more refined
statistical methods*^
In this country, the foremost exponents of quantita
tive and regional studies of a more or less ecological nature
have been:

A* N. Holcombe, Stuart Bice, George Lundberg,
£
Harold Gosnell, V* 0. Key, Jr., and Samuel Lubell*
In gen
eral the work of these men has emphasised the regional (geo
graphic), or the statistical approach, or a combination of

^Andre Siegfried,
11cue (Parist Ansand Colin, 19^*7).
5r . Heberle, From Deaoeraoy JjoJfaaism (Baton Rouges
Louisiana State University Press, I9**5) •
^Arthur N. Holcombe, 2he Political EaJfttSE jof 2
(New forki Harper and Bros., 192^): Stuart Bice. Qmntltative
Methods in Politics (New York! A. A. Knopf. 1928)5 George
Lundberg, "The Geographic and Economic Basis of Political
Radicalism and Conservatism,'1 American
&L l&gisl&gY,
Vol. XXXII (1927)5 Harold F. Gosnell, Grass Boots Politics
(Washington, D.C*, American
19*2)$

radT. 0 . K

e

y

,

Knopf;

19^9); S. Lubell. The Future of American Politics (New York*
Harper & Bros*, 1951)*

k
both*

The work of Lubell suggests what may be accomplished

from a skillful interpretation of voting statistics coupled
with a general knowledge of the characteristics of various
areas and groupings.
A veritable "school" of political ecology has been
developed in France since the end of the last World War?
most of these have been the students of, or have been influ
enced by, Siegfried*

A series of studies have been published

by the national Foundation of Political Sciences Which are
ecological in nature and are described by the term sociologie
electorale.? These scholars do not pretend that the increase
ing number of monographs on the electoral sociology of dif
ferent regions of France makes possible at this time the
statement of general laws concerning the determination of
political opinions by specific factors; their knowledge is as
yet too fragmentary*

It Is possible, however, to engage in

certain comparisons, surely the way to generalisations, and
to make some reflections on the nature of the existence be
tween given social and political phenomena.
The term soclologle electorale has likewise been
adopted by the Norwegian political scientist, Sten S, Nilson,
who has published the first comprehensive treatise on the

7P. Ooguel and 3. Dupeux, Soololpgie Electorale:
Sfi.aalgae IV.Sn S U M , S a U A
Mjtefitoa (Cabiers de la Fonda
tion Nationals des Sciences Polltiques, No. 26. Paris,
Araand Colin, 1951).

9
subject#®

the value of this work lies in bringing together

both European and American findings and the drawing of com
parisons between the various studies#

M l son provides a

thorough review of the literature concerned with application
of quantitative methods to political behavior#

He suggests

that a comparative political ecology may be developed#
In the attempt to abstract general "principles'1 of
political ecology, some amount of discussion has centered
about the charge that the "ecologist** may be guilty of being
a geographic determinlst#

Such is not the ease, for as

Heberle has pointed out,^ the implications of a schema such
as found in Siegfried's Ardeche study are not that geographic
(or even geological) conditions determine the political be
havior of the people of an area, but that geographic or geo
logic zones tend to correspond to politically relevant zones•
Heberle goes on to say that f(«..ln this h© is quit® justified,
because it is perfectly amazing to see these correspondences
even in regions where the geological structure is as incon10
splcuous — for the layman, at least — as in Louisiana."
The point is that the physical landscape Is there to be used,
and that the way in which men utilize a particular natural

8S. Nilson, Hlatolra &

ficjfiMfla £flUA&flaga (Bergen,

1950).
Heberle, "Principles of Political Ecology,"
Sozlalf^r^ung in m&BZSZ
l M £ 1l< m i
*°Heberle, Principles, pp, 192-193.

6
environment depends in large measure on their system of
values
{Louisiana appears particularly amenable to an appli
cation of the techniques of political ecology for two reasons.
In the first place, although Louisiana has been a "one-party
state," at least since 1900, the Democratic party contains
quite well-defined factions representing the Interests of
various elements of the population*

Secondly, the state may

be divided into definable sub-regions on the basis of socio
economic , cultural, geographic, and even geologic indices*)
Much has been written concerning Louisiana politics, but we
gain from this literature little understanding of the ecologi
cal conditions of political life*

Louisiana politics become

intelligible by analysis of the social forces behind the fac
tions and by the demonstration of the tendencies which the
factions represent*
The present study has been undertaken to meet certain
problems encountered in an earlier attempt at determining the
political ecology of L o u i s i a n a [ T h e examination of voting
behavior in "crucial" elections in Louisiana (Secession in
l86lf Populism in 1896, Socialism in 1912, and the vote for
Huey Long in 1928) suggested that the events of the past most

11w. Flrey, Land fias. tofiantei S m S U B (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1947)«
12P. Howard, toft foltotofll ESS&m. St LffiltoMM («£>
published Hester’s thesis, Louisiana State university, 1951)*

7
certainly influenced the present,

let, the need had been

felt to check generalisations made for different periods in
regard to the possible continuity of basic behavioral tenden
cies and the Influence of cumulative experiences.
A growing body of empirically derived data established
through ecological analysis of political behavior has made it
practical, if not necessary, to re-examine the generalisa
tions being made concerning Louisiana

polities,^

(investi

gations, quite legitimately, focused upon certain problems
(such as support of the Long faction) and specific periods
(such as the 1890fs when Populism appeared in Louisiana)
with the intention of bringing understanding to political
processes, the careers of politicians, and the voting behavior
of classes within the electorate#)
Analysis utilizing the methodology of political
ecology has shown that a "one-party1* state is amenable to
quantitative study.

Factions within, as well as deviations

from, the Democratic Party stemmed from definite elements
within the social structure of Louisiana society# [ Evidence
suggested that within the rural population two divergent

Heberle and A, Bertrand, "Factors Motivating Vot
ing Behavior in a One-Party State," Social Forces, Vol, 27,

Quarterly, vol, ajuuii My?!)} r. nowara, "voting oenavn
in Baton R o u g e Proceedings of the Louisiana Academy of
Sciences (1952),

3
groups, planters and farmers, displayed a long-time continuity
©f social and political antagonism*

The phenomenon of Loagism

was believed to have emerged from this traditional cleavage#
Within the urban areas of the state there appeared to be the
beginnings of another political cleavage, ^The older commer
cial layer of the city populations allied themselves with the
planter class, i How, an increasing urban-industriallzation
was producing a growing differential between middle and work
ing classes.

Evidence was found of a correspondence of fac

tional cleavages to nationwide (party) cleavages.

The apparent

consistency in the continuity of geographic distribution of
the support of various parties and factions indicated that
the voting behavior of sub-regions of the state manifested
the crystallization of antagonistic tendencies in the social
relationships of divergent groups.
The contention that similarities in voting tendencies,
found for specific "crucial” elections, of necessity demon
strated the existence of a continuity of basic influences
might be seriously challenged.

The investigator did not show

what voting behavior may have been manifested In the periods
between the key elections*

Furthermore, the very choice of

"crucial” elections might be biased by value judgment or a
superficial interpretation of historical events*

The present

study therefore proposes to examine Louisiana politics in his
torical depth.

The theme may be stated thus!

the search for

basic political tendencies in situations of change#

9
This study will begin with an investigation of the
interrelationships of ecological factors and social values
of the people of Louisiana before the Civil War* ^The attempt
will be made to demonstrate how Louisiana colonial experience
Influenced the early days of statehood and the development
of Louisiana political parties*) After showing how the in
strument of government was established in 1812 and manned
through electoral choice, |th® success or failure of Whig and
Democratic party will be traced*

Finally, with the discov

ery of the leading political tendencies of the period, an
evaluation will be made concerning the influences 'which led
to the tragedy of Secession.
Chapter III will provide a fresh view of the period
of Reconstruction, tracing political developments from l86*f
through 1900#

The focus of attention will be placed upon the

voter support of the various factions and parties which en
gaged in the political struggle for power during these decades.
Of special concern will be the attempt to discover the pres
ence of social cleavages and experiences which may provide
\

evidence of continuity In basic political tendencies*)
(in the fourth chapter, the problem is one of putting
the phenomenon of Longism In proper perspective, to ascer
tain whether the political maneuvering in the years before
1900 which gave rise to ”one~party politics’* guaranteed the
potential rise of a leader such as Kuey Long*

SSmphasia will

highlight social conditions rather than the influence of

10
personality and individual activities.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the most recent elec
tions in Louisiana,

Here the purpose is to discover how much

of the experiences and tendencies of th© past are still in
fluent ial in Louisiana political life and will channel the
voting behavior of the future.

At the same time changes and

the appearance of new factors will be noted.
Finally, Chapter VI will present a brief evaluation
of the entire study, citing what generalizations appear
feasible concerning Louisiana politics.

CHAPTER II
LOUISIANA EXPERIENCES REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
•Of forms of government in which one rules,
we eall that which regards the common interests,
kingship or royalty; that in which more than
one, hut not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is
so called either because the rulers are the best
men, or because they have at heart the best in
terests of the state and of the citizens. But
when the citizens at large administer the state
for the common interest, the government is
called •••a constitution.**
Aristotle

a. coioaiai

J&& Baatag ol j&a fimaddr

tutlon of 1812. (in the only early ‘•ecological11 study of
Louisiana politics,* Greer asserted that the social and In
dustrial activities of Louisiana were influenced by two fac
tors, topographical and geographical conditions, and the
nature and diversity of the population. \ If one can find In
terests requiring different policies, then he has found potent
elements in the determination of political choices.
Louisiana was obviously a land of economic and, hence,
political differences.
duction —

In simple terras of agricultural pro

which became Louisiana*s economic lifeblood --

*J. K. Greer. "Louisiana Politics, 1830-1861," Louial
a m Historical Quarterly. Vol. XII, XIII, MMfcn.

12
there was cotton, a natural staple, and sugar, an artificial
one.

Here was an assertion of simple economic necessity

leading to political organisation* ( Norton has written that
"sugar could not be produced in Louisiana without the active
protection ©f the central government, and the realisation
that this m s an Inexorable fact made the sugar growers al
most without exception National Republicans, and later Whigs.”2
That, up until 182^, no political party per se was or
ganised does not invalidate the thesis.

It must always be

remembered that Louisiana emerged a United State In one day.
Her citizens had had no past experience with political repre
sentation, and the subsequent development of political parties
and factions within the state speaks well of her successful
adaptation to republican government.

When it became neces

sary to organize politically In order to seek and gain the
support and well being of her interests, developed in colonial
status under French and Spanish dominion, Louisiana emerged
as a copy in miniature of national political processes.
It is against a background of colonial experience that
the subsequent political processes of Louisiana, the state,
must be viewed.

When Louisiana entered the Union, her con

stitutional framers met peculiar difficulties in establishing
the instrument of a democratic form of government among a

2L. M. Norton. A History s£
M L g £S£iZ In fefflAffitoa
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University,
19M)).
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people devoid of past polities! experience of such a nature*
(Louisiana's early political development differed from
that of other American states.

Her colonial experience was

gained under French, rather than English, influences*^ For
a short period France had ceded Louisiana to Spain*

The

colonists had resented the Spanish transfer, and Spain’s rule
left little Influence.

As a Boyal Colony, the laws govern

ing Louisiana emanated directly from France*

Her laws were

Louisiana law; particularly, the Custom of Paris became the
local law of the colony* (Present day civil law doctrine of
the state, in large part, stems from the experiences under
this arrangement.

Under France and Spain, then, the Louisi

ana colonists were politically passive*

They did not partici

pate in civil administration to any extent, and apparently
they were satisfied with the generally kind paternalism of
their rulers*
Although extending for only sixty-seven years, French
rule left the lasting mark, influencing the institutions and
the attitudes of the people.) Later Anglo-Saxon infusion ’’has

3m . Evans, a Stndy la
£tgj& tfapxmgfl.lt 4fl IfiflMana (Baton Rouges Louisiana State University Press, 1931)•
Mr. Evans divided Louisiana political history before 1812 into
three main periods with the following divisionss
Under France
1699-1712
1712-1731
1731-1769
Under Spain
1769-1803
Territory of U*

1803-1812

Royal Colony
Charter Colony
Royal Colony
S*

Ik
never been powerful enough to displace, but only to modify,
the basic Latin institutions*11** (under the Enabling Act of
1 8 U , the United States Congress allowed the Territory of
Louisiana to call a convention and frame a constitution, that
she might become one of the United States*

How different an

occasion than the convention which had met on an earlier date
\

at Philadelphia! i
Usually, a constitution has a gradual development,
the product of the progression or retrogression of the com
munity.^

The majority of the original thirteen American

colonies had experienced Anglo-Saxon Influences*

The colon

ists revolted against oppression tinder the prevalent political
system, not against its common law traditions.

In the fram

ing of the American Constitution there was little which was
z
new in it, if there was much which was debatable.
In Louisi
ana the people had no such continuity of experience which
might be articulated In an instrument of government.

The dif

ferences in the social structure and in the cumulative experi
ence between Louisiana and the thirteen original states are
apparent when their constitutions are compared.

Hot only was

the political experience vastly different, there was also a

4 b l d .. p. 12.
5W. Dart, ed., Constitutions of £h£ State s i Louisiana
(Indianapolis *i&b'bs*4ft@rril! Co ., 19327 •
67. L. Parrington, Main Streams in American Thought
(Hew fork* Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930/ Vol. X, p. 279•
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unity of interests among the politically active which had
h e m lacking in the other colonies*
[The royal French colonists had dreams of aristocracy*
The major problem of Louisiana was to frame a constitution ac
ceptable to the American Congress, being republican enough to
satisfy the temper of the time*

This becomes clear when the

office of the governor in the new state of Louisiana is exam
ined below.

(hie student of Louisiana government has aptly

summarised the differences alluded to above in these wordsi
Louisiana, too, had her symbol of external control,
but in comparing the formation of her first Constitution
to that of the revolutionary state constitutions, the
differences remain more significant than the similarities.
Of fundamental importance was the lack of a revolutionary
struggle; no Loulsiananfs blood had been shed in their
effort to rid themselves of external control# In addi
tion, there was not the same Internal conflict that had
expressed Itself in the lively struggle between the
yeoman class of farmers and the large planters and
financial interests in the older states*'
Louisiana was an aristocratic society with strong French
sympathies and, hence, the constitution which was framed ex
pressed the will of this dominant element of the soolety
Just as all ensuing constitutions were to express the influ
ence of some other dominant portion of the citizenry* \
r

The prevailing attitude of this early elite was re
flected in the pages of the Louisiana fi&gsMa when it

.urged

the convention to adopt a short aristocratic constitution based

7j. v. prothro, a study af S.aaa$i&&la3al fiavatomaa&a
ifl Ste Office at I&8 M s s a a E 1& t o a M a B | (unpublished
master's theeis, Louisiana State thiiverslty, 1938), p. 30.
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upon a propertied electorate, and which provided for a gov
ernor not elected by s u f f r a g e (The membership of the con*
vention was composed of seventeen men of American descent
and twenty-six of Creole ancestry*

Among this elite group

were three future governors, five future United States
Senators, one future Congressman, and a future minister to
Q
France*
This was to be a convention which would take care
of its own.
Casting about for models of a constitution suitable
i
to their needs, ^
vthe framers decided upon the Kentucky Con
stitution of 1797* ; It had been written by a similarly con/

servative convention with anti-democratic leanings.

In most

cases the Louisiana convention used the exact language of
this Instrument.

The Kentucky Constitution, in turn, had been

patterned after the Federal document. (But the Louisiana Con
stitution emerged ultra-conservative and ultra-aristocratic.)
In studying the origins of this first of Louisiana #s consti
tutions, Usee concluded that the explanation most warrant
able "...was that the members of the convention chose the
Kentucky Constitution as a model because it was the last
southern constitution to be adopted before 1812, and that they
believed it contained the provisions which most nearly

P* D« Uzee, S M Zijesi
_
J m W m m SM&

£ (unpublished master1® thesis, LouislA m ax a lj& a . SiiaAaTunpu
ana State University, 193°) P* 30
9Ibld.. p. 15-
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coincided with their needs
f

^The Constitution of 1812 was far from being in aeeord
with the spirit of the American Union. ,M...It had been so
formulated as to satisfy the alien prejudices in favor of
hereditary government existing in the State during its early
11
years.w"
The preamble heralds the aristocratic attitude of
the convention.

It began, MWe the renresentatives of the

people* and ended with, "do mutually agree with each other
to form ourselves into a free and independent State.*1* 2
[Finally, emphasis must be placed upon the provisions
made concerning the powers of the executive in the first
Louisiana Constitution, since the present study shall focus
upon analysis of the electoral support of Louisiana gover
nors.

The framers of the Constitution of 1312 adopted a

strong executive, an action at variance with the practice of
the earlier states, who had reason to reject a strong govern
mental head, /in Louisiana the power of the executive began
with strength, reflecting the experiences of the past and
the pervasive unity of the early plantation aristocracy.
Moreover, a record of the appointive power of the governor
likewise points up the extent to which the people wished to

10Ibld.. p. 31.
**Evans, o p
^Evans,

. clt.. p.

33*

clt.y p. 283 italicised by Evans.
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delegate authority to the executive#^ (^Th© document dimin
ished the absolute appointive power of the governor only to
senatorial approval, and the elite would provide the member
ship of the General Assembly,

The governor was to be elected

by the Assembly from the two highest on the list of candi
dates voted upon lay the people.
his preference.

The voter only indicated

The executive was required to be a citlsen

of the United States, a resident of Louisiana six years, and
to own taxable property valued at $5,000,

Aristocratic,

indeed i)
b. ufi.li.ste t e %pMh.ery
aIggy si h m d s t e m W

W

m

2?

X Easfete*

Sm M&few guber

natorial elections were in the nature of skirmishes between
local factions, although cutting across this was the struggle
for power between French and American#

The Florida parishes,

then four in number, were Joined to Louisiana in the Act of
Statehood in April, 1812, although these parishes, settled
by American stock of American experience and Uemocratie in
politics, had not been represented at the Constitutional con
vention,

The native Louisianan outlook was strange to the

Americans who migrated in ever increasing number to New
Orleans, the Florida parishes, and to north Louisiana,

It

is perhaps understandable, in terms of ethnocentrlsm, why the

13B. J. Taylor, Jr., T M Appointive a M Bamoval Z2ESZS
fi£ jjjia Governor fi£ Loulslara (unpublished master»s thesis,
Louisiana State University, 1935) P- 151-
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issue in these early elections was carried by old Creole
settlers against American newcomers*

"The Frenchman," in

turn, * .**was looked upon as a Frenchman by the English
citizen or settler) though he might have been of the same
political part
The cleavage was not apparent, perhaps, In the first
gubernatorial election, when the old Territorial Cfovernor,
Claiborne, was chosen by the assembly over Jacques Villere#
Probably there was more unity of opinion concerning the per
formance of this man whom everybody knew, even if there might
have been some honest differences of opinion regarding cer
tain of his actions while working for the national govern
ment*

As his term of office drew to a dose,

•.it was

evident he had done a difficult job amazingly well****

He

had succeeded in winning the admiration of the people and
had headed them in the direction of successful representative
government*"*^
In 1816) despite the attempts at keeping nativity out
of politics, the French-speaking elite had nominated an il
lustrious son, Villere, while the Americans had backed
Joshua Lewis.

Villere received 2,31*+ votes to 2,1^5 for

Lewis$ the Florida parishes, predominantly American, gave

*\lreerf &£• clt*, p* 330*
1?0. McGinty, A History of
Exposition Press, 19bDf p. 126*

(New Iork»
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Lewis 7**0 votes and Villere 18 votes.^

It had been feared

that Villere would show partisanship in his appointments,
hut such was not the case*

The Frenchman demonstrated his

capacity to rule and his aristocratic sense of responsi
bility in making a sincere effort to heal the breach be
tween Creole and American*
Thomas Robertson, candidate of the American faction,
polled the highest vote in a field of four in 1820.
highest vote was cast for the Creole, Peter DerMgny*

The next
Louisi

ana had had her first taste of representative government and
had found able candidates were not wanting*

By 182** the

people were becoming more vitally interested with national
issues, finding that there could be a rewarding relationship
of local with national concerns*

Continuance of the Creole-

American split would remain an influence on Louisiana poli
ties, but there were other Interests about which to focus
the political struggle*
Louisiana became a meeting ground of national tenden
cies in the lSaO’s*

A clarity of interests and party sup

port might be observed resulting from that emerging structure,
the plantation economy*

Ultimately, the Interests of sugar

and cotton country might be the same; but since the cotton
planter was a more recent arrival on the Louisiana scene, he
had brought with him a political preference for the

l6Ibid„. p. 127.

£1
Democratic party.

Up until the early thirties the great

national parties were the National Federalists and the Jef
fersonian Democrats,

ihe program of the former found sym

pathetic support from "native" Louisianans, the sugar planters
and the attendant commercial Interests of the city.

The

simple process of migration was bringing to Louisiana ever
increasing numbers of backwoods Democrats, from the same
stream as the cotton planters, but arrived too late and not
so fortunate.
Though in the following decade the party labels changed,
the two basically different views of the ends of government
remained.

The Whigs of Adams and Clay lined up against the

Jacksonian Democrats.

The Whig program envisaged the state

as the originator of ambitious programs of internal improve
ments whereas the Jacksonians wanted the state kept simple
and frugal.

The middle class Whiggery of Clay represented

the Influence of the maturing settlement, while Jaeksonianism
was of the frontier —

coonskin Individualism with its simple

agrarian lalssea fair..17
The South was the heir to the Democratic Party.

But

behind the label it was a party divided against itselfj un
fortunately, in retrospect, the Democrats became split on
principle.

Failure to look behind the label of the party of

^Parrington, on. clt.. Vol. II, pp. 13Q-139•
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traditional choice was costly*

Since the Democrats of the

South also were the party of numbers, when the time came to
stand up and be counted, Secession was inevitable*

the in*

telleetu&l leaders of the two streams of thought were Jeffer
son and Calhoun*

"The contrast In their philosophies — * the

rejection by the latter of equalitarlan idealism, and the
substitution of economic realism —

mark the diverse tendon-

cies which in the end disrupted the South*"
Jackson was of Jeffersonian bent, whereas Jefferson
Davis was of the Calhounian school of thought? Henry Clay may
be depleted as having wavered in between*

Louisiana, in the

three decades from 1830 to the Secession, embraced the two
great parties, Whig and Democratic*

Possibly in the good of

both, or at least the portions which were not ideologically
in contradiction, the local interests and demands of the
politically articulate people of the state found satisfaction*
When crisis came, however, it would be necessary to look be
hind party labels and determine what ends were being furthered*
The immediate Impression was that the Democrats were
the party of poverty and numbers*

On the other hand, the

Whigs appeared to represent property and talents*

Emerson

was supposed to have remarked that the Democrats had the best
principles and the Whigs the best men.

*®Parrington, o p

. clt *? II,

k.

In Louisiana, as the
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cotton planter found prosperity, he might drop his previous
Democratic affiliation.

The Whigs had good men and they also

attracted propertied reinforcements.

They found strong sup-

port in the South,
In the South, the Whigs were the party of gentility
and property, owning over two-thirds of all the slaves.
Sugar planters in Louisiana, who wanted protection
against Cuba; big cotton planters, who regretted the
U,S, Bank, and who, in state politics resisted the re
pudiating tendencies of their poorer fellows * * • •
all went Whig. *
It would not be difficult to imagine, then, how the alignment
of support for the principles and parties worked out In
Louisiana.

All the diverse elements working to produce the

national situation appeared to have been present*
In the early days of statehood the political struggle
had been between the old Creole elite and the American new
comers.

The gubernatorial election of 182^, however, brought

a broader cleavage, support for Republican or Democratic
party.

To be sure, there was superficial similarity between

the old and new alignments.

The sugar planters, mostly of

French lineage, tended to become Whigs, finding agreement be
tween their Interests and the Adams-Clay political philosophy
of the "American System."

And the newcomer Americans, bring

ing their Democratic heritage with them, supported the
Democratic party of Louisiana,

There was room enough within

these two parties for the Intrusion of Interests other than

« S . E. Morlson and H. S, Cowaager.
American Re^bllc (New Yorki Oxford UniversTEy Press,

A
nativity*

These alignments initiated the political experi

ences which were to mold traditional support and climates
of opinion in the history of Louisiana politics.

c . £h£ garaUaJ, a£ k a k t e i §M UsAismir Z sll$lss»
and

Triumphant . In the election year of iBzk

the people of Louisiana embraced the two great national par
ties.

At least, the representatives of the "peoplew in the

General Assembly manifested a tendency toward party politics
as they cast the five electoral votes allotted to Louisiana.
The Congressional delegation had had opportunity to report
favorably to their constituents concerning the advantages of
supporting one national party or the other.

The Assembly was

split with three electoral votes going to Jackson and two
for Adams.

Democrat and Whig emerged in Louisiana politics.

The results of the gubernatorial election, however,
showed that despite this tendency to adopt labels or support
a party interest, the old vestiges of the French-Araerican
cleavage remained.

Once again the campaign was a struggle

of personalities, where provincial prejudices served as
issues.

Of the five competing candidates, Henry Johnson

was the strongest, as he had succeeded W. €• C. Claiborne in
the Senate in 1818.

With Washington experience, Johnson was

more likely to spell out the Issues behind the emerging party

*°£ton» B g M U M f Aa SaaMJalsflsat t o U t o
1699-1876 (Baton Bouge: Franklin Press, 1935) p. 102.
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labels*

The two other candidates with any considerable chance

to succeed were of Oreol© lineage.

Bernard larigny cam© from

the illustrious family of the Be Mandevllle.

It was claimed

that he had played politics and ran to split the Creole vote.
Jacques Villere had served with distinction, previously, as
Governor.
For the first time, in 182*4-, the Journal of the Louisi
ana Senate published parish returns In the vote for governor.
Henry Johnson had received 2,8*+7, Or H & A per cent of the
popular vote.

He gained pluralities in fourteen of the twenty-

five parishes which published returns*

In fact, however, the

combined vote for the two Creole candidates would have pro
duced 52 per cent of the total votes H&rlgny gained plurali
ties in four French parishes and Villere In eight of them.
The support of the latter was more general, as his strength
ranged from Plaquemines to the southeast, on up the Mississippi
to Point© Coupee and Avoyelles, and up the Bed Hiver in
Hatchit©(dies*

Pockets of French sentiment were spread through

out Louisiana*
Quartlie distribution of the Johnson vote indicated
that his strongest support came from the Florida parishes
where American sentiment was firmly established.
ure 1.)

(See Fig

It would take further elections before the French-

American cleavage would cease to dominate gubernatorial
campaigns.

Vet even so, In several parishes where settlers

were of predominant American stock, there was indication
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that the vote in lB2b revealed more than native prejudices*
Concordia and Ouachita, for example, although on the list of
majority Johnson parishes, registered a sizable opposition
to his candidacy.

The lack of relatively complete solidarity

here might bespeak divergent economic and social Interests*
Preparations for the 1828 campaigns commenced ar *arly
as two years ahead of time.

Louisiana politicians were

learning the value of uniting national and local control of
the offices of government.

Both National Republicans and

Democrats sought to gain all the state offices, the national
congressional and senatorial seats, as well as the support
of the presidential electors.

The Republicans supported

Pierre Derblgny and Philemon Thomas, and the Democrats
Bernard Marigny and Thomas Butler.

Derblgny won with M+.l

per cent of the vote cast in his favor*
cratic vote was only 39*6 per cent.

The combined Demo

In this election Derblgny

gained pluralities in fourteen parishes, including most of
south Louisiana as well as the parishes of Natchitoches,
Concordia, and Rapides.
The quartlie distribution of Derblgny support, in Fig
ure 2 , however, indicated his greatest backing came from the
French sugar country.

The support for Derblgny in Concordia

Parish, which was also plantation (cotton) country, although
not sufficient to place it in the top Republican quartile,
was nevertheless relatively strong, again.
said of Rapides.

The same may be

In other words, the intrusion of economic
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interests, rather than nativity, was seenj the predominant
plantation parishes of cotton country were comprised of popu
lations with no general consensus of opinion*

The weakest

Republican support was found in the Florida parishes, where
the planter opinion was more entrenched and where it had been
traditionally Democratic*
The results of the 1828 presidential vote in Louisiana
may be considered a forecast of things to come*

An element

of demographic processes worked to the detriment of the con
servative groups of the state who were championing the
Republican cause*

It was not the sheer addition of numbers

to the electorate which gave a hint of inevitability, for
with a property provision in granting the suffrage, the proc
ess of economic selection would do its work*

The vast ma

jority of migrants to Louisiana came from areas where the
climate of political opinion had produced a traditional
Democratic leaning*

North Louisiana was the predominant seat

of Democratic support, for it was here, and in southwest Louisi
ana, that the migrants settled*

The politically articulate

were predominantly Democratic, but evidence has already been
given showing that as an area became less "frontier," elements
of economic self-interest might blunt the traditional Demo
cratic sentiment*

This is seen when new parishes were estab

lished, which would register a high Democratic vote while the
vote of the older "core" area remained more conservative in
tendency*

30
It was not as if the Republicans were unaware of th©
great popularity of the "Hero of New Orleans. 11 Experience
with the ever more popular ^democratic” form of government
Indicated the importance of mass appeal.

Louisiana Republi-

cans put up a vigorous opposition, but Jackson gained the
vote of the electorate, though his margin was not as high as
might be expected5 he was given 53*0 per cent of th© popular
vote.

A student of the period explained Jackson*® support*

Jackson’s endorsement cam© from the City of New
Orleans, and from the ’interior.’ His personal popu
larity will largely explain his victory in the city.
The ’interior1 cotton farmer had no need or desire for
the application of the protective principle,. No West
Indian latifundia challenged their staple.**
Quartlie distribution of the Jackson vote clearly dem
onstrated his ttinterlorM popularity.

(See Figure 3*)

The

FI orIdas and north Louisiana emerge as the seat of Democratic
support.

The National Republicans carried only twelve par

ishes, mostly the predominant sugar producers.

Southwest

Louisiana, at that time all St. Landry parish, appeared to be
Republican country, and yet this was an area, recipient of a
steady migration of farmers.

The answer to the seeming para

dox must lie in the fact that the "core” of the parish, can**
tered about Opelousas, had an electorate which outnumbered that
of the hinterland.

And there was a sizable conservative ele

ment centered in the more settled portions of St. Landry.

21Rorton,

£ History

1M &

£aiSZ, p. 63.
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The fact that New Orleans voted Jackson by only 52*9 per cent
demonstrates the split of the electorate there between Ameri
can and European migrant labor and the great commercial
interests and old French*
Although the Louisiana Jacksonians triumphed in the
presidential campaign, they were not yet strong enough to
challenge in state politics.

For in 1831 the Republicans

again captured the governorship, this time with Andre Homan,
who represented the elite of the Creole element*

Again each

party entered two candidates, the Republicans Roman and Arnaud
Beauvais, the Democrats entering
Randall*

W. s.

Hamilton and David

As was the case in the previous gubernatorial elec

tion, the combined Democratic vote would not have been enough
to ensure victory.

Roman received ^3*6 per cent of the vote,

whereas the combined Democratic vote would have amounted to
but 3 6 per cent.
The highest Republican support came from the sugar
country, as Figure b Indicates*

The Floridas and northeast

Louisiana were strongly Democratic*

Even so, there was enough

Republican sentiment in West Feliciana and Concordia, for
example, to register close to a quarter of the vote for Roman.
Of special note is the behavior of Assumption Parish.

Th©

voters were evenly divided in their presidential choices in
1828, as was the Ascension electorate*

In subsequent elec

tions, the support for one party or the other took ups and
downs.

Assumption was in th© heart of th© French country, of
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course, but the politically articulate population had been
influenced by several waves of Anglo-Saxon settlement and the
establishment of the plantation e c o n o m y T h e r e was the ob
jective foundation, at least, for differences of opinion
which might show up in the voting statistics*
The victory of the Republicans in the gubernatorial
election of the preceding year was no indication of victory
in 1832.

Nationally, Jackson was in the political saddle,

and Louisianans flocked to his support in even greater numbers
than in the previous election*

(See Figure ?*)

Th© pattern

of distribution of th® Jackson vote was quit© similar to
that of his first success; the striking difference was in the
proportion favoring him*

New Orleans gave six per cent more

of its vote to the Democrat than in 1828. Whereas both
Ascension and Assumption parishes had compiled tie votes in
1828, in this election the former gave 87*3 par cent, while
the latter gave him only 15*^ per cent ot Its vote*

Ascen

sion had company, though, for neighboring Iberville, St*
James and St. Charles along the river, also registered ma
jorities for Jackson*

This was in contrast to the heavy Re

publican support deeper in the sugar country*
While the great popular hero won elections with ease
in Louisiana, his party had not yet been able to translate

22 V. J . Parenton, £ Sociological gJmdjr 3.t & MSZXS.
Village is th£ French Section of Louisiana (unpublished
master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 193°), pp.
30-33.
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this national success to the state scene*

For the Democrats

did not succeed in winning the governorship until 18^25
after this election they won each contest up to Secession*
No doubt, the pattern of Jacksonian victory m s a forecast
of coming events*
Meanwhile, in 183*+, another of Louisiana's most noted
sons was nominated as candidate of the newly formed Whig
party of Henry Clay,

She Whigs had retained the nationalistic

program of the old Republican party and were organised to give
opposition to the leveling tendencies of the Jacksonians*
Quite naturally many Louisiana people joined forces*

the

Whigs were to

elect Edward Douglas White in 1831*-and Andre

Homan for his

second term of office in 1838.

White's victory over the Democratic candidate, John
B* Dawson, was complete*
the vote cast*

Ee received nearly 60 per cent of

The election was conducted so as to arouse

class consciousness, and both parties used demagogy to wln.2^
Bach sought the French vote and the New Orleans Irish vote*
Since such was the case, it might be useful to present a sum
mary of the qualifications of the two candidates *
Edward D. White was proclaimed as an uncompromising
Whig, a fast friend of protective tariff, a jealous ad
vocate of internal improvements, a warm
and substantial
friend of the United States Bank, and a
firm andcon
sistent exponent of the American system.
John B. Dawson was zealously supported by the Demo
crats, who represented him as a firra and pure public

2%orton, Headings, p. 1095 McGinfcy, a&.

p. 137.
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man, a friend of the people, a supporter of the Union
of the states, and an advocate of low tariff*kand an
unflinching enemy of the United States Bank*
The Whigs were more successful in their campaign ef
forts.

Even the "Hero of New Orleans" had not been able to

command the support given to White in that city.
obvious that Dawson could pose as no Jackson.

And it was

Within the par

ishes, there was some indication of the old pattern of split
between French-American.

(See Figure 6.)

Dawson took plu

ralities in the Floridas and in north Louisiana.

Heturns of

more than 80 per cent were registered in White#s favor in
seven of the sugar parishes.

All of the sugar country gave

majorities for White, who, after all, was the Whig represen
tative of the south Louisiana aristocracy.

The contrast in

support given the Whig in Catahoula and Concordia is striking,
with the latter once again listed in the ranks of the conserva
tives.

Catahoula, bordering the hills, had more of the farmer

class whose subsistence agriculture need not bring a shift in
sentiment away from the traditions of the Democracy.
Political reversals on the national scene apparently
have always brought repercussions back home.

The panic of

1837 and ensuing depression placed a stigma on the Democratic
administration.

The local effect was immediate.

The panic

had caused fifteen Hew Orleans banks to suspend specie pay
ment, paralyzing business and spreading consternation among
planters and commercial people alike.

N o r t o n , Readings, p. 109*

Such a consequence

GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1834
VOTE FOR EDWARD WHITE
BY PARISHES
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might not have guaranteed a Whig victory, hut coupled with
the reputation of the Whig candidate, ex-Governor Homan, this
circumstance brought success *
Even so, Roman won with only ?2,8 per cent of the vote
in his favor.

The support of the candidates in this election,

as seen in Figure 7, demonstrated that in a crisis situation
the voter might leave his traditional tendencies and give
support where it might do him the most good.
Prieur cut into sugar and cotton country.

Both Roman and

The Floridas were

split in their support of Roman, and his strongest support
was seated outside the sugar country.
Concordia supported the Whig.
showed no such predisposition.

Both Catahoula and

Hewly established Caldwell
On the other hand, Caddo Par

ish reported its first returns in this election, also, and
was listed in the Whig ranks*

Caddo was Red River plantation

country, while the farmer might be found in greater number in
Caldwell.
Louisiana.

This was to be the high water mark of Whiggery in
In this election, the margin of victory was nar

row, and with population steadily Increasing every year, the
success of the Whig party was doubtful.

In 18**2 the Demo

cratic party captured the governorship with Alexandre Mouton,
state legislator from Lafayette Parish, who received 60 per
cent of the popular vote and became Louisiana*s first Demo
cratic governor.

The HSfhigs had suffered from the same malady

which had given victory in 1838. Unsound banking policies,
enacted over Homan's protests, had sunk the Whig party.

m
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1838
VOTE FOR ANDRE' ROMAN
BY PARISHES
1st

quarter: 21.0$ - 35.6#

2nd

quarter: 41 *9^ - 49.9$

3rd

quarter:

4th

quarter: 65.6$ - 96.5$

51.0$ - 64.4$
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In the long run, population growth would work against
the Whigs,

the strongest support for that party came from

the sugar country, which in the two decades from 1820 to 18^0
counted a white population increase of between ^0 and 50 per
cent.

At the same time, predominantly Democratic north

Louisiana marked a population increase which was more than
double.

The number of slaves in south Louisiana increased by

over IkO per cent.

The percentage increase in north Louisiana

was much greater5 cotton country was more recently developed,
and the number of slaves Increased from a base of practically
none.

Hot all of north Louisiana was devoted to the planta

tion economy, by any means.
There were relatively few slaves but many farmers in
the hill parishes.

The differential between white farmer and

planter may be viewed in comparing Concordia, which had a
sizable voting element partial to Whiggery, with Catahoula
Parish, strong in support of the Democratic Party.

With more

than twice as many white people, Catahoula counted nearly
five times fewer slaves,

Concordia recorded an Increase in

slaves of over 300 per cent from 1820 to I8*f0 . The incidence
of slavery marked the plantation economy, which In turn
tended to be an index of conservative political tendencies.
There were more farmers than planters in north Louisiana as
a whole, though,
4

Ize
the success and aehievemmt^^f ^the Republican-Whigs, In

k2
view of the general excellence of the qualification of Louisi
ana *s early governors, it might be regretful that the Whigs
could win no more*

Of course they were not voiceless, for

Whigs were in strong representation in the Louisiana Assembly
throughout the forties and most of the fifties.

Th© two

strongest economic elements of the state followed Whig ten
dencies*

these, '‘the merchants and the sugar planters, were

the aristocrats of Louisiana*

They had a community of inter

est which was satisfied by the Whig platform$ and as elec
tions approached, they expressed themselves as preferring a
party nominee who was a ’gentleman- * This usually meant that
they preferred the nomination of a wealthy sugar planter."2'*
Little wonder the Whigs could get nowhere with the rural
Democrats, the raw frontiersmen with their strong sense of
individualism*
Governor Roman had represented this elite community*
He was a sugar planter from St. James, on the west side.
his qualifications there is no argument.
progressive leader.

Of

He was a wise and

He worked for the Improvement of public

education; Roman established a model penal system, a well
organised militia; he worked for the multiplication of com
munications and the encouragement of science and agriculture*
Crossing party lines where principle mattered, Homan had en
dorsed Jackson’s stand against the Nullification Ordinance

2-’Norton, Readings, p. 113.

>♦3

of South Carolina,

The Whig tempered conservatism with

political responsibility.
Quotations from Homan’s inaugural address in 1831 and
his farewell address of I8b3 will catch a bit of the Whig
flavor:
The gratitude which I feel for the extreme kindness
conferred on me by a majority of the votes of my fellow
citizens, is increased still more from the idea that it
is not due to party spirit that 1 am Indebted for my
election. That illiberality which some would wish to
substitute for patriotism and which consists In inquir
ing not whether a candidate is capable and honest, but
whether he belongs to such a party, such a section of the
state, or to such a population has not generally exerted
against me.
The country has changed; the wide career offered to
our agriculture and commercial industry is not closed;
no convulsions of nature have destroyed the fertility
of our soil, or turned away from our capital th© stream
of the Mississippi, We are now aware of our real sltuation; we enjoy the advantages of solf“government, and
our destinies are in our own hands, Louisiana must yet
be prosperous and happy if the means which we still re
tain, are administered with that prudence and economy
which should have been always observed*2'
The Whigs were gone from the seat of government, but not for
gotten,

Many of their numbers were yet to make contributions

to the well-being of the state,
Louisiana had been a Whig state, but in the iS^O’s the
winds of Jacksonian doctrine became strong.

It was as if the

democratic sentiments of the ever increasing migrant groups
incubated until Democratic number could make them felt.

2^McGinty,

cit** p* 135*

27D. F. Barge, Louisiana I M S I S a m i iMZfi
Roman 18^1-1835. l839-18j»3 (mpqLllahed master’s thenls.
Louisiana State University, 1937)» P* 150,

But

Mf
before rooking an analysis of the political fortunes of Louisi
ana in the period from 18**6 to Secession, it is necessary to
investigate the move for, and the outcome of, the Constitu
tional Convention of 18V5#

The desire to drive aristocracy

and privilege from government was said to have served as the
animus of the entire Jacksonian movement.

By l8**5 the Demo

crats were numerous enough in Louisiana to make their desires
felt*

As early as I8*f2, and again in 18^3, the people of

Louisiana evinced strong approval to hold a constitutional
convention*

In the former year the electorate voted nearly

three to one "for."

Eight parishes voted against th© proposal5

these were sugar parishes clustered near Orleans, which was
also "against.*1 Nearly every parish of north Louisiana had
registered approval by over 90 per cent,

The actual enabling

act passed the legislature March 18, l8Mt, and the convention
y
was held the following year.
It may seem strange In retrospect from the present,
after Louisianans almost doubled the mortality rate which
Jefferson had prescribed for constitutions —
years —

ten in 110

that the first constitution was to last for over

thirty years.

However, the social grouping which had written

Louisiana’s first organic law was satisfied with the results;
for them there was no real need to make a change.

The multi

plication of Louisiana’s electorate through migration from
the southeastern states and the growing success of the Demo
crats at th© polls upset the old order.

"The populace....

felt that they were living in the nineteenth century under a

*♦5
seventeenth century government .,|2®

The main "aristocratic**

provisions which were objectionable were the property and re
ligious qualifications for holding office, the limitation on
suffrage, the great appointive power of the governor, and
the Inequality of senatorial representation.
The great significance of the convention was the fact
that the membership brought two distinct philosophies of
government.

The existence of a two-party system in the state,

and the fact that one of these, the Democratic party, was a
rising party with leveling tendencies established clear issues
leading to meaningful argument.

The great Issues were con

cerned with the proper function of government and the position
of the governor.

“Should the government represent the simple

public needs and desires of the entire population, or should
it establish a restrictive order under the auspices of those
gentlemen of principle and property who best know the needs
of the unthinking masses?*'2^

Obviously the Constitution of

1812 had given answer in far different terms than was desired
at this time.
That both sides would be represented was guaranteed
when the results of the election of delegates were made known.
The convention was composed of thirty-nine Whigs and thirtyeight Democrats.

One Whig editor exulted*

2®Prothro, on. elt.. p. 9*
2^Prothro, ££« clt.t p. 153.

**6
thank providence our Constitution will be safe from
the agrarian and leveling view of the radicals? of th®
numbers elected to the Convention M5 are conservatives *
enough to satisfy us that none but changes absolutely
necessary will be made in the Constitution — that the
Judiciary will not be elective by the people — thus
securing toAus one of the greatest boons we were strug
gling for.3°
Yet, the constitution written in 18*»5 was a liberal doctrine
compared with that of 1812•

And it was prefaced by words

far different than those embodied In the Preamble of 1812*
Gentleman rule was still maintained) but a concession had
been made by the aristocrats*
things for themselves*

How the people were doing

The Constitution of 18**5 began* **We

the people of Louisiana* do ordain and establish**1
Of course* none went away from the convention com
pletely satisfied.

There had been opposing views and com

promise had been achieved? for such a social process to work*
every one must give up some point or interest*

Borne Whigs

were dissatisfied because the new instrument was too Demo
cratic*

The convention president* Joseph Walker* and the

Democratic "radicals" signed* but purely as compromise? the
instrument was not democratic enough for them*
One of the controversial Issues had centered about the
suffrage*

The Whigs feared to let the bars down completely*

As finally written* suffrage was granted to all white males
twenty-one years of age or over and who had been citizens of

3°Horton, Readings, p. 122.

the United States for two years and of the state two years
preceding an election.

The governor was no longer required

to have a property qualification, but he must be thirty-five
years of age and a resident of Louisiana for at least fifteen
years*

The office of Lt,-Qovernor was established*

The

legislators were no longer restricted to property qualifica
tions, and some offices formerly appointive were made elective
The conservatives successfully maintained the Judicial bulwark
for judges were still to be appointed by the governor, with
the consent of the Senate,

A lasting accomplishment of the

convention was the creation of the Office of State Superin
tendent of Public Education.

In fine the influence of Jack

sonian Democracy had been felt\ Anglo-Saxon traditions,
reworked through American experience, became a part of the
political heritage of Louisiana,
o* 1 M Poimfall at libs MfrAsa S M Impending Secession.
The downfall of the Whigs, in the elections which were to
follow, may be explained by the simple phrase t too many
Jaeksonians*

"Whig power In Louisiana was enervated by the

liberalisation of the state’s constitution,11^
never succeeded in electing a governor again.

the Whigs
Election

analysis then must focus upon the successes of the Democratic
tickets and the various elements which made up the voting

^Norton, A History at A M I M S £S£$X! dee also, S.
Asseff, Legislative Apportionment ifl Aawiglflp (Baton Rougei
Bureau of Government Research, Louisiana State University,
1950).

support.

Until i860, the gubernatorial elections were close;

the Democratic support ranged from only 51 to 5**- per cent of
the total rote.

A close election might indicate a clear

cleavage within the electorate and an intense interest in
the resolution of pressing issues*

It would be important to

know how many of Louisiana's people had the suffrage, also*

TABLE I
POPULATION AND THE VOTE

1830*1860
J&Q.

j m L

JLfiSL

White Males, 20
Years Old and
Above

25,886

50,110

80,^50

98,1*6

Total Vote Cast
Nearest Election
Year

8,318

20,000

36,119

VI, O M

Vote Per Cent
of Population
Group

32.1J8

39.958

M 4-.85S

♦Sourcet

Vl.758

U, S* Census, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth; Lmig.iana g M U m feSUSMlfl*

The table printed above presents only an approximation
of the relation between population of voting age and the
number of people actually voting, but it does allow several
Important generalizations*

In the first place, it belies the

assumption that if Louisiana had government by gentlemen,
then the "people” were politically voiceless*

It has been

shown that Louisiana aid enjoy gentleman rule? this fact reenforces the classic proposition that political power follows
fro® economic domination*

Louisiana ’a wealth came from the

plantation economy and for this reason, perhaps, it was the
planter and merchant, the articulate upper classes, which
dominated the government.
Less than half the population of voting age practiced
suffrage in the four decades prior to the Civil War*

Un

doubtedly the majority of votes cast were upper class ballots.
Yet, how many people bother to vote even If they have the
privilege?

In the presidential election of 1952, certainly

an intensely heated election in Louisiana, only kO per cent
of the people of voting age voted,

this percentage Is little

different than those in the decades under discussion.

The

backwoods farmers of north Louisiana and the "interior11 popu
lation of south Louisiana, 1&& pe.tJAS

M

probably outnumbered the planter-merchant groups.

But it Is

an open question whether the problem of suffrage was major.
These groups migrated to Louisiana, established homes and
farms and self-sufficiency.
curity first?

Would they not seek economic se

It might take time to develop the level of

articulation enjoyed by the elite, and to participate in po
litical affairs.

Politics would become important when the

farmer found he might have to fight someone else's warl
The figures do show the Increase of able bodied voters,
though, and indicate that a good many of the migrants must

have utilised the suffrage» Between 1830 and 18^0 the popu
lation of voting age almost doubled, while th® number of
votes cast had increased by 150 per cent.

It Is significant

that this increase came before the liberalisation of the suf
frage requirements, too.

In the next decade voting popula

tion increased 60 per cent, and the number of votes cast had
increased by 80 per cent.

Obviously the number of voters

had increased steadily In Louisiana,
Whether planters or farmers, the majority of the in
creased voter population must have been Democrats.

But with

the support in elections breaking even, there must have been
a subtle change in the combinations of groups supporting the
Whigs and Democrats,

A new alignment of interests was in the

process of developing,

through emulation of the Whig aristo

crats, or through identity of interests, portions of the
cotton planter class had left the Democratic party.
In the first election after the adoption of the new
constitution, the Democratic party, in l8*f6, successfully
supported the candidacy of Isaac Johnson, who received
per cent of the total vote of 23,35^,

The Democrats gained

a majority of two In th© senate, whereas th© Whigs, behind
De Boys, held a majority of three in the house,

Johnson was

a member of the West Feliciana aristocracyj his leadership
of th© state administration left little to choose from, so
far as accomplishments were concerned, between th© new Demo
crats and the old Whigs.

However, the issue of slavery was
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in emergence, an issue which the Democrats would face in a
different manner than the Whigs.
The Wilmot Proviso was advanced nationally, in meeting
the problem of the annexation of Texas.

The storm of protest

raised by southern politicians was indicative of the determine*
tion of a dominant element of the Democratic party to struggle
for their views on slavery.

This was sectionalism, and it

remained to be seen whether the traditional parallel of Louisi
ana with national Interests would be spread.

As a spokesman

of Louisiana Democrats, Governor Johnson answered in these
wordss
Noninterference of congress with the slavery question
is the surest means of preserving the Union, and that
doctrine should be insisted on with an unflinching resolu
tion never to surrender it. To any proposition, there
fore, to compromise that doctrine, the South, with the
bitter and humiliating experience before her. will turn
a deaf ear. Submission to Incipient oppression prepares
men for the yoke, and compromises on this question are
nothing else than anti-slavery victories. The repeated,
galling, and unprovoked aggressions of anti-slavery
leave no room to anticipate a cessation of hostilities,
and the South had been sufficiently warned that, if it
is wise to hope for the best, it is equally prudent to
prepare for th© worst. It is far^better to be lawless
than to live under lawless rule.*^
Despite these words, which suggest that then as now the use
of the social process of compromise was little less than ap
peasement and almost treason, Johnson was not a strict party
man; he appointed some Whigs to office, and tried to steer a
middle course on the slavery question.

32m . L. McLure, Louisiana Leaders t 183Q-186.Q (Shreve
port* Journal Printing 3 o ™ & ) , p.72.

What areas of the state had given voting support to a
Democrat of such ideas and actions?

Although gaining but a

slim majority of about 2,000 votes, yet Johnson had plurali
ties in thirty of the forty-three parishes which voted, in
dicative of the wide spread of his appeal,

Th© highest

Democratic vote was seated in th© "interior* parishes of
north and southwest Louisiana.

(See Figure 8 ,)

Likewise,

the Floridas were strong in support of Johnson, th© native
son.

The formerly named areas, where th© Democratic farmer

resided, show the effects of the lowered suffrage qualifleations*

This was the first election in which nearly all the

parishes of the hills and the prairies registered support in
the highest quartlie of the Democratic percentages#
The sugar parishes remained the seat of the Whig sup
port#

However, parishes from cotton country likewise emerged

with Whig leanings#

Wherever there was a sizable layer of

planter classes within th© northern parishes, a rather even
split of the vote occurred*

In this ©lection, in fact, both

Union and Morehouse were on th© list of parishes lowest in
support of the Democratic candidate, and Madison and Concordia
had given majorities to th© Whigs, also#

A very definite ten

dency toward fhiggery had emerged In th© four "front" parishes
of the Mississippi delta.

Here the large seal© planters pre

empted the levee lands and In back, along the secondary
levees, more small planters were found*

Th© election returns

Indicate that a difference In political opinion likewise

GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1846
VOTE FOR ISAAC JOHNSON
BY PARISHES

1st quarter:

21,4# - 47.

2nd quarter:

47.436 - 52.5/6

3rd quarter:

54.236 - 61.736

4th quarter:

63,0% - 11,2%
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5**
occurred#

Th© significance in th© distribution of th© Demo

cratic vote in this election, then, was twofold 5 it marked
the cluster of strong Democratic tendency in th© hills and
the emergence of a Whig leaning among portions of the planter
groups of eotton country.
Two years later, in l8*+8, the Whigs became enthusias
tic concerning their chances In the gubernatorial campaign
of 18?0.

The Whig candidate for president, Louisianafs

General Taylor, was successful, and had carried Louisiana.
Whigs should have known from past experience, however, that
Louisianans were strong in their support of military heroes
at the polls — > "old soldiers never die. 11 Just as the Whigs
remained in office despite the election of Jackson, so th©
Democrats in 1850 won despite the Taylor popularity.
The Democrats eked out victory in the race for governor
in 1850#

Joseph Walker, native of New Orleans, and president

of the Constitutional Convention of 18V5, had won with 51A
per cent of the vote, a slim majority of just over a thousand
votes over the Whig, Plauche.

The campaign had followed

national Issues, among which was the problem of the Wilmot
Proviso\ the Democrats had opposed, and th© Whigs had favored
it.

In his inaugural address Governor Walker gave much at

tention to the problem of slavery#

These are his words*

Situated as we are, I think we owe it to ourselves,
to our sister States of the South, and to our northern
brethren, to declare that if, unhappily, the anti
slavery agitation, which has so long been allowed to
insult our feeling should be carried to the point of
aggression upon our rights\ if the equality between all
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the members of the Confederacy, established and guaran
teed by the constitutlon, should be destroyed or trenched
upon by the action of the general government, then we
are prepared to make common cause with our neighbors of
the slave-holding States, and pronounce the Union at an
end* I shall look upon the dissolution of the Union as
the greatest calamity that could befall us5 but that,
great as this calamity would be, I am certain there is
no one of our citisens who would be willing for a moment,
to weigh it in the balance against the dishonor of sub
mission*^
Walker had been among the group of "radical” Democrats
at the constitutional convention who had felt that the instru
ment had not gone far enough toward democracy*

It could be

assumed that the people, newly tasting of more democracy,
would have given Walker great support at the polls*

That

such was not the case was the resultant of the continuation
of a tendency noted in analysis of the preceding election*
The geographical distribution of the highest quarter of sup
port for Walker indicates that the supposed backing of the
"people” was indeed apparent*

(See Figure 9»)

There was a

cluster of Walker strength in the newer parishes created in
northwest Louisiana*

Indeed, the bulk of Democratic support

came from the same "interior” parishes which had voted Demo
cratic in 1( M *

However, the increased solidarity of the

cotton and sugar plantation parishes In support of Whiggery
was such that the total Democratic vote was evened.
The people had tasted of the joys of democracy, and
it became apparent that they wanted an instrument that was
absolutely democratic; the appointing power of the governor

33Ibld.. p. 73

//,
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1850
VOTE FOR JOSEPH WALKER
BY PARISHES
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was still too groat*

Governor Walker now opposed the sailing

of another convention; but th© people demanded it, and a
peculiar document resulted; It was both more radical and more
conservative than the instrument of seven years previous.
The Whigs were quick to perceive their opportunity in this
movement and campaigned vigorously in the ©lection for dele
gates » Their strategy showed they could not afford to be as
openly anti-democracy

..with th© same honest vindictiveness

that had been used earlier#

Jacksonianism had so popularised

the word fdemocracy1 that those later Whig® shifted their
strategy,#3^

Vernon Farrington observed concerning th®

national scene that

.instead of proclaiming democracy the

mother of all mischiefs, they/the later Whlgs^ welcomed it
as an effective aid in vote g e t t i n g , T h a t such an approach
was successful is borne out by the fact that of the membership
of the convention the Whigs outnumbered th® Democrats by 35
to W5.

The Baton Koug® Gazette hid Its enthusiasm when the

Whigs filled two-thirds of the seats in saying*
The Whigs have an awful responsibility resting upon
them, and it behooves every Whig to work with diligence
and to present to the people a constitution wise in its
construction, liberal in its provisions and worthy of
the great state of Louisiana and of the Whig party. We
now have it in our power to place Louisiana beyond the
reach of Locofocoism and..to retain its government in our
hands for years to come.™

3**Prothro, op. olt#.

p.

62,

35parrlngton, op. eft,f II, 152..
3^Prothro, OP. jslfc., p* 62*
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Diverse elements pushed through the 1852 convention,
and its work reflects the demands of different groups• It
met the demands of the people for a more democratic struc
ture; ©very office became elective, Including the judiciary,
and terms of office were shortened.

The Whigs did work with

diligence, however, and in the changes made concerning re
presentation saw to the perpetuation of their control of
government.

Representation was to be based upon total popu

lation rather than upon qualified voters.

This meant that

the planter interest would control the legislature, as their
slaves would count in their favor.

The Democrats had argued

with some justification that H«• .one Whig master and his
1,000 slaves possessed representation in the Oeneral Assembly
equal to 1,001 free, white Democrats

Th© Democrats were

also in objection to the more liberal provision granted cor
porations and commercial interests generally,

let, the Con

stitution was endorsed by the voters of the state, the feeling
being that despite some objections this new Instrument was
more satisfactory than the one it superceded.
Under stipulations of th® new Constitution, the citi
zens of Louisiana ^hould vote for governor in 1852.

Th©

Democrats chose as their candidate Paul 0. Hebert, resident
of Iberville Parish and of Acadian lineage.

Again as in th©

last election, the Democratic margin was very slim, this
time a majority of less than 2,000 votes.

^Norton, Headings, p. 161.

His main support
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came from the hill farmers of the interior parishes, and from
the Floridas*

(See Figure 10*)

Once more the cotton and

sugar planters showed their like-mindedness in joint support
of the Whig candidate, Bourdelon*

Over half of Hebert9s

slight lead might have been secured in Hew Orleans, where he
obtained
votes.

per cent, representing a majority of some 1,200
Elements of city and country were lined up behind th©

Democratic party; of course the same could be said for th©
Whigs, save that the elements were of far different composi
tion*
Louisiana supported the Democrat, Franklin Fierce,
in the 1852 presidential campaign.
crats had not put up a united front*

But the Louisiana Demo
The Impending dissolu

tion of th© Rational Whig Party and the consequential
weakening of the Louisiana Whigs presented the Democrats with
a secure situation in which to conduct a factional quarrel.
Events would prove the folly, however, of the meeting of th©
slavery crisis in a one-party situation*
Factions were divided under the lead of two dominant
personalities,

John Slidell was demonstrating his finesse

at the game of political arithmetic, becoming boss of Louisi
ana politics through combination of the unified support of
New Orleans Irish and the Jacksonian farmer of the "inter
ior.”

Pierre Soule provided leadership of th© opposing fac

tion from his post as United States Senator*

The personal

ambitions of these two men for political power became
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entangled with the Issues of slavery and the possible gain
that might follow fro® supporting one of the opposing streams
of thought within the Democratic party*

Bach leader became

a political Hamlet*
During the decade of the 1850*s both Slidell and Soule
shifted positions *^® At the beginning of th© deoad© th©
national affiliations of th© two men were in contradiction
with their local stands*

Slidell*s supporters favored

Buchanan and the radical wing of the national party, but
Slidell was a Unionist*

Soule *s local support was sym

pathetic to Douglas and the conservative wing, while Soul©
himself was a seetionalist• While the situation in the
national Democratic party remained unchanged, in i860 Slidell
had turned seetionalist and Soule was an ardent Unionist*
It was written, "unto thine own self be true*w These two
men had been more concerned with alignment with a winning
team than with the political resolution of a very serious
problem*

It was too late in i860.

In the gubernatorial election of 1858$ the American
Party had appeared in Louisiana*

It was unique In this sec

tion of th© country, for nationally it had repudiated the
Catholics*

The bulk of the membership of the old-line Whig

party found haven in th© ranks of th© American Party*

They

had believed the Democrats were voting the Hew Orleans Irish
and other foreign born against them.

Apparently, the anti-

3®Gr©er, op, clt»* XII, 331, and XIII, *f62.
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democratic tendency of the old Whig combined with the antiforeign sentiment, overruling the solidarity of Catholicism.
Still, although forwarded by the sugar parish Whigs, the
Know Nothing candidate, Charles Derbigny, found strong sup
port in cotton country, also.

Perhaps the American Party

had been supported because there was no other alternative
than vote Democratic*
The Democratic candidate, Robert G. Wickliffe, was
another of the West Feliciana elite*

He had conducted him

self so well in the legislature that he was boomed as a
gubernatorial possibility*

Wickliffe was a Douglas supporter

and influenced the state nominating convention to endorse the
Douglas Kansas-Nebraska Act as just legislation*

The Louisi

ana Democrats then pledged cooperation with the northern
Democrats so long as this branch accepted the ruling of Con
gress on slavery as set forth in the Act
The American Party was strong in New Orleans, and when
the 1856 vote m s

counted, the city had given a very slight

majority to Derbigny*

The most significant result was the

loss of support in many of the old-time Whig parishes of the
sugar country*

(See Figure 11.)

Still, continued solidarity

of cotton and sugar voters is to be noted*

Wickliffe had

39T. B. Landry, !&£ Political Career a£ BafePXl Charles
air!1tfn (unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State Uni
versity, 1939), p. 21? Horton, Readings, p. 158s W. D.
Overdyke. "History of the American Party in Louisiana,"
Louisiana Historical fflaaHfiZto Vol. XV, XVI (1932-33).
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6k
gained the support of the Democratic hill farmers again, and
his appeal had apparently made some inroads on voting sup
port in the Mississippi delta area#

The Democrats had lost

some ground in the Florida parishes, and Wickliffe had ;just
barely won in his home parish of West Feliciana.

Obviously

the electorate was in favor of Democratic rule, but appar
ently, the issues of this campaign gave no directive as to
alternatives.

The planters in both north and south Louisiana

demonstrated their anti-Demoer&tic Party tendency, but that
was about all*
The national Know Nothing Party ceased to function in
1857, but the New Orleans organisation still showed some life.
They controlled the city and did not want to surrender that
control*

Likewise, the large settled foreign population

and the constant immigration of more foreigners was a factor
working for them*

The Know Nothings could continue to say

they were the bulwark against Democratic manipulation of
these groups#
tivity.

However, 1858 marked the climax of party ac

Speaking in 1859, Pierre Soule summed up the

political situation in Louisiana $
Partyisms are entombed in the past* The American
Party, the Whig Party, exist no more as national or even
state parties, though we may at times still see their
shadows flit around our municipal halls and elective
precincts* Their scattered fragments are in process
assimilation with £hg
i s M Bt&gfa J&& S m & ~
cratlc E a r S A&

^Norton, Headings, p. 163, italics mine; M. L. Mature,
"The Election of 1860 in Louisiana,"
SiHftEterly. Vol. IX (1926).
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The gubernatorial election of i860 became a struggle
for control of the Democratic Party*
for the showdown*

Soule faced Slidell

The firmly entrenched support of "King

John" prevailed in the nomination of Thomas 0* Moore.

In

final desperation, Soule organised an opposition party which
was a coalition of "purifiers," or anti~311dell Democrats,
and the remnants of the Know Nothing party.
received the nomination of this group.

Thomas J. Wells

The campaign issue

boiled down to "for or against Slidell."

The resulting vie*

tory for Slidell could have been forecast from the beginning.
The electoral balance of two decades had been destroyed as
Moore received a convincing 62.0 per cent of the votes cast.
Soule’s candidate retained majorities in only two parishes,
Orleans and Terrebonne, although the Jefferson vote was a
toss-up.
The distribution of Moore’s highest voting percentages
is

scattered in parishes throughout the state? however it

is clear that the greatest anti-Slldoll sentiment was seated
in plantation parishes.

(See Figure 12.)

With the statewide

support of Moore so strong, an interpretation of the voting
percentages favoring the Slidell faction must remain In rela
tive terms.

This election had been a battle of factions and

it was obvious which one had the greater support.

Slidell

sentiment was widespread, although most generally found con
centrated in hill parishes or prairie*
cratic one.

This vote was a Demo

In the previous election, for example, the four
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hill parishes of Bienville, Jackson, Caldwell, and Winn had
registered votes in the highest quarter support for the
Democratic candidate, Wickliffe, who had been a Douglas man.
In i860, the same four parishes recorded votes of over 70
per cent for Moore, who with Slidell1s backing was in the
other camp.

The hill farmer voted Democratic out of tradi

tion and did not look behind the party label.
The same could not be said for those parishes where
planter groups were dominant § opinions appeared to be di
vided, since the electorate might have known more of what the
factions stood for*

Sugar parishes along the river marked a

continuation of a trend toward Democratic support observed
as early as 1850*

Parishes of the upper Mississippi appeared

on the list of Slidell supporters, although here Madison and
Concordia, Know Nothing in 1856, were weaker in support of
Moore’s candidacy*

Factional support in i860 was divided,

but no clear pattern emerged indicative of a clarity of
issues.
E.

Evaluation

and the Tragedy

2?

fjaU&sal

lIMrlMQ,

-Secession. It has been fashionable, fol

lowing Roger Shugg,*1^ to make a socio-economic interpretation
of the issues which led Louisiana to Secession. (jKis thesis
maintained that the planters were a dominant minority, who,

r# w* shugg, satolM &£ 9Mm, amMflji to smXsAsm,

(Baton Rouge* Louisiana State University Pres®, 1939)*
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Imposing their will, led the state out of the Union in order
to proteot their Interests.^ A cleavage was found between
the planter of the delta-lands and the farmer of the hills*
Without doubt| such a cleavage did emerge in Louisiana
polities*

But the proposition to be maintained her© is that

this plant er-farmer antagonism was a much later development
which emerged from the actual factors which brought Secession
and its aftermath,
Shugg’s collection of detail and analysis of existing
social classes was a masterful work*

However, he wanted to

go farther than the data allowed in the matter of describing
actual class struggle, in this period*
is forgivable.

Exaggeration, though,

If there was no manifest class struggle,

Louisiana was the setting for a lively political struggle in
which members of farmer, worker, and planter gfpups could en~
■i
gage, (in the 1850#s there certainly was a growing sentiment
of class consciousness in Louisiana society*
class was exploiting the lower white classes*
was reflected in the vote for parties*

The upper
This solidarity

The Irish, for example,

voted Democratic because the party took care of their inter
ests.

Success and failure In the political side of society

marked the way to Secession* j
In the preceding analysis, It has already been sug
gested that the establishment of a traditional Democratic
vote and a subtle shifting of party labels and alignments
guaranteed, when the issue became crucial, that Secession
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was Inevitable• (to be sure* analysis of voting support demenstrates that the settlers of the "interior* parishes, the
farmers of the hills and prairies* brought with them and
practiced the ways of Jacksonian Democracy, j On the other
hand, it had been shown that the planters of both the sugar
and cotton country tended to line up behind different labels*
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a spelling
out of these political tendencies and their consequences*
Louisiana had become the land of the planters?1*2 and
by 13$0 Louisiana had come of age.

Most of the fertile

lands of the state were devoted to the plantation economy*
Early French and Spanish masters had followed the practice
of giving large grants of land along rivers and bayous?
hence, large-scale land-owning became an integral part of
Louisiana's development as an agricultural state.

With the

introduction of the two staples, sugar and cotton, in the
nineteenth century, the great estates already in existence
beeame even more profitable.

Slaves constituted the laboring

base of this economy, and their importation Into Louisiana in
ever increasing number before i860 meant that the vested in
terests of the planter became more and more lucrative.

The

problem is to ascertain through what political channels these
Interests were protected and forwarded.

^2W. E. Highsmlth, Louisiana Mriaa Beopnatructlan
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University,
1953), P* 16.
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At the same time, American Immigration into Louisiana
was continuing apace*

The planter having preempted the more

desirable land, the farmer pioneered the piney woods and the
empty prairies, developing a subsistence agriculture*

Un

deniably, there was a striking contrast between the ways of
life of farmer and planter as between two social worlds, but
the farmer was not voiceless* (a h electorate emerged from
both groups; and it was discovered that the farmer was a
die-hard Democrat.

He made a fine pioneer because embraced

within his political philosophy was a vital individualism;
the farmer in coonskin was the first Mrugged Individual*" ]
Sew Orleans was the "New fork" of the South*

Thou

sands of immigrants cam® to the city, many from foreign shores.
By i860 there were over 81,000 foreign-born in the city*

Of

these there were 28,207 of Irish nativity, 26,61^ people of
German lineage, and over 1^,000 from France*^

The Irish, as

a general rule, became manual workers here as elsewhere; al
though they would work indisorlmlnantly with the Negroes,
the Irish were given the privilege of the franchise*

In the

%

New Orleans of i860 the whites outnumbered the Negroes three
to one, an indication of the Importance of the white labor
vote which could be mustered*

Planter unity was a phenomenon

of the country, where Negro outnumbered white*

The City of

New Orleans regularly contributed over one-fifth of the total
state vote, and hence the Immigrant vote was one to be

**3(freer,

irfJfcM P* 387*
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reckoned with,
There were, then, in the prosperous Louisiana of the
eighteen-forties and fifties, several population elements of
political consequence*

Political parties were dependent upon

the alignments of portions of these elements*

An understand

ing of Louisiana politics circa the decade of the 1850*s re
quires an analysis of certain political tendencies * ^ The
planter element was certainly the dominant minority **- together
with the closely allied commercial interests, this element was
master of the economic resources•^
Traditionally, however, the historian has separated
this block of voters into cotton and sugar planters*

There

is evidence presented above which indicated that it is more
realistic to isolate Mplanter" Interests and identify them
with the Louisiana Whig tendency*

There was a general rap

prochement between sugar and cotton planters in the decade be
fore th® war* [the Immigrants were the groups of number*

The

farmer of the hills and prairies was numerically more power
ful than the planters of the delta; likewise, the laborer of
the city occurred in greater number than the businessman and
professional, the city cousins of the rural elite^ Determina
tion of which way these groups voted will explain the complex
of events which led to the great Secession*
In order to discover the political tendencies of the
Louisiana electorate during the fifteen year period which
preceded the Civil War, a map has been compiled which registers
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the average incidence of each parish In a quartlie computetion of the gubernatorial elections held within the period*
(See Figure 13.)

The quartlles are represented by numbers

1 - *ft from low support to high.

There were five such elec

tions 9 each won by the Democrats? usually they had also
gained control of the General Assembly.

With the aid of

the map it will be possible to ascertain the regularity of
party support within different areas of the state, and to
make a judgment concerning the groups of citizens involved.
The most striking observation which can be mad© Is
the general geographical distribution of the predominant
Democratic tendency*

It is seated within the ”interior”

where, with increasing populations, numerous new parishes
tad t ~ n c r - t l . ( a . I k t a t a . frtati.tataa tad ( » « . W

the land of these parishes*

Investigation will show that the

core group of parishes of the north Louisiana hills had
registered strong Democratic majorities In election after
election.

Lafayette Parish, on the fringe of the south

western prairies, and Calcasieu Parish both show strong Demo
cratic leanings.''] These, also, were predominantly "farmer”
areas.

One would expect to find the Florida parishes pre

eminently among the strong supporters of the Democracy?
yet this was not wholly the case.

It may b© recalled that

these parishes had been settled by Americans, also, but at
an earlier time than north Louisiana.

The Americans here had

developed a plantation economy which paralleled the way of

7*f
life of the Creole planters to the south of them*

The po

litical tendencies of these parishes were influenced by more
complex factors than had been felt by the American farmers
of the northern hills* (Plaquemines Parish sticks out like a
Democratic thumb; close to New Orleans, Its electorate was
subjected to political machinations even in those early days*
John Slidell assured the Louisiana electoral vote for Polk
in I8*f0 by floating a voting contingent down the river from
New Orleans to the Plaquemines parish seat, where a sizable
majority was registered for the Democrats*^
The sugar planters had found repose within the ranks
of the National Whigs* (The party was to die nationally,
engulfed by the issues of slavery and the force of the Aboli
tionist movement.

It could no longer hope to sustain the

alliance between north and south*

Whiggish sympathies were

not to die out in Louisiana y however; even without party,
the sugar planters and commercial alliances could not whole
heartedly support the Democratic cause.

The distribution of

Whig tendency, then, would be seated within the sugar country.)
Within the deep delta, more slavish than the parishes to the
north, the support for anti-Democratlc candidates remained
firm*

Likewise, among the parishes of the old German and

Acadian "coasts,” along the Biver above New Orleans, the Whig
tendency continued to the bitter end.

These parishes had

gained less population from immigration, and the planter unity
prevailed*

The most significant political expression within
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the period under analysis, however, Is to be found within the
cotton country of the upper Mississippi delta, and as far
north as Caddo on the Red River*

Concordia, for example,

was one of the original Louisiana parishes, and had emerged
as a supporter of Whiggery in the forties and ’fifties *
|A1though cotton was King in the southern nomocracy, yet in
Louisiana, at least, the cotton planters did not give the
undying Democratic support which was evident elsewhere*) in
the eight cotton parishes, where slaves greatly outnumbered
whites, half of them registered Whig tendencies after ISM)*
These were the four Mississippi delta parishes $ in three of
them, Concordia, Madison, and Tensas, the whites were out
numbered by ten to one, and in Carroll the ratio was three
to one*

Cotton was king and dependent upon slave labor*

Yet

prosperity was too great to risk all without first searching
for a party of moderation*

These were conservatives, and the

Whig party had been the home of conservatism as well as
aristocracy, in Louisiana* )
The conclusion to be drawn is that Louisiana had come
of age in the ’fifties, and

very definite cleavage between

conservative planter and Democratic farmer was the dominant
political tendency.) With the breakdown of the Whig party
organization and the division of the Democratic party into
Slidell and Soule factions, large groups of Louisiana voters
were left politically voiceless when the issue of Secession
became crucial*

It was too late in l86lj the conservative
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sympathy for Union* compromise, and moderation had been ren
dered helpless in the political struggle for control of the
Democratic party.
With a failure of party in i860, the forces of Slidell
captured the state for the Democracy,

The farmer groups sup

ported the "real0 Democrats* out of tradition? victory was
guaranteed.

Factional strife among the Democrats and lack

of party organisation among the old-time Whigs merged in the
presidential election of i860 in such manner that a golden
chance was missed to register a stand for moderation.

The

combined votes for the conservative Bell ticket and the com
promising Douglas ticket would have been enough to have won
the electoral vote of the state.

As it was* the Breckinridge

forces won? moderation was overwhelmed.
In the call for Secession which followed the next
year* the electorate lined up, for or against, in the elec
tion of membership for the convention. | Wow, it was farmer
and sugar planter who Joined forces —

neither desired to

resort to bloodshed in the protection of vested interests?
but there were not enough hill Democrats, or planter Whigs,
to halt the now Inevitable move for disunion • \
Inexorable circumstance had done Its work.

Party

strife

and failure, and cumulative political experience brought the
great tragedy of Secession.

And In Louisiana the tragic was

touched with irony, for, how curious that It had been Jo slab
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Quincy of Massachusetts who had protested Louisiana’s admis
sion to the Union In 1811, and the Abolitionists of
Massachusetts who vehemently protested her secession in

.

1861

CHAPTER III
A NEW LOOK AT RECONSTRUCTION
♦I certainly think that It is better to be
impetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman,
and it is necessary.••• to conquer her by force.Machiavelli

A-

E1SSS&8 1B&-1868.

A failure of par

ties destroyed the opportunity to master fortune in the events
which led to Secession,

If it were correct that the war had

been begun by and conducted for a slave-holding minority,
then the probability was certain by 186V that the dominated
majority of 1861 could become the master of Its own fate«
For Federal forces controlled the Louisiana parishes sur
rounding New Orleans and vicinity; the Confederate troops
stood in force beyond the Mississippi and up the Red River in
north Louisiana.

The people were to be allowed to pick up

the pleees of Statehood and begin afresh the political strug
gle for power.

A new Constitution was to be drawn and state

offices filled.

Within the Federal lines were the old con

servative Whigs, who at the end had stood firm for

the Union,

and remnants of the Democracy in the persons of farmer and
laborer. That farmer and laborer had built up an accumulation
of grievances was to become manifest In the constitutional
78
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instrument written in 186V*
Unionist sentiment* in 1863, was divided on the issue
of the constitution**

One group favored Negro suffrage and

held that the old constitution had been destroyed by the
Secession*

On the other hand, a more conservative group felt

that only mul&ttoes should be given the vote, and they pro
tested that the state government had been suspended, and that
It should be revived.

In January of 186V, General Banks or

dered an election be held for state offices, and further,
that in April delegates should be elected for a constitutional
convention*

The moderates nominated Michael Hahn for governor

and James Madison Wells for lieutenant-governor*

The radicals

gave opposition with the nomination of B* F. Flanders.

Upon

becoming elected to the governorfs chair, Hahn reiterated the
views of the conservatives concerning Louisiana's constitu
tional status; in March, President Lincoln transferred to him
the powers which had previously been exercised by the mili
tary governor*

The governor allowed the call for a constitu

tional convention, Issued by Banks, to stand*
The move for the Constitution of 186V, and the later
one of 1868, may be viewed as a manifestation of a social
revolution in which white labor and the newly-freed black

A . D. Da spit,
Governors1 Massages a£
t860-1900 (unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State Uni
verslty, 1932% p. 5 ff.
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successively gained ascendancy.2

It has been suggested that

the Constitution of 186^ must have been written by Loulsianans
whose memory of the problems of the state were fresh.

They

recalled the machinations whereby in 1852 the conservative
Whigs had gained unequal strength in representation at the
General Assembly.

Perhaps this was one reason why no Negro

suffrage was put forth at this time* HIt was said that any
grant of the suffrage Itself to the Negro might well serve to
re-establish the control of those on whom the Negro must de
pend for his livelihood.
This constitution, rather, was to be a vehicle whereby
the grievances of farmer and laborer would be redressed.
The suffrage was extended to all white males of twenty-one
years of age or over who could meet the one^year residence
requirement.

The constitution established representation on

the basis of qualified voters, with no restrictions placed
upon New Orleans.

It revived the 18**5 restriction on banks

and corporations.

A progressive Income tax was inaugurated.

Minimum wage and maximum hours for laborers In public work
were established.

There should be public schools for whit®

as well as for black.

Finally, slavery was abolished.

This

^R. W. Shugg , Origins &£ Class
In I m U U m
PP*
(Baton
196-197. The year 1879, then, may be viewed as the ineviIn
table counterrevolution.

^ n s tltu t^ a lD e v g l^ M iM
ulsiana (unpublished mas-

5 H t y T l 9 W , p. 73-
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was the first Louisiana constitution which had mentioned
slavery*

The constitution was ratified on July 23, with a

vote of less than the ten per cent desired by Lincoln#
Louisiana, it appeared, was off to a good start in re
establishing her Statehood#

Governor Hahn gave up his post

in 1865 to serve as United States Senator$ Wells succeeded to
the post ©f governor, and although many felt that the recently
adopted constitution was invalid, Governor Wells called for
an election for state offices that year in accord with the
provisions of the new instrument of government#

Wells was

nominated for the office of governor by the Democrats, and
another group, appreciative of the merits of Louisianavs war
time governor, Henry W. Allen, nominated him for the position#
This was little more than gesture, for Wells was elected by
a large majority#

Wells had been candidate for governor in

unsuccessful opposition to Moore in 1860| he had been a Union
sympathiser#

Wells had by proclamation given full legal

status to the Confederate parishes which had held out until
the end of the war#

His attitude was instructive*

Whatever may have been the cause of the outbreak and
however bitter may have been the feelings engendered in
the hearts of some, it is better that all such matters
be buried out of sight forever# It is not the past,
but the present and future, we have to deal with# You
must go to work to organize civil government in your
respective parishes#^

U. Norton, Headings la Saslal MSQfifi* IgBlglam
l60Q-l876 (Baton Rouges Franklin Press, 1935), P* lob#
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A contemporary sums up the feeling toward Wells In a
letter written to ex-Governor Moore, exiled In Cuba*
Governor Wells bears,.*, the same happy relation to
Louisiana that President Johnson bears to the whole
South. Their instincts, if not of the States Eights
school are yet & £ lagJkjcg t& j&e South and they are and
will show themselves to be true to their instincts*«*.
Governor Wells from a combination of circumstances *. **
jxzj the most fortunate selection which could be mad© to
carry out the true policy — « the Presidents policy
the patriot’s policy — a reconstruction of the Ghlon
on the basis of the perfect equality of the states
A study of the distribution of the election returns
in favor of Governor Wells might be instructive, revealing
some indication of the appeal of his actions*

Figure I1*

shows that in fourteen parishes Wells had received

95 per

cent of the vote or better; and there was a consistency in
the distribution*

It might be supposed that this electorate

was anxious to have the affairs of government in order once
more.

Along the entire length of the Mississippi, the par

ish vote was overwhelmingly for Wells*

These were plantation

areas; the cotton parishes of this group had moved for Se
cession, whereas the sugar parishes had been in the ranks of
the Cooperationists in i860*
more.

Wow they were in accord once

The bulk of the remaining voting interest a had followed,

as there were only five parishes which had not given a majority
vote for Wells.

5w. M. Lowry, Iftg Political £a££SE

teas JMlSffi

Wail* (unpublished master’s thesis, Louisiana State imlver-

sltyT 19*+7), P.

GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1*65
VOTE FOR JAMES WELLS
BY PARISHES
r

source

Journil of Senate. State of Louisiana. 1865
Figure 14

1st

quarter:

7.8$ - 60.0$

2nd

quarter: 61.0$ - 79.

3rd

quarter: 80.0$ - 94.0$

4th

quarter: 95.0$ Above

co
uj

The nature of the support given Wells in the ©leetion of 186J seemed to assure that Louisiana would be able
to realise a good reconstruction*

However, there were other

elements of the populace seeking political fortune from dif
ferent premises than those of Governor Wells*

The name

Warmoth first made Its appearance on the Louisiana scene $ he
was claimed by the Radical Republicans to be the delegate to
Congress for the Territory of Louisiana*

At the same time,

political fortunes on the national scene bode ill for Louisi
ana.

In 1866-67* the Republicans carried congressional elec

tions by such majorities that they became determined to
carry radical reconstruction into effect.

When Louisiana re

jected the lVth Amendment along with other southern states,
the die was cast In the National Congress.

The First Recon

struction Act of 1867 was passed, and Louisiana once more fell
under military rule*
Wells had apparently been a man of moderation and
sympathy for the problems of his statef he was also the only
governor who served during Radical Reconstruction Who had
been a native Louisianan*

After his election in 1865, how

ever, he experienced trouble with the Democratic legislature*
Although he had shrewdly enlisted the support of the numeri
cally strong and Influential ex-Conf©derates in furtherance
of his own political fortunes, the old dominant groups had
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ambitions of their own.^

Walls had pressed for th© ratifica

tion of the l*fth Amendment , but of course this did not fit
into the plans of the conservative Democrats.

But this was

no time for the ex-Confederatea to assert themselves with the
expectancy that the social and political orders would fall
back into the old slots*

The Negro problem must be solved,

but not through legislative actions bound to raise the anger
of the Northern Radicals*?

No new black code, no matter how

mild, could stand for long*

Radical Republicans were organ

ising in New Orleans, and of course they too would have am
bitions and plans of how best to attain them*
b. PQiin.qtang a t loztm .a«

J M fiam&feagg,gtst 126S-

1.876* The rapprochement of ex-Confederates with Unionists
with such views as Wells entertained might have indicated
that in a few years the former would be in a position of
dominance and security, once more.

However, this was not to

be; in 1866 Wells joined forces with the radicals and reversed
his stand on Negro suffrage.

His remarks at this time stand

as revealing testimony of the impending struggle for power
between radical and conservative.

He said, M*»*only by giv

ing all Negroes the right to vote could the large Democratic
or conservative majority possessed by the ex-Confederates in

6J. R. Ficklin, Htatorz s i
As AfisAfiiana (Through 1868) (Baltimore, 1910), pp» 10^ ff.
?Shugg, ££• brl-t*« p* 212*
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Louisiana bo overcome.”®

There could be no doubt now but

what, with the renewal of Federal supervision, the lot of
the white conservative would be dire*
General Sheridan Instituted a registration of voters
under provisions of the Reconstruction Act#

Delegates for

the constitutional convention were chosen and an equal num
ber of whites and Negroes convened in 1868. The Constitution
of 1868 was the first in Louisiana containing a Bill of
Rights; a phrase from the Declaration of independence was
utilized.
continued.

The social revolution inaugurated in 186** had been
The Negroes were granted suffrage, and the politi

cal fortune hunters who were filling New Orleans established
the residence requirements in such manner that they could
proceed to act with the full privilege of citizenship; re
strictions were placed upon unrepentant ex-Confederates.
This meant that with the aid of the native scalawags, Repub
lican domination would be guaranteed, providing the Negro
vote could be influenced.

It was possible to outnumber, or

at least to outmaneuver, the Democrats.
The Constitution of 1868 was adopted by the eligible
voters, and in the election for state offices Henry Clay
Waraoth was elected governor.
Oscar J. Dunn, a Negro.

His lieutenant-governor was

During the ensuing administration,

Louisiana was to witness an unprecedented struggle for

®Lowry,

op.

clt.. p. 119*

political powar*

Democrat and Republican alike sought to

use means, legal or otherwise, to ensure success for their
side in the quest for state offices • The Negro had become
an important political factor and «...Republican politicians
organised the Negro vote, massed it, and carried it to the
Q
polls.”
Without education and with no previous political ex
perience, the Negro was easily swayed | since the Negro popu
lation of the state was slightly larger than the white, the
inference is obvious t the Negro vote would dominate any elec
tion.

It was to combat this advantage that Democrats organ

ised such secret societies as the Knights of the White Camella
in order to intimidate the Negro and to secure white supremacy
Prior to the gubernatorial election of 1872, then, the
Louisiana Democrats became radicals*

Finding peaceful means

to gain the upper hand would fail, they utilized their “white
man's association*”

Warmcth had charged the former govern

ing group with disgraceful acts of intimidation as early as
the presidential election of 1868* Reconstruction was in
full swing in 1871 j but as occurs in any power struggle of
such open admission as this, coalitions were transitory*
The Republicans commenced to quarrel among themselves, and
two factions emerged, each with a candidate for governor*
One faction consisted of the governor, Warmoth, and his sup
porters* the other faction consisted of the “customhouse
crowd,” which handled patronage and was close to the Radicals

^Norton, pp. clt♦« pp# 192-193•
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of the National Congress*

The former group nominated John

McKnery for governor, while the candidate of Packard and the
customhouse group was William Pitt Kellogg*
In this quarrel the Democrats thought they saw an op
portunity, and they fused with the farmoth faction in opposition to Kellogg*

When the returns came in, victory was

claimed by Mc&iery, but the rival "returning board11 of the
Kellogg group counted victory for their faction*

Two rival

governments were set up? but the customhouse group gained of
ficial recognition from the Federal government, and the count
of their Returning Board was established*
It is a political paradox worth noting*0 that the Demo
crats, who had heaped so much scorn upon Waraoth earlier,
should now have gone down in defeat with him*

For, given

the alignment of support they were able to muster, the move
of the Democrats for fusion had seemed a wise one*

The re

turns which had been made official gave Kellogg a majority
of over 17,000 votes; the Hew Orleans compilation was allowed
to stand with a 6,000 majority for McBnery*

The Republicans

piled up their count, apparently, in the parishes with large
Negro registration, where it could be safely assumed they
were strong.
In defeat, the distribution of the fusion support for
MeEnery demonstrates the part the Democrats had played*

*°Horton,

£££*, p. 196*

(See Figure 15.)

The parishes of the northern hills and of

the southwestern prairies, and the Floridas, registered anew
their Democratic tendencies.

The vote from West Feliciana

Parish, one of the richest plantation districts in ante
bellum days, was pro-Republiean, but the Florida parishes to
the east, where the Negro was less numerous, tended to sup
port the Democratic cause*

Already in emergence is to be

found the "fracture line" of subsequent Louisiana politics*
The parishes along the length of the Red and the Mississippi
rivers show a unity of electoral support, in 1872, of course,
held together by the vote of the Negro. Here the pattern
that is going to be typical in the future appears for the
first time

but "in reverse," so to speak*

This was a struggle to the political death*

Governor

Kellogg showed no disposition toward moderation! his rule was
absolute.

Louisiana became an armed camp in l8?3 as a result

of the "Colfax riot" which had resulted In the death of a
number of Negroes*

Federal authorities had a necessary ex

cuse for keeping troops in the state*

The Negro had found a

place in Louisiana politics, but his position was an uncom
fortable one.

Salvation of the state lay in overthrowing the

rule of the Negro, the Democratic majority of the whit©
people of Louisiana believed.

It might be true that the Negro

became the scapegoat in the development of this critical
situation in the state.

“It is...* impossible to trace White

political Issues and cleavages without reference to the Negro
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as the common enemy, the red herring across all political
trails
The point of view has merit, but It has generally been
utilised incorrectly.

in 1865, during the constitutional de

bate, it was seen that neither the Democrats nor the Conserva
tive Unionists had been for Negro suffrage$ but since such a
fact as Negro suffrage was to become a political reality,
most certainly the conservative Democrats would have developed
sentiment one way or another concerning it*

Negro suffrage

was a s t e m reality, and the block of Negro votes became
enormously important.

It was a support worth struggling for

if political fortune was the goal.
The first inclination was to attempt to discredit the
Negro at the polls $ the planter would insure that his former
slave would look ridiculous as a citlsen.

The events which

actually followed lend credence to the remarks of P. B. S*
Pinchbeck, Louisiana's only Negro governor?
Democrats In many portions of the state instigated
and thrust forward the most ignorant colored men that
could be found for election to the Constitutional Con
vention with the view of making that Constitution
/l 86Jy a farcef and In order to make success certain,
they put no competing candidate in the field.... The
illiterate men returned home successful statesmen and
from that day to this nearly every man In Louisiana has
felt himself every inch a statesman and from this policy
has arisen in a great degree the ignorance that has found
its way into the public offices of our state.

n P. Levinson, Race. Class, agd Early (New York*
Oxford University Press, 1932;, p. **>
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There were other ways of attempting to meet the problem of
manipulation of the Negro vote*

After the defeat of 1872,

in the looal elections which preceded the next gubernatorial
election, the Democrats prepared for drastic action*

The

Shreveport Times published this warning?
The carpetbaggers * careers are ended } we are deter**
mined to tolerate them no longer} and if they care for
their infamous necks, they had better stop their work
right now and look out for a safer field for rascality * ■*
Federal control made it impossible to overthrow Negro rule in
a legal manner, so it was decided to circumvent Negro domina
tion by subterfuge or extralegal action*
In 1876, the Democrats overcame the carpetbaggers}
and since there was an Increase in the total vote of over
30,000, it is not feasible to believe that they won by sup
pressing the Negro vote, though they might have stuffed ballot
boxes.

In fact, the Democrats went all out to woo and win

the Negro to their cause.

The cumulative results of carpet

bag misrule likewise weighed heavily against the Republicans.
Particularly, the exploitation of the state coffers by these
political adventurers, and the fact that the Negro had gained
little by these financial maneuvers, weakened Republican
chances*

It became evident early in the campaign that the

Negro vote would again play the deciding factor, and the
P i c a 17*? keynoted the policy of the Democrats?

^uorton, 211* £l&*» P* 196*
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We must convince the Blacks that we are In earnest In
our expression of good will, and they, for their part,
must evince a disposition to meet us half way* As ours
is the superior race, at least by culture and experi
ence, it becomes us to take the Initiative * bet us en
deavor to persuade the colored people that an alliance
of the two races Is necessary to the preservation of
their common safety* *
This policy must have borne fruit, as the Democratic candi
date, Francis T* Nicholls, from Lafourche Parish, polled a
clear majority over the Republican candidate, Packard*
An Inspection of the distribution of the Nicholls vote
will indicate, however, that If the Negro had voted Democratic
in some numbers, the resultant was a general spread of the
total vote; for it is clear from the compiled map that the
parishes predominantly Negro were still foremost In the Repub
lican count*

(See Figure 1 6 .)

Future events were to prove

that the Democratic party control remained with the old
planter elite. They won their victory, however, with the
strong support of the farmers vote.

The bulk of the highest

quartlle of the Nleholls* parish vote was distributed in the
hills and prairies.

The ancient Democratic prejudice re

mained a factor to be reckoned with*
And what of the old Whig country?

All of the parishes

of the sugar country were predominantly Negro; together with
New Orleans they were the seats of Republican strength.
Coupled with remaining Negro strength In Red River and

l!+H. M. McDaniel, Francis Tlllon
ills Had.
of Reconstruction (unpublished master1® thesis, Louisiana
State University, 19**° )j p. 29*
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Mississippi delta parishes, the Republicans were formidable*
Still, whit© Democrats had achieved a signal victory, but
there was no pronounced political change, in the results of
this election, either way*

One student of the period sum-*

m&rized*
The change of political control did not bring forth
any outstanding modification of political principles nor
any great improvement in public morals* With the excep
tion of Governor NichoILs and a few others, the new pub
lic servants were not especially concerned with
improving the lot of the masses.1?
Governor NichoILs had promised not to be counted out
by a carpetbag Returning Board should he be elected; he
would beat the Republicans at their own game*

After a year

of Republican opposition, in 1877 President Hayes recognised
the HichoUs government, and Federal troops were withdrawn
from Louisiana*

Packard surrendered the State House to the

White League; "Reconstruction" was over*

This event did not

signal the establishment of white supremacy, however, for
there were still many parishes where Negroes were entrenched
in local office.

Likewise, one of the institutions of Re

construction, the Louisiana Lottery Company, remained a
force of political influence*

It had donated funds to the

administration in 1877 and, with great strength in the legis
lature, was seeking to perpetuate its Influence by an exten
sion of Its charter, first established in 1868*

**0. McOinty, Louisiana Redeemed (New Orleans* Pelican
Publishing Co*, 1 9 W ), pp* 2*f7-2H-o*
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Hicholls began his opposition whidh was to culminate
successfully in 1892$ lie vetoed the legislative enactment*
The Lottery Company gained relief from the Federal courts,
however, and in 1879 Joined its influence with the leglslature in a move for a constitutional convention.

This was

the inevitable counterrevolution of the movements of 186s*
and 1868.

It was not surprising that the Constitution of

1879 should have imposed strong restrictions upon the legis
lature and granted the executive powers rivaling 1812.
As it appeared on paper, this constitution was not a
reactionary instrument! there had been no move to disenfran
chise the Negro at this time.

Of course such an action was

prohibited by fear of the action of the Federal government*
No, it was the attitude of the new ruling group which was
reactionary, as the events of subsequent decades were to show*
The actions of 1879 mark the emergence of the wlllywhites,w
for the Democratic party, under the direction of the conserva
tives, became the tt.♦institutionalized incarnation of the
will to White Supremacy
It was the planter-merchant elite which re-emerged
triumphant.

White support for the new Democracy might have

appeared solidary, but the ability to use the hindsight of
the present day suggests that the dominant group in the Demo
cratic party would make the moves to protect its position

l6». J* Cash, The Blind of tfoe South (New Yorks Alfred
A • Knopf, 19^1), P* 128.

9?
whenever the tine and the event should present Itself*

Any

rebel would have to oppose the established hierarchy of the
one political party to achieve redress of a grievance*

In

the end, the Yankee failed in his mission to Reconstruct the
South and especially the southern attitudes*

Cash reminds us*

So far from having reconstructed the Southern mind**.*
in Its essential character, it was the Yankee’s fat© to
have strengthened It almost beyond reckoning, and to have
made it one of the most solidly established, one of the
least
©*er developed*1”
C. 22& BffiftSfflPMfl fi£ £ & LJJLygMteg. ( ?he experience of
Reconstruction took on proportions of a first class traumatic
episode within the ideological structure of Louisiana’s
governing elites a political bill of goods was fashioned
which depicted carpetbag political adventurer and Negro sup
porter as the bogeymen*| Catharsis lay in action designed to
perpetuate forever the assurance of political supremacy.
^ Drawing from the experience of the past, elements of
both Whig and Jacksonian philosophy were accepted as dogma
The planter groups, which had shown a tendency toward political
alliance, before the issue of Secession arose, were to con
tinue the spirit of Whiggeryf and the farmer groups, whose
Democratic tradition was utilised by elements of the former
groups before the War, were to continue to be susceptible to
the appeals of Jacksonian Democracy*
However, the struggle for power was to become more

17Ibid.. p. 107.
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naked, and groups of cotton planters, using the machinery of
the Democratic party to their own ends, were to fall to prac
tice the political responsibility which had gone hand in
hand with the political authority of the old sugar country
Whig*

In revamping the economic losses brought by the War,

the sons of planters became ,frugged individualistsw and man
aged, through continued alliance with city commercial inter
ests and the establishment of an avaricious credit system,
to maintain the dominance of large-scale agriculture* 'j It has
been concluded that IT**.the end result was that the dogma of
an individualistic democracy became the accepted political
lA
theory of a state permeated with the spirit of thlggery*nA
It has been said that Reconstruction ended with the
withdrawal of Federal troops In 1877# (A recent evaluation
ofthe period, however, Indicates that

more realistic, if un

popular, justification lies In closing the period with the
Democratic success in the elections of I8 7 B ^

j In this year

white supremacy was established through Democratic fraud,
violence and Intimidation against the ffegro*

A contemporary

had written*
The election of 1878 marked the final overthrow of
the Bepublican party in Louisiana* In 1878 we had
elected Nicholls governor on a state ticket, but it took
1878 to finish the work# So complete was the overthrow
of the Radical-Republlcan-Uegro party**.* at that

l®Prothro, g£# cit*f p« 15^.
19,
^ 0 . A. Singletary,
Heassertlon &£ flUta
in Louisiana (unpublished master1s W e s is, Louisiana State
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election, that from that time to this, It has never been

able to elect a constable, even in the parish. "
The Democrats were taking no chances and fanned the flame of
white solidarity;^ reigns of terror had been established In
several parishes in an attempt to intimidate the Negro.
These disclosures are revealing, as they indicate the extent
to which Reconstruction experience became a rationalization
Justifying actions as severe as had been practiced earlier by
the former rulersj and this after 1876, when the whites had
attempted to persuade the Negro that a vote for the Democrats
was more in line with his Interest.
Singletary has revealed the duplicity of the whites*
action.

Their first reaction had been non-recognition of

the facts of 1878, but the Democrats were actually too proud
of their achievements to remain discreetly quiet.

The claim

was prevalent that the Negroes had voluntarily voted the
Democratic ticket, but the facts of actual violence robbed
this argument of support. ^ A favorite theme of Democratic
rationalization was that the actions were not the resultant
of prejudice against the Negro as Negro, but against the
Negro as a political leader. ; "From a moral viewpoint, the
negro was, on the average, a good citizen$ the negro
politician vile.

From a political viewpoint, both were

2QIbld.« quoted from letter of Newton C. Blanchard
to John R.Fieklin, Feb. 9* 1903*
21Ibid.. p. 66 ff.

100
go
bad.*

j
.

(Therefore, whether "accidentally" or "Incidentally/*

tha Negro In 1878 became the object of white terror based
primarily on political grounds*

The inescapable conclusion

is that in 1878 the Republican party was not given a free
ballot in a fair election. \
Ifhe emergence of the reality of White Supremacy,
through the use of such desperate measures, marked the mood

of the time.^ The important question to answer la this con
nection is who gave doctoral support to the standard bearers

of this movement, (a planter-merchant elite reestablished
itself in the political saddle, but it could stay there only
through gaining support of the farmer groups and a portion
of the Negro group, or through intimidation of either or both.)
The thesis that race prejudice, per se, united the
whites after the War in the ascendancy of the Democratic
party must be

re-examined.^

It has been supposed that the

presence of the slave before the War had given the poor and
white, farmer and laborer, a privileged position on the
social ladder.

There was someone lower t© be looked down

upon| hence, the farmer did not turn justifiable rage against
the wealthy planter who had dominated him politically.

Bace

prejudice filled the void of class hatred. (^The .Tacksonians
of the forties could effectively escape the fear of the

22Ibld.. p. 68.
“^Stage's popular contention.

ioi
Negro, whereas the farraer-Democrat of the Seventies and
’eighties could not afford to ignore hiza*^
Bat is It absolutely necessary to hold that the Jack*
sonian hill-farmer should have been concerned about the race
problem unless his way of life were threatened?

then he

would quite naturally protest the necessity of fighting someone else’s war.
absence in

After all, the Negro was conspicuous by his

the areas of settlement predominantly farmer.

r

(Moreover, as Cash has pointed out, the farmer of the south
was not directly exploited by the plantation system, @ither$
the farmer could act as a relatively free agent within society.

/ Could not the old Jacksonian think for himself and

vote his traditional beliefs?

We shall never know, for

aside from the evidence of his vote there is no record.

The

hill-farmer as the south Louisiana Cajun had no press through
which to articulate his opinions, for such mediums of communi
cation were established and dominated by the self-styled
aristocracy of planter-merchants*
The events of the l880*s would more likely substanti
ate the thesis concerning incipient class struggle and the
fanning of the flame of racial prejudice.

Economic exploita

tion of the farmer would become more apparent through the
development of the crop lien system.

The white family farmer

became dependent on the cotton merchant through indebtedness,
and the merchants and planters controlled the (new)

2lfCash, ££• cit.« p# 39*
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Democratic party

Hera lay the foundation for group strug

gle culminating in the political explosion of the 1890*s*
With fears of economic insecurity, the farmer might admit to
the compulsion of using the Hegro as the political whipping
hoy, just as In another age the fear of the communist threat
was to lead good•hearted men to condone the slander of the
Liberal*
D* MLttftrtfr &

& & m u g ’ 1879-1892* If the domi

nating elements of the Democratic party were prepared to
fight to make the state safe for white democracy, then they
must turn to the hills for support*

Without the threat of

the Hegro vote, experience had shown the natural majority of
the Democratic party support in the state*

The quest for

political supremacy was more arduous now and required the
dogma of solidarity*

An investigation of the distribution of

the Democratic support by parishes, in the period of a little
more than a decade in the Eighties, will reveal the pattern
of success of the lllywhites*

An election by election dis

cussion will be followed by a summary and evaluation of the
tendencies which are revealed*
In 1879, following the successful ratification of the
new constitution, the Democrats elected Louis A. Wilts
governor of Louisiana*

Of the total vote cast, 63.5> per cent

was in favor of Wilts\ his majority of over thirty-one thou
sand was a large increase over the rather close majority of
some eight thousand which Nicholas had received in 1876.
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Significantly, there was a sharp decrease in the number of
Negro rotes, assuming that the Negro rote was a Republican
rote.

Since the total white rote was smaller, also, in

1879, the indication is that some thirty thousand fewer
Negroes had gone to the polls; and there were more Negroes
registered than white voters#

Suggestion of intimidation

once again appears when an Inspection Is made of the distributton of voting support#
Although the support for the Republicans remained
seated in the sugar country of the southern delta, in the
election under discussion, the continuation of the political
"fracture line" up the Red River and along the upper Missis
sippi delta appears disrupted#

The parishes Involved were

composed of populations of Negroes outnumbering the whites#
Since the voter registration figures favor the Negroes, also,
only one conclusion is feasible*
Ten parishes registered a Democratic vote of more than
98 per cent#

This was solidarity; or it might just as re*

alistlcally have been the effect of Intimidation or machine
pressure#

Host of these parishes had consistently given Demo

cratic majorities, but never such proportions as these#
Likewise, the predominant group in each was the farmer#

These

were the hill parishes where the Negro had never resided in
great number; at least this was the situation in most of the
ten parishes under consideration#

In the two decades since

i860 the Negro had actually migrated in large number into the

ICft
parishes bordering Arkansas*

Winn and Sabine had shorn de

creases in Negro population*
The incidence of this high voting percentage, however,
would not assume such significant proportions were it not
for the fact that it occurred In a clustering of parishes*
(See Figure 17«)

Stretching from Franklin and Richland, on

Macon Ridge, to Sabine and Vernon, on the Texas border, the
group is broken only by the parishes through which the Red
River flows, and of course the planter was the dominant ele
ment here.

Almost all of the parishes fringing this Demo

cratic core area had also produced relatively high votes for
the sane party.
The factor which counts heavily in favor of interpret
ing this pheaxmesioa as a demonstration of Democratic manipu
lation Is the diversity of the composition of the population
in some of the parishes.

Desoto, to the west, and Ouachita,

Richland, and Franklin on the eastern fringe, were parishes
where planter interests were great and where the Negro popu
lation outnumbered the whitej and in the case of Ouachita,
there was also the commercial town of Monroe to take into con
sideration.

Ouachita gained around 3,000 in Negro population

from 1800 to 1880.

In the core parishes of the hills, the

Democratic tendency was already strong; it had not been so
readily visible in the parishes of the fringe.
This pattern of voter solidarity again appeared in
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the next gubernatorial election of 188***

(See Figure 18.)

Once more the seat of Republican opposition is found in the
sugar country, with some vestiges of Republican tendency
showing in Grant and East Carroll*

However, this time,

there were twelve parishes with a vote favoring the Demo
cratic candidate, McEnery, by more than 98 per cent.

West

Carroll and Tensas Joined the block of solid Democratic par
ishes, and these had compiled votes of over 80 per cent for
the Democratic candidate the previous election*

The former,

another Macon Ridge parish, was predominantly an area of
farmers, although the Negro population outnumbered the white,
in the population count of this decade.

But East Carroll,

on the Mississippi, was planter dominated in contrast to a
large farmer class in West Carroll*

In the former the

Negroes outnumbered the whites by ten to one; the proportion
was nearly equal in West Carroll*

Tensas was a parish of

planters which had, of course, registered high Republican
votes in the years of Negro support of the carpetbaggers*
The results of the gubernatorial election of 1888 show
a slightly different distribution of voting support*
Figure 19*)

(See

There was not only the appearance of gaps in

the block of sugar parishes which favored the Republican party,
there also appeared to be a shift in the distribution of par
ishes with strong Democratic leanings.

Seven of tho parishes

which had given over 98 per cent of support to the Democrats
continued to do so; and two new parishes, Morehouse and
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Madison, were added to the list*

However, West Carroll and

Richland, registered less support in this election.

Like

wise, Winn Parish, in the heart of the hills, no longer ap
proached one hundred per cent solidarity in its voting
tabulations*

Cameron and East Feliciana round out the group

of parishes which approached perfect unity*

The lure of

Democratic solidarity was fading, or the accomplishments of
Democratic administrations, perhaps, was not all to be desired.
The most significant aspect of these political tenden
cies which were expressed in the l880*s lies in the emergence
of the events of the next decade*
below in the following section.

This will be discussed
However, this phenomenon of

Democratic solidarity also must be viewed in light of the
actions of the time.

The Democrats had regained control of

state politics in the "seventies, and although the Republi
cans remained a determined, if out-voted opposition, they
continued to put up a ticket for each gubernatorial election*"^
To win elections, the Democrats had to somehow counter the
numerical strength of the Negro vote.
Unless some other alternative is brought forward, the
thesis must stand that the emergence of the Bourbon Lilywhites
was a political paradox.

Their support would have to come

from plantation-Negro areas of cotton country and from farmer
areas; but these groups had nothing to gain from acceptance

25P. D. TJzee,
?SXXt*lSSL ill Loolalana. 18771900 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Uhiversity, 1950).
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of such political bedfellows*

Ota the planter-merchant group

which dominated the Democracy sell the farmer the idea that
the Negro in politics was bad for him, or did they control
the vote In both Negro and farmer areas?
The necessity for white solidarity had been forwarded
by the dominant minority*
prophecy11

The theory of the “self-fulfilling

states that as people define the social situation

so it shall become through their consequent actions*

The

grand old Democratic party was threatened by the vote of the
Negro, so he must become a scapegoat*

Racial hatred might

have been an exaggeration of the Bourbon, but the solidarity
of the farmer was a reality.
The most striking Democratic success at the polls in
this period occurred in those parishes where a unified front
was least needed*

Solidarity would mean little in the ten

parishes with a support of over

98

per cent for the Demo

cratic candidate of 1879, for example*

For the combined vote

of these parishes would have been but a third of the majority
of the total Democratic vote for governor*

Moreover, the

combined white registration outnumbered the Negro registra
tion almost two to one*

What the Democrats wanted, then,

must have been control of the local parish political machinery,
to augment their state-wide control? and no logic could deny
that the predominant farmers groups of these parishes would

^ R . E* Merton, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,M The
Antioch Review (Summer, 1 9 W *

Ill
prefer white to Negro control in the political offices on
the leeal level.
As the voting results of the decade have shown, there
was little trouble in gaining solidarity*

In this endeavor

the Democrats were eminently successful, if the statistics
have any meaning.

It would be far easier to control a par

ish where the predominant political tendency had always been
Democratic, and where the Negro vote was small.

The politi

cians were intent upon spreading the techniques of sueee&s
as widely as possible! and in the end it would prove easier
to deal with the Negro populations than with the whites of
certain parishes, at least.

Whereas in the political strug

gle the party could draw upon a traditional vote in the farm
areas and forward the ideology of racial solidarity, events
were to prove that in the accompanying economic sphere the
patent lack of a union of interests in this alignment worked
against the Bourbon.
Competent research has amply demonstrated the fact
that by the end of the 1880*3 the plantation system had not
only survived in Louisiana, but had also become established
as the predominant agricultural s y s t e m . T h e political con
sequence of this is the fact that the agrarian base of the
old Jacksonian Democracy, Louisiana style, was destroyed!

27Shugg, SSL* sit.; also W. B. Highsmith, Louisiana
During Reconstruction (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loulslana State University, 1953)* Highsmith had special Census
data which Shugg had not used.
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gone was the self-sufficiency of the frontier farmer, gone,
in fact, the frontier*

The pre-Civil War pattern of large

land-holdings still prevailed In the delta lowlands, and al
though the farmers of the hills still worked their small
plots, they devoted their efforts to raising cotton*

Many

farmers enjoyed a prosperity rivaling the planterf hat the
results of one-crop farming were Insidious*

As more and more

Louislanans devoted their lands to cotton, the crop lien be
came established*

In bad years Indebtedness Increased,

f a n s were lest through forfeiture, and farmers were forced
into tenancy*

An economic situation was established whereby

the farmer class might find itself building up new and real
resentments toward the planter-merchant elite which could
manage to ride out the failure of a bad crop*
The difference in the Incidence of Negro participation
in elections was striking to the south, In the sugar country.

Here was seated the continued support of Republicanism in
28
Louisiana during the l880!s.

The party had survived, after

1877, due to the fact that it controlled the Federal patron
age in the state during much of the period from 1877 to 1900*
Funds were available with which to maintain party organiza
tion and a sizable following*

However, this factor alone

cannot explain away the large Negro vote in the sugar country
which brought to the Republicans the label of the MBlaok"party.

2^Uzee, ££*
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To be sure, the predominant Negro registration would
guarantee a Republican majority in most sugar parishes, but
the question could be asked as to why the Negro could vote
here while his participation in elections was discouraged in
cotton country*

In the first place, the sugar plantation, al

though it had been devastated by the events of the War years,
had remained the stable economic unit of the area*

large

land-holdings were maintained and sharecropping was far less
prevalent.

let, the primary conclusion concerning lack of

widespread Negro intimidation in south Louisiana must be a
sociological one*

There was a cultural tradition 'manifest

in the French background and the presence of the Catholic
Church.

The more "tolerant" mood in regard to Negro voting

in sugar country also happened to coincide with the planters'
Republican leanings, which were of an economic basis.

E. JQ& Ponullst-Bepubllcan fotgAw

lft.92-3.9PQ.

Becon-

struction, as generally viewed, had ended by 1880, but po
litical reconstruction was not over, for the ascendancy of
the Bourbon-Democrat was not fully assured; and the assertion
of the Dogma of White Supremacy not fully accepted.

The

Populist Party appeared on the Louisiana scene in the elec
tion of 1892 and made its strongest inroads in that part of
the area of Democratic solidarity which had been manifest In
the eighties.

The success of the Populists was to set up a

severe challenge to the continued supremacy of the Bourbons;
to maintain their economic security there was nothing more

1!**
rewarding than political success.
The Democrats had somehow established a solid front
against the opposition of the Black Republicans; but now the
farmer groups, upon whom the Democrats had depended so heavily,
became Populists, in head-on conflict with the party of their
formerly Intense preference.

The Democrat had shown the

farmer of the l8809s that In unity there was strength; how
well the farmer had learned his lesson would be demonstrated
In the political battles of the 1890*8.

It could be held

that the Bourbons no longer needed the support of the farmer;
but the actions of the Democrats in the decade of the nineties
in Louisiana were to dispel this notion.
Why did the farmer of the hills lose faith and disavow
the established Democratic solidarity?

The answer to that

question can be stated in socio-economic terms.

The movement

for Populist-Republican fusion became one in which elements
of farmer groups became class conscious and joined others who
sought economic redress through political action.

Self-

sufficiency for the farmer had vanished with the passing of
the frontier, and the heavy concentration upon the one cash
crop of cotton, served to place him in an untenable situation.
He was under the mercy of the merchants of the country towns;
with a crop failure the farmer must find credit to fill his
needs or lose farm and go down into tenancy.

The conclusion

is valid that "••• the plantation system not only survived,
with modifications of labor and finance, but extended to the
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upland farms to make trouble for the future*h2^

This pattern

was not peculiar to Louisiana, but was a familiar on® through
out the south.
The historian of Populism, John H i c k s , p l a c e d the
movement in the common perspective of the south and the
nation when he wrote:
The Populist Party was almost exclusively a farmers1
affair. Its roots lay In the acute agricultural distress
that overtook both the New West and the New South toward
the end of the eighties* Impressed with the occasional
effectiveness of labor unions and eager to win compar
able victories for agriculture, the farmers of both sec
tions began to band themselves together into farm orders
of various names and natures *31
Two great branches, the Northern and the Southern Alliances,
met with great success in their forays into local and state
wide politics*

So much so, that in 1892 a movement was ini

tiated to merge the two into a national People’s Party*
This was accomplished despite much southern reluctance in

making a move for a third party which might upset the newly
won White Supremacy*

There could be found little reluctance

amongst the Louisiana Populists when they went into political
battle in the gubernatorial election of 1892*
In 1892 the Lottery issue split the parties with the
results that four candidates were entered in the race for

29ghugg,
clt*. p. 273 1 Highsmith, 22* Jail** Ch. X
"Problems of Money ana Lands
3°J. D. Hicks, 2&e Ponallst HfiZ2l£ (Minneapolis*
University of Minnesota Press, 19317.
31J. D, Hicks, The American Nation (Boston* Houghton
Mifflin Co., 19*+?), p. 2 % .
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governor.

The Democrats split between the factions headed

by Morphy J • Foster and ex*-Governor MeEnery• Fearing that
solidarity would be breached, the Democrats called for a
state-wide vote to solve the Issue of candidacy.

This move

ves the forerunner of the party primary in Louisiana *32
Mefinery was the candidate of the Lottery Company, although
he denied the claim*

When Foster became the choice of the

Democrats, McBnery decided to run anyway*
the Lottery in the legislature*

Foster had fought

He was a gentleman from St.

Mary, and in the fight against the Lottery he had gained
many friends.

It has been said that he had w..* led the

forces of morality to victory over the graft and corruption
that permeated the state government •n33
If it were true that the Democratic dogma required ab
solutes, then they had found the man for the Job, a man
versed in the imagery of persuasion.

Concerning the Lottery

he had asked "... the mothers of this land when they kneel
with their little ones at prayer to teach them to prays
Lead us not into this temptation, deliver us from this evil
and save us from this polluting monster."^

32S. J. Romero, Jr.. l&e faH.Upftl £&£&££ SL Morpto Jtor’s thesis, Louisiana State Univer
lbid.T p. 19*
quoted from New Orleans New Deltar
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The Republican® were split, also, over the Lottery
question, with the WArmoth Faction opposing, while the
Kellogg faotion championed it*

the former group nominated

John S. Breaux, and the latter nominated Albert H. Leonard.
The newly organised People's Party nominated R. L. Tannehlll.
The Lottery issue was robbed of significance prior to the
election when the TJhlted States Supreme Court upheld the con*
stltutionallty of the anti-lottery postal law.^5>
Something was wrong with the old Democratic unity,
when the "real* candidate of the party, Foster, was given but
¥*■•? per cent of the total vote cast*

Even without the de

fection of MeEnery, the Democratic party would have polled
some six per cent less votes than in the previous guberna
torial election*

In this situation, the Republicans might

well become enthusiastic about chances in the next elections*
Even though the Lottery question had lost force, yet the can
didates had lined up more or less on that basis*

Hence it

is interesting to find the quite sharp split in the vote be
tween north and south Louisiana,

Perhaps the issue of the

Lottery had a religious or cultural connotation*

At any rate,

the distribution of highest parish support for the candidacy
of Foster clustered along the Arkansas Border in north Loui
siana, although he was at home in south Louisiana,

35uzee, o p . qifr

Here, in
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south Louisiansy the only overwhelming *oster support was
found in St, Mary and neighboring Acadia and St. JShrtin*
The Floridas were likewise safe for the democracy.
Support for the candidacies of MeEnery and the Repub**
liean hopefuls was seated in south Louisiana almost exclu
sively, save for the Republican support of Leonard in Tensas.
(See Figure 20.)

Leonard, fro® Caddo, received pluralities

in seven parishes strung along the Mississippi from Points
Coupee to St. Charles.

In this election, at least, the color

line was not apparent in the political support within the
area.

The emergence of this situation made the possibilities

of new alignments in the quest for political supremacy more
certain.
The highly significant result of this election of
1892 was the emergence of support for the Peopled Party?
but the significance lies not so much In the support, but in
its location.

(See Figure 21.)

The break of the near-

perfect solidarity in behalf of the Democrats which had ex
isted in the hills in the eighties was the acre striking in
its suddenness • Tet, the beginning of the shift of the uni
fied support to the parishes of the Arkansas border was seen
In 1888. Five parishes, in 1892, registered pluralities In
favor of the Peopled Party, and this when there were four
other choices.

Each of these parishes was comprised of a

farmer population, where the whites outnumbered the Negroes.
Moreover, there were seven other parishes with a sizable
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Populist veto clustered adjacent to the core group $ and In
these parishes there were also goodly numbers of white farm*
ers*

In fact, the whole group of parishes with these Popu

list leanings comprise the bulk; of what are popularly known
as the “hill parishes'* of Louisiana*
From the hills of north Louisiana, then, to the piney
woods of Washington Parish, the farmer had sought a voice to
protest his concern at the condition of things*

the economic

ailments confronting him evidently could not be cured by the
party of his traditional choice*

Conscious of himself as

part of a specific grouping within Louisiana society, the
action of the farmer indicated he no longer was willing to
put up a solid political front along with the planter, In
behalf of the quest for White Supremacy; the Populist farmer
became elass conscious.
The untenable situation in which the farmer found him
self, as the eighties became history and he faced the nineties,
was one of crisis.

Once before, the farmer had faced crisis,

in 1361, at which time he had voiced his protest, in vain,
in opposition to the impending Secession.

The farmer had re

mained a Democrat after the war and through the struggles of
reconstruction.

Now, the pleasure of solidarity was not

enough, since it had brought no great benefits to the vast
majority of the Louisiana farmer groups.
In the decade of the 1890*s chances looked as good for
the Republicans as for the Democrats.

The bulk of
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carpet bagger-sc&lawag influence had h a w softened and the
opportunity for fusion with the "people* of the white race
fhe election of 1896 found the Democrats

had been found*

facing a three-headed opposition comprised of the union of
Republicans, disgruntled sugar growers, and the People *s
Party*

fhe sugar Interest were hurt by the Tariff of 189**>

and these planters, many ex-Democrats, Joined forces with the
opposition.

Considering the cluster of anti-Foster support

in the sugar country in the previous election, it is not sur
prising that a community of interests could be established*
The Democrats ran Foster for a second term as governor In
opposition to the Fusion.
fhe Hegro vote again became a factor of great impor
tance, and the Democrats made much of the distasteful political
bedfellows embraced by the Fusion, and particularly the Popu
list element •

It is not known whether the Fusion candidate,

J. B. Pharr of the Peopled Party, spoke for the membership
of his party or not, but his words concerning the Hegro in
I896 were far different from the views of the Democrats 1
I was reared with the Hegro and worked side by side
with him for twenty odd years. I may say for all my
life, I never have found him other than a good laborer
and as honest as most other men* If he has*cut a bad
figure in politics, we are to blame for It***
For good or bad, the Negro still had a vote in 1896,
and this worried the Democrats.

^Romero,

op*

Foster had fought for the

clt.. p. 76,
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unity of hia party all his political career, and the elec
tion of 1896 was to he his toughest battle.

He had believed

that only with the Democrats in power could the commonwealth
prosper, and of course this meant the Negro vote must somehow
be managed $ this meant White Supremacy.

The main issue of

the election of 1896 for the Bourbon Democrats was the prob
lem of Negro suffrage*
Not only did the intrusion of the problem of Negro
suffrage irk the Fusion, which stood to gain by the Negro
vote, also, the Populists had become antagonistic to Foster
as a result of the governors action while in office his
first ten.

The Louisiana Populist had claimed that "...the

first thing Foster did after he was counted into office was
to take the farmers by the nape of their necks and the slack
of their trousers and dump them outside the party lines.
If the faner wanted to try his luck with the Peopled Party,
then the Democrats could do without him; and the election re
sults proved the Democrats to be correct.
When the voting returns were counted, It was revealed
that the Democrats had won with 56.2 per cent of the total
vote.

Foster claimed 116,216 votes to Pharr1s 90,136*

Fraud was claimed, and with some justification, since Foster*&
largest majorities came from parishes where the Negro

37ftomero, ££• £ & m

P* 61+*

IZh

registration was heaviest*3®

$he Fusionists were sure the

Democrats had stuffed the ballot boxes and insured victory*
Ho one will ever know? but after an investigation of the cir
cumstances, each may draw his own conclusion*
The distribution of the parish support of Foster shows
the marked pattern of the fracture line in Louisiana politics*
(See Figure 22*)

It shows the Foster support in the parishes

of the Bourbon Democrats, where to this day the large propor
tion of Louisiana’s Negro population resides*

Very signifi

cant was the strong voice of the farmer manifested In the
"People’s1* vote of West Carroll*

The faimer was anti-Democratic

party wherever he predominated a parish in 1896.
The motto of the Democrats in I896 was apparently "if
you can’t beat ’em, keep ’em away from the polls•** The sup
port of the Fusion, as registered in the count which was
made official, was seated in those parishes where the Negro
was not predominant.

(See Figure 23*)

In general, the par

ishes which had shown Populist tendencies in 1892 were the
ones where the Fusion of 1896 was successful*

The people

had found their voice, but in so doing they had discovered
their common enemy, the Bourbon Democrats*

The people would

not be heard again until the advent of Huey Long*

38i. E. Daniel, Jfcft LftUiai&fla. ££&el&l£ E&llZ (un
published master’s thesis, Louisiana State University,
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1898-1900.
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the reconstruction, which was to shape the course

of Louisiana politics in the twentieth century, was completed
in 1898* The Bourbon Democrats had successfully met the
challenge of the Populist-Republican fusionf now the destiny
of Louisiana was in safe hands.

Yet some further safeguard

must be devised to assure that no rebel farmer class nor
Negro voters should again have the opportunity of upsetting
tbe status quo. Once more a call was made for the convening
of a body to write a new constitution, since the general
feeling was that the instrument of 1879 had served its pur
pose and changed conditions made necessary a new one.

How

ever, the real reason for the convention was to consider the
problem of suffrage.

It interpreted its mandate from the

"people** to be, to disenfranchise as many Negroes and as few
whites as possible, without violating the Fifteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution.
Several of the constitutional provisions brought
forth reflected the general temper of the age.

Legislative

provisions, for example, increased the power to control cor
porations, a Populist idea.

The legislature could no longer

enact either local or special legislation.
made ineligible to succeed himself.

The governor was

Yet, the constitutional

provisions extended the practice of putting detailed re
strictions on legislation; and this despite the fact that
Negro dominance would be gone.

The Constitution of 1898 was
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still under the shadow of Reconstruction•
The main problem was to construct provisions concern
ing the suffrage which would aooomplish that which the Demo
crats were under compulsion to achieve, and at the same time
to meet the limits of legality as the United States Supreme
Court might interpret them.

The scheme devised was to pro

vide for several alternative suffrage requirements;^ if
Hegro could not be refused the vote under one provision,
then he could be banned under another*

Certain educational

and property qualifications were required of all voters,
except any whose fathers or grandfathers had been legal voters
in 1867*

This meant that four classes of men would be allowed

to votes

literates, tax-paying property owners, sons of

property owners, and men who had voted in 1867 or their de
scendants*

This action assured the successful completion of

the struggle for reconstruction*
Poster had been influential in leading the move to
change the constitution*

An investigation of his message

concerning the 1898 constitution reveals, perhaps, the domi
nant attitude which prevailed within the membership of his
partyi
The white supremacy for which we have so long strug
gled at the cost of so much precious blood and treasure,
is now crystallized into the Constitution as a funda
mental part and parcel of that organic instrument* and
that, too* by no subterfuge or other evasions* With
this great principle thus firmly imbedded in the

^constitution of 1898, Article 197*
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Constitution* and honestly enforced* there need be no
longer any fear agAto the honesty and purity of our
future elections•
The results of this principle of suffrage will be invest!**
gated below; suffice it to say* the immediate results were

to disenfranchise store than the estimated twenty to thirty
thousand whites which the grandfather clause11 provision had
proposed to maintain on the registration books#
fuge* most likely* genuinely was not desired*

Overt subter
The remarks of

a member of the convention are instructive of the objective

consequence of the actions of I8981
By the irony of fate* as it were* this ultra conserva
tive convention was called upon as its first chief duty
to do the most radical thing known to legislation; to
falsify the accepted teaching of history and roll back
the wheels of political revolution without bloodshed; to
take away the ballot from almost* if not quite* a ma
jority of the voters of the state. *
The registration statistics* before and after 1893*
and the results of the gubernatorial election of 1900* provide
an eloquent finala to the struggle for Bourbon supremacy*

The voter turn-out in 1896 had been extremely great* indica
tive of the Issues at stake in the election*

The more than

two hundred thousand votes cast was a new high; and 70*1 per
cent of the registered voters had gone to the polls and cast
ballots*

In the election of 1900* not only was the total

^^LouAslana Senate Journal* 1898* pp* 33-3?*
^^T* J* Kernan, "The Constitutional Convention of
1898 and Its Work." The Transactions of the Louisiana Bar
Association* (1899), pp* 56-57*

vote considerably smaller than in the previous election, due
to the great disenfranchisement, bat also, the participation
of the electors fell off*

In 1900, only 53 P«f ©ant of the

registered voters actually went to the polls#

Quite obviously

the Democrats had not only managed to keep many from voting$
they had also discouraged interest In the utilisation of the
suffrage#
fhe registration of voters reached Its highest peak
in 1897, the year following the attempt at Fusion*

At that

time there was still expectation that the vote of the people
held a promise of victory*
29*+,*+32, of which some

The total registration reached
per eent were Negroes.

However,

this strong numerical position in whleh the people found them
selves was to be of no avail*

For, in the registration which

preceded the gubernatorial election of 1900, the total count
was but 130,757 qualified, registered voters*

The decrease

in Hegro registration was over 95 per cent 5 the suffrage
elauses had done their expected work*

However, far more sig

nificant is the fact that the percentage decrease in the
number of idiite registered voters was 23#5*

Almost *f0,000

less white people had registered in 1900 than in 1897*

More

over, a glance at the distribution of the greatest percentage
losses among the parishes will indicate that it was the poor,
illiterate, but certainly not necessarily Ignorant farmers
who had lost the suffrage#
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As if it had been calculated, the parishes which showed
the greatest drop in white registration were by and large the
same which had supported the Fusion*

(See Figure 21**)

At

any rate, such a distribution is a strong reenforcement to
the proposition that the People’s movement was a farmers1
movement*

And the impact of disenfranchisement hit north

Louisiana and the south alike*

In some parishes white regis

tration actually increased? most of these were planter domi
nated.

In the enforcing of the new suffrage provisions, no

breach of honesty need be made, for so long as the registrar
of voters could pass on minimum qualifications, there was no
need for Bourbon support to suffer*

In the northwest and

southeast parishes an increase In white population had oc
curred, blunting the general decrease In voters*

The move

of whites into East and West Garroll was a forerunner of the
large migration Into the Eacon BIdge parishes of Bichland and
Franklin which would occur after 1910*

An overall gain was

likewise registered in Vernon and Washington parishes, where
increased lumber operations had already brought an Influx in
the white population in these areas*

Still, the statewide

distribution of losses in white registration was a commentary
of the indignity imposed on the farmer groups*
The Democratic state convention nominated the incum
bent state auditor, William W. Heard, for governor in 1900*
He was the preference of Governor Foster to carry on the Demo
cratic duties of the state*

The Regular Republicans nominated

/rX\;

I

PER CENT LOSS OR GAIN OP
WHITE REGISTRATION

1897 - 1900
j*. • i Above State Average
Lose, 23.556
Parishes With Gain

3
m

m
\
MAP

Report of Secretary of State. Louisiana.
1897 an3~1900
Figure 24

NO. COSt 0—LOUISIANA

Source:

133
Eugene S. Reems, while the Lilywhite Republicans and the
Populists Joined in the support of the candidacy of Donelson
Caffery.

Although the campaign was spirited* the result was

never in doubt.

Heard became governor with the support of

78.3 per cent of the total vote cast*

In examining the par

ish distribution of the 1900 vote, the pattern of final domina
tion is discovered.

The situation found in 1872 had been

reversed•
The Bourbon Democrat and his urban allies emerged as
the dominant minority, at the beginning of the twentieth cen
tury, in Louisiana.

Solidarity of support was again estab

lished, but this time in the parishes where it should have
been.

(See Figure 25.)

The parish vote was over 90 per cent

in favor of the Democrats In the plantation areas of the cot
ton country, up the Mississippi, down the Red River, across
the Felicianas.

Also clustered about New Orleans, there was

another seat of support.

Most of these were the parishes

where the Negro registration had outnumbered the whites, pre
viously, and where the plantation remained a potent force in
the economy.

These were the home parishes of the Bourbon

Democrat, the conservative, unreconstructed southern gentle
man.

For them ideology had become fact.
Despite the overwhelming victory of the Democrats at

the polls, and despite the decreased white registration, the
white Republican-Populist fusion carried pluralities for
Caffery in Cameron, Ascension, and St. James$ and Impressive

Source:

Journal

13?
support was given In many other of th© parishes which had
demonstrated the Populist tendencies before. Th© tradition**
ally Whig-Eepuolioan sugar bowl supported a sizable Republican
vote in backing Caffery on the Republican ticket.

The distri

bution of Caffery support on the Populist ticket brings into
sharp relief the block of "hill" parishes where yet th©
farmer1s voice was heard*
In general outline, the pattern of support for th©
People's Party and its Republican allies has remained a sig
nificant one in the history of subsequent Louisiana politic®.
(See Figure

26.) The "people" had been frustrated in their

attempts at gaining the political upper hand In the struggles
of the decade just finished.

But a precedent had been estab

lished which would bear observing in th© future#

The protest

of the farmer in the decade of the 1890's had been effectively
frustrated by the dominant elit© within the Democratic party.
In his ascendancy, the Bourbon forced th© farmer to re-define
the situation the elite had structured for him.

Participation

in elections after 1900 was far from what it had been in the
grand straggles of the eighties and nineties.

It was after

1908 before white voter registration figures again reached
the count of 1897.

So far as total vote for gubernatorial

candidates was concerned, there was no appreciable rise In the
count until 192*+, when there were over 95*000 more voter, than
in 1920,

In the ©lection of 192*+, Huey P# Long had thrown

his hat into the Louisiana political ring.
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CHAPTER I?
ONE-PARTY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF LONOISM
-A wise Prince should devise means whereby
his subjects may at all times* whether favorable
or adverse, feel the need of the State and of
him and then they will be faithful to him.Machlavelll

Machine Politics * With opposition effectively
eliminated, the Democratic Party had a d e a r field in Louisi
ana politics*

The sole problem became one of maintaining

control of the party machinery*
loss in knowing what to do*
the city.

The Bourbons were not at a

There were allies to be had in

For, New Orleans had regularly polled about twenty

per cent of the total statewide vote.

For purposes of repre

sentation in the state legislature, the City of New Orleans
was divided into districts (wards), each of which sent a
representative to the legislature.

Utilising the ward as a

unit, the city could be organised into an effective political
machine*

With the ability to deliver the city vote, the

selection of a gubernatorial candidate with a reasonable de
gree of strength outside the city would be tantamount to vic
tory.

Organized in 1897, the New Orleans Choctaw Club, the

Ring, or the fl01d Regulars11 as they were known to their
137

138
friends* developed a machine along these lines and began to
play an influential part in state politics^

Experience m s

to demonstrate that intra-party factional struggles could be
Just as bitter as the previous struggles between parties had
been.
The gubernatorial election of 190** was a very one
sided contest*

The Republican candidate, W* J* Behan, re

ceived but ten per cent of the total vote.

The count of the

votes polled in this election revealed a drop of more than
twenty thousand below the total vote for 1900*

What littl©

Republican support remaining in Louisiana was seated in the
sugar country*

The Republican support reached as high as

*tl per cent in Ascension parish, and in total there were
fourteen parishes which had registered a Republican vote
higher than the state average of 10 per cent*

Three of the

previously strong Populist parishes, Natchitoches, Winn, and
Catahoula, registered vestiges of the former protest? these
were not yet willing to let Democratic ascendancy be complete.
In the Democratic primary which had preceded the ©lec
tion, the total vote was some 12,000 more than the Democratic
total in the general election of 1900*

Part of this gain

came from south Louisiana Democrats who had voted for Caffery
then, now back in the Democratic camp*

The distribution of

the support for the winner of the primary, Newton Blanchard,

1G» M. Reynolds. Machine Politics in fey Orleans. 19971926 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).

139
demonstrated the pattern of the new one-party t e n d e n c y when
a candidate had the endorsement of the Choctaws,
27*)

(See Figure

The prediction of Blanchard^ victory might have lain

in the fact that he registered 71 per cent of the Hew Orleans
vote.

Part of the highest parish percentages favoring the

machine candidate clustered in the Mississippi delta and in
the sugar country*

Reynolds suggested2 that the surprising

support of the ring candidate in the hill parishes was due to
the successful campaign appeals of Martin Behrman, Choctaw
leader, who ran for State Auditor on the Blanchard ticket.
The election of 190*f demonstrated the assurance that Louisi
ana had become a one-party state.
The Old Regular Democratic organisation supported
Lt .-Governor J. Y* Sanders in 1908,

Re had been a law partner

of former Governor Foster, and in the primary was opposed by
Hr, Wilkinson, a friend of Governor Blanchard and his choice
as successor.

But the line of gubernatorial descent was evi

dent in this period.

The politicians mad® the choices, and

their alliance with the Bourbons was a leading tendency,
Sanders received 56,3 per cent of the state-wide vote, but
the machine produced a near 10,000 majority in Hew Orleans
with which to offset any close margins in the country parishes.
The distribution of support in this election approached the
classic pattern; Bourbons from the Mississippi delta parishes

2Ibid.. p. 99.
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and from sugar country aligned with the cluster of support
about New Orleans.

(See Figure 28.)

The appearance of par*

ishes from western Louisiana within the ranks of the Demo
crats of this decade gives reason to pause.

These parishes,

Vernon and Sabine in particular, were predominantly composed
of a fans population, and yet after the experience of the pre
vious decade they turn up in the Democratic column, with
stronger than average majorities!
A study of population increases within Louisiana from
1890 to 1910, however, will demonstrate that the group of
parishes under discussion falls into a class which ranked
among parishes with a rapid population increase in these de
cades.3

Extensive lumbering operations were carried on dur

ing this period, bringing in their wake large numbers of
farmers and laborers.

The population of Sabine, for example,

doubled in the period from 1390 to 1910? and that of Vernon
had tripled.

In 1910, the racial composition of the two par

ishes was 79.0 and 78.6 per cent white, respectively.

Vernon

had shown a thirty-three per cent increase in voter registra
tion in the period from 1397 to

1900. This is more understand

able against the fact that the population was increasing so
rapidly,

but this does not mean that the poor and whit©

farmer might: not have lost his right to vote.

3t. l. Smith, X M Growth

:iaybe only the

Population in

1890 to 1222? Louisiana State University Experiment Station
Bulletin, No. 26**, p* 9*
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upper classes and the more fortunate farmers and workers voted*
It Is likewise understandable why a decade or so later
a parish like Vernon, enjoying such a boom in this period,
should show a decided change in political tendencies*

For

the lumber combines came, cut and moved on to fresher forests,
leaving a devastated cut-ovar area, where farmer and lumber
worker became hard pressed to eke out a bare existence J*
The machinery being perfected by Bourbon and city Demo**
crats was not to remain unopposed*

It would seem inevitable

that sooner or later some one or some groups within the elec
torate would become dissatisfied with the political arrange
ments . The cry of "corruption and Inefficiency in government"
could be raised even in those halcyon days, and there was
strong possibility that the cry would be heard among the rural
electorate-

At the same time that opposition was being con

solidated, there had emerged a problem which would serve as
another source of dissatisfaction and of the desire for "re
form,"

The Constitution of 1898 had failed, as would the

subsequent one, to fit the processes of government to the tem
per of the time.

Louisiana was faced with industrial growth

which would reshape her society*

Hew groups and new problems

emerged requiring satisfactions and solutions*

The governor

was head of an administration largely beyond his control.
is well taken that "the two governing bodies had become the

Si. 0. McWhiney*
Socialist Vg&g la taalalaijf
la Historical tatOTmflllaa
aafliskl fgas m < ^ * > 1
master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1951).

It

constitutional convention and the Indifferent electorate which
voted on the flood of amendments which came in the twentieth
century.
The name of John
Parker emerged in Louisiana polities in the gubernatorial
election of 1912.^

Two years before, Parker had been instru

mental in organizing the Good Government League, whose leader
he became.

The League was established in an effort to work

for a more efficient local government in Hew Orleans*

The

move was parallel with action on the national scene, where at
the turn of the century a new rationale of public adminis
tration came under the impetus of reform movements.

In

1910, for example, Taft had established the "Commission on
Economy and Efficiency in Government 5tt the business men got
behind ltf and apparently old attitudes hang on, for the
slogan, even then, was "let’s make government more business
like."

Parker meant business, and in 1912 the League put for

ward the candidacy of Judge Luther Hall for governor.
As the League candidate, Hall was in opposition to
the New Orleans machine, which had put forth John T . Michel
as their candidate.

He was Secretary of State and an Old

5jr. w. Prothro, A study si Constitutional Developments
la ihe Office s i ifce Governor la Louisiana (unpublished mas
ter*. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1 9 W , p. 88.
6S. Phillips, Administration si
£&£&§£ (un
published master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 1933)•

Regular of long standing*

The race took on a new form when

Dr* James B* Aswell resigned the presidency of the State
Normal School at Natchitoches and announced his candidacy
as an independent J

Aswell had been elected State Superin

tendent of Education during the administration of Governor
Blanchard, and he had established a reputation for having
guided the progress which had been made in education.

The

rural people had reason to appreciate what a lack of educa
tional advantages could mean.

At Natchitoches, Aswell had

worked for improvement of rural schools in the hill parishes.
In this election he had gained stature through refusal to
place himself in the hands of the Good Government League and
withdraw from the race.
The race lay between Michel and Hall, although th©
entry of Aswell was to demonstrate th© support that could be
had for an appeal in the hill parishes.

Hall won the primary

election with *+3 .2 per cent of the total vote.

The machine

candidate, Michel, gained but 37*^ per cent of the votes cast.
Even without the candidacy of Aswell, who received 1 9 A per
cent of the vote, it is doubtful that the machine could have
won; for the strength of both Hall and Aswell was found in
the rural parishes.

The machine did, however, maintain its

strength in the city, for again New Orleans gave the ring

T. Chevis} Tiie Educational aa£ Political, fiagegr &£
James Beniamin Aswell (unpublished master*s thesis, Louisiana
State University,1937)•

Ik6

candidate a plurality of almost 10,000 over the opposition*
The appeals of reform had spread too widely to enable the
machine to swing the election of 1912*
The Old Regular, Michel, was able to gain pluralities,
outside New Orleans, in but eleven parishes®

The distribu

tion was instructive, indicating that th© Bourbon-machin©
alignment could still register the old pattern, despite the
strong opposition.

In the rural areas, Michel won plurali

ties in plantation country.

Caddo Parish does not disturb

the pattern, for along the Red River were many large planta
tions and the Bourbon predisposition of Shreveport would be
come stronger with the passing years.
The distribution of the parish support for the Good
Government candidate was widespread.

(See Figure 29*)

Nearly all of south Louisiana voted Hall in a block, and he
also won pluralities in the parishes of the Arkansas border*
The parishes of the hills, however, gave their plurality sup
port to the candidacy of Aswell.

It is not surprising that

here, in the parishes which had produced so recently the
strong Populist tendency, the electorate would have been en
thusiastic for the one candidate who had been a genuine In
dependent.

At any rate, the cluster of parishes which gave

Aswell his pluralities was the heart of the country of the
People's Party.

Even Washington Parish, In the extreme

eastern edge of the Floridas, once again manifested the po
litical tendency of similar farm parishes.

n

i
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The appearance of lumber corporations in the hills
and prairies of central and southwest Louisiana after the
turn of the century brought not only an Increased population
of farmers and workers and momentary economic gain, but also
p
the organisation of the lumber worker by Socialist groups*
When Eugene Debs spoke in Winnfield in 1908, the local
Socialist party was well organized and elected half the of
ficials of Winn Parish*

This parish had only a decade before

taken the lead in the Populist movement*

The struggle for

economic betterment through the use of th© ballot was not
completed*

In 1912 Winn Parish gave almost 36 per cent of

its vote to the presidential candidate for the Socialists,
Debs*

Two more parishes, Vernon and West Carroll, voted

more than 30 per cent for Debs, and Caldwell, Grant, and
LaSalle each supported the Socialists with more than 20 per
cent of the total votes cast*

Where the lumbering industry

was important, the Debs vote was high*
The phenomenon of such a radical vote In Louisiana
would not be so important except that the very people mani
festing this tendency had come from or resided In th© par
ishes of Populist protest and were of or related to th©
farmer class.

For as the lumber operators worked th© Louisi

ana hills, the farmer had grasped the opportunity to augment
his meager subsistence by engaging in lumbering*
o
°McWhiney, gp. cit.

The work

I*f9
did not appreciably increase th© level of living of th© hill
people, for there was a plentiful supply of labor among th©
farmers willing to work at almost any wage.

The farmer had

experienced the "corporation**
Bfcmmoured with the pure principles of Progressivism,
John M. Parker decided to run himself in 1916,

He was op

posed, of course, by th© Old Regulars, whose candidate was
Ruffin G. Pleasant*

In 1912 Parker had become an active

Progressive, endorsing Roosevelt in the fight for national
Republican leadership 5 he resigned his position as chairman
of the Good Government League, as it was a faction of the
Democratic Party.

In so doing he voiced his determination

to be found fighting, still, for good government in Louisiana.
Parker said he had become a Progressive out of respect for
Theodore Roosevelts

"I am for Roosevelt because I believe

he is one of the most active and progressive men in the TJmlted
States, and does things *"^

Parker would need to do things and

to become quite active himself, if he desired to win the gov
ernorship from the control of the still active New Orleans
Ring.

Parker announced his candidacy in Crowley, during the

fall of 1915*
tion am

He advocated a limited constitutional conven

a protective tariff on sugar and rice.

This stand

should have had sympathetic appeal among old-time Republican
groups in Louisiana*

^Phillips,

oli*« p. 11

1?Q
An interesting anecdote coming from the campaign re
vealed the forthrightness of Parker.10

The New Orleans

Protestant Ministers1 Association asked three questions of
the candidates| concerning the enforcement of gambling and
Sunday laws.

With a straight face, Pleasant had answered

that he would enforce the laws under question, and of course
all other laws within his jurisdiction.
however, in no such virtuous terms.

Parker had answered,

Where there were regula

tions on gambling, these would suffice, if followed.

Be

sides, it was a matter for the people to decide, whether they
wanted to gamble or not.

Anyway, the enforcement of such

laws generally was left to local authorities.
There had been mixed feelings concerning the candi
dacy of John Um Parker.

No one wished to doubt the personal

qualifications of the man, but it was felt that inasmuch as
the Democratic candidate, Pleasant, had been duly nominated
by the party primary, it was a bit unfair for Parker to merely
nominate himself*

clear this feeling, the Progressives

held a nominating convention in which Parker was overwhelm
ingly endorsed.

Nevertheless, it was felt that Parker and

his ticket were foredoomed to failure*

‘
fo beat the combined

efforts of the established Democratic party and the New
Orleans Bing would be singularly difficult*

Even if Parker

should win, however, his power of performance would be

l0Phillips, q e * clt*. p. 13*
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negligible In the face of a probable hostile legislature*
As good men as Parker had tried in that unequal struggle and
failed*

The editorial opinion of the Alexandria Democrat

adequately summarised the situation*
We are willing to admit that the conditions In
Louisiana are bad politically, and there is much room
for improvement, but considering the fact which everyone
knows that Parker is a man of splendid character, great
personal integrity, rugged honesty and extraordinary
business ability, in the event of his election, which
nobody for a moment thinks probable, what would he be
able to accomplish? He would be absolutely powerless
as has been the present governor whom Mr* Parker assisted
largely in elevating to the executive chair, and whose
honesty of purpose and sincere desire to put into execu
tion plans for the upbuilding and advancement of the
State and all its people have never been questioned by
any except his political e n e m i e s *^X
The reformers might be able to capture the governorship, but without some friendly support in the legislature,
no great reforms would be forthcoming.

Th© platforms and

appeal of the Good Government faction of the Democratic Party,
and the earnestness of the Progressive movement might find a
widespread support among an electorate still dominated by the
Bourbons.

However, the Democrats had found the necessity for

organization in the struggle for power, and control of local
parish affairs, and particularly control of the legislature,
was in their hands.
In 1916, however, the Old Regulars and their country
allies emerged triumphant, anyhow*

Pleasant received more

than sixty per cent of the vote cast, piling up a majority

n phiiiips,

as.,

cit.. p. m .

1?2
over Parker of about 32fOOO votes*

New Orleans voters gave

Pleasant a majority of 10,000, which was apparently what had
come to be the usual safe lead the Bing produced*

Neverthe-

less* Parker had gained majorities in sixt@envof the state*s
sixty-four parishes*

The distribution of these majorities

indicated the impression that Parker had made upon voters
within the sugar country and among parishes of rice produc
tion.

(See Figure 30*)

The majority parishes* taken along

with those in which the percentage vote was above the Parker
state average of 3 7 «3 per cent* describe a pattern outlining
quite precisely the borders of French south Louisiana*
A number of factors could account for this phenomenon.
South Louisianans, slightly less adverse to the sins of
gambling* may have supported Parker on that count*

His stand

on the tariff may have been widely accepted $ and finally* the
Progressive label of 1916 was akin to Republicanism* whose
seat of support had ever been In the south of the state*
Parker received his weakest support In the parishes of north
Louisiana* along the Mississippi, and along th© Arkansas and
Texas borders* as if there had been an anti-gambling judgment
among hill farmers.

Too* this was Democratic country*

There

was one exception* West Carroll on Macon Bldge* which had
supported Aswell in 1912* now continuing to show its Indepen
dence in support of Parker.
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A BMMfltfcttLe failure« Failure by

John M. Parker in firmly establishing his political position
may have been part of the success of Huey P. hong*

Although

not a “man of the people,” nevertheless the rather “pro
gressive” program of Parker was somewhat different from that
of other state politicians up to this time*

At any rate,

the present section, in outlining the activities of Governor
Parker, will highlight the political philosophy and program
of Parkerisa.

Another gubernatorial aspirant was to likewise

draw from Parker *s experience as mid-century reached Louisi
ana, although most likely Hobort Kenmn was unaware of the
parallel*

Parker had demonstrated there was some truth to

the idea that if a candidate kept right on running for office,
sooner or later he would be elected*

In 19^8 as in 1916, the

defeated candidate learned the value of organisation*
In 1952 as in 1920, on© of the primary concerns of
the campaign was the pledge for governmental reforms*
both years, the chief issue was !{antl,f —
Bing.

In

anti-Long and anti-

Finally, in elections where the rural vote was going

to be close, the value of organization in Hew Orleans was
recognized*

Kennon, as Parker before him, managed to capture

a sizable vote in the city to Insure victory.

In 1920, John

M. Parker was recognized by the Old Regulars as the man to
beat, and the resulting campaign between Stubbs and Parker
was bitter.
It appears that time may corrupt, In terms of

155
political longevity.

Past mistakes, th© actions of opponents,

and perhaps even some corruption, had made the Bing machine
the target of cries of corruption.

Moreover, th® experience

of success had given hopes of more, and even established pat
terns for the future.

After all, Mayor Bateman, the leader

of the Choctaws, had recalled that in twenty years of politi
cal struggle there was plenty of time to make many enemies*
He philosophised that "most people remember what you did to
them rather than what you did for them." 3,2

the theme of

corruption in government had a long and notable record of
usefulness.
Parker realized full well that if he were to defeat
the machine he would have to gain a sizable vote In New
Orleans,

to this end he established the Orleans Democratic

Association with which he hoped to cut deeply in Ring support*
With the provision of enough votes to insure victory in the
gubernatorial primary, it was Parker’s Intention to use the
appointive powers which would be at his disposal to take
patronage away from the Old Regulars and defeat Behrman in
his race for the mayorship with a candidate of his own choos
ing.

Parker proved successful, in 1920, on both counts*
In the game of politics, it is axiomatic that to de

feat organization, it must b© opposed with better organiza
tion.

There was a danger that Governor Parker might have

^Reynolds,

op

* cit*. p* 216.
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created a machine not different from the one he was set to
defeat• The claim has been made that Parker failed in his
attempt at defeating the Choctaws and putting them out of
political business due to his realization of this fact 5 he
was reluctant to use the tactics of the Ring to defeat the
Ring. J

The old Ring, defeated by Parker in 1920, promptly

made a comeback.

The organization Parker had established,

in order to defeat the Ring, had been composed of many dis
gruntled members of the Old Regulars| and there are always
the opportunists who sense that a change of horses might be
advantageous.

The elements which made up the organization

of the Orleans Democratic Association were too discordant,
and composed as It was of reformers and disgruntled Old
Regulars, it could not hope to become the permanent opposi
tion to the Choctaw Club, which had been Parker’s aim.
However, in Louisiana politics it was necessary to
organize, and to make organization relatively permanent, for
with the advent of Democratic supremacy only the strong and
the politically wise could hope to wrest control from the
Bourbons.

For their successful domination they had worked

long and hard.

If it were impossible to beat them without

joining them, and copying their methods, then join them and
beat them at their own game.

This was part of Huey Long’s

success»
Who supported Parker in his successful overthrow of

13Phillip3,

Eli-, p. 156.
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the Ring in 1920?

First of all there was the organised sup

port in New Orleans, where old members of the Choctaws had
formed the Orleans Democratic Association in Parker!s behalf.
The city vote favoring the candidacy of Parker constituted
per cent of the total city vote*

The consistent spread

of some 10,000 votes in favor of machine-backed candidates
had been narrowed to 5,000.

If worker groups were In support

of the Choctaw machine, It appears likely that Parker*® gain
had come from the support of the more privileged groups of
the city,
Parker received his largest country vote in the Third
Congressional District, which embraced the heart of th© sugar
bowl.

(See Figure 31 •)

His most impressive gains over the

1916 Parker support came from north Louisiana, however, there
being fingers of support pushed up the delta and up the Red
River country*

It Is likely that planter groups of both

north and south were in favor of Parker*s candidacy*

But

Parker gained likewise In the hills, from Vernon Parish across
to Franklin.

The Ring candidate, Col* Stubbs of Monroe,

gained far less support than had the machine candidate of th©
previous election in the hills.

Farmer groups must have

voted for Parker since Huey Long had stumped for Parker In
1920, believing he favored the sort of economic reforms Long
had been proposing as Public Service Commissioner*

It is ap

parent from the election returns that Parker*s support had
1

been w i d e s p r e a d .

The success of the program for which he had
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campaigned so vigorously lay in th® hands of th® new legisla
ture which Parker hoped to influence.
Ask some old-timers about John M, Parker, and they will
assert he was the best governor Louisiana ever had5 in turn
they will scoff at th® name of Long*

Yet, if the measure of

success be political longevity, Long managed to perpetuate
his position, while Governor Parker failed in his endorsement
of a successor in 192b. However, the measure of success
might just as well be th© resultant of the establishment of
a constructive program of governmental reforms*

Ascending to

the governorship in 1920, after the completion of World War I,
Parker was to meet with a prevalent mood of sympathy among
the electorate in behalf of the principle of reform*

The

social and economic changes wrought in Louisiana, as else
where in America, as a consequence of the first World War
meant that whoever became governor must be prepared to solve
many practical problems*

Moreover, natural reaction of puri

tan morality which gripped the country after 1913 provided a
fertile ground in which to emplant a sweeping reform against
the corruptions of machine politics*

Th® political indepen

dence of Governor Parker likewise tended to demonstrate to
the voters that the man was more important than the party.
During the campaign the Parker forces never allowed
attention to be diverted from the main issue —
lk
rule* Their platform has been summed ups

P h i l l i p s , an- Silk** P* 3^*

that of King

160
1 . fh© ring rules New Orleans and rules it badly.
2.

If th© ring elects a governor, the ring will rule
the State and rule it badly.

S£22» defeat the Ring.

Ihis much of the Parker platform was

successful, for the time being at least.

Upon the first meet

ing of the legislature after Governor Parker took office, a
series of proposals were forwarded at regular intervals to
the representatives which rivaled in scope and detail those
of the Republican President of the United States in his direc
tives to the Eighty-third Congress,
l1?
summarized thus* ^

the ten points may be

1.

Financial program
a. severance tax of 2 per cent
b. inventory of state property
c. construction work

2•

Good roads

3.

Labor legislation

*f.

Oil and gas laws (including ways and means of
regulation)

5.

Political program, Including constitutional con
vention

6 . "Blue Sky” law to protect investors
7.

Legislation for New Orleans

8 . Changes in executive department, including admin
istration of state charitable institutions
9.
10.

Cost of living aid by encouragement of agriculture
and invitation for business to come to Louisiana
Conservation and reforestation.

l5Phillips, ££. clt.. p. k6; cited from Messages of
Governor, 1920.
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Important portions, at least, of all the ten points
mare enacted Into law by th© regular session of 1920*

Parker

has been called the "Gravel Roads" governor because of the
steps taken under his administration to create a workable
highway system in Louisiana.^

H© negotiated a so-called

"gentlemen’s agreement" concerning the proposed severance tax,
and proceeded to the building of a greater agricultural and
mechanical college on a large tract of land Just south of
Baton Rouge •

Still more of his program became effective

after the Constitution of 1921 was ratified*

Yet for all

this efficient and forward-looking administration, Parker
was unable to perpetuate his influence.

In 192*f the Ring

made a comeback and aided in the election of Henry L« Fuqua*
Any governor in the early twenties would have had to
do much of what Parker did, anyway*

There were pressing

problems concerning which policy had to b© formulated § and
there did not appear to be anything amiss in the particular
steps which Parker had taken*

Reform makes a popular appeal,

but Parker would have had to make good on hi® reform of the
Hew Orleans Ring if his administration were to be called a
success.

In that he had failed, and the Parker program was

not carried for another four years*
Why was Parkerism a respectable failure?

First of

all, because there was nothing wrong with the program of the

l6G. McGinty, A. History g£
position Press, 1951 )* P* 2p0«

(New Yorks Ex*
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governor.

In fact, the spectacular success of Huey Long four

years after Parker left office might serve to demonstrate
that he should have given more of the same.

Where Parker had

built gravel roads, Long built concrete roads| and they were
good roads, even if "...a few miles were paved in ©very par
ish to let the people see the superiority of concrete over
g r a v e l . T h e programs of the two governors paralleled In
many respects, but the popular support of the two leaders was
singularly different.

Long*s appeal was more broadly to the

masses, whereas Parker, half a Republican anyway, had not
sufficiently disassociated himself, in the peopled eyes, from
the dominant economic groups of the new Louisiana.
Moreover, Parker never seemed to realize that more
than the New Orleans machine could be politically evil or
corrupt*

"The corruptor of politics in the form of privileged

business he did not see, or seeing, was unwilling to break its
strangle hold.

His reforms failed because they were not in

reality carried out and because they did not remove the econo-*
mie causes of machine control."

The failure of Parkerlsm

to perpetuate itself rests essentially upon the factor of
electoral appeal.

For the people of the hills, who were to

give Long such strong support, had some pretty definite ideas
about the reforms necessary in Louisiana society*

17Ibid.. p . 252.
^-^teynolds,

o p

. q,it** p. 233*

The
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generation which had felt the exhilaration of the movement of
the People’s Party, and the sting of disenfranchisement, had
not yet died off#

Reform has become fashionable in Louisiana,

bat only after the masses had been afforded the opportunity
to make a mess in Choices of leaders.

A clean-up campaign

whose purpose was to perpetuate the domination of the Bourbon,
or his big business cousin, lacked broad popular appeal#
Like the Whigs of the last century, the program of Parker,
no matter how good, must fail#

It failed because it was not

conceived of and for the "people.”
Xtongisa: An Appraisal. The nice arithmetic of
one-party politics had been finally worked out by the conserve
tives; and it provided easy calculations, too, for the Negro
had been effectively blocked from political activity since
1398.

The struggle for political control was narrowed to

participation by members of factional alignments, all of which

were representative of some dominant groups in Louisiana so
ciety,

The only numerically dominant group which had been

left out of political calculations was the "people," the have-

nots, farmers and laborers.

Political monopoly had been added

to economic monopoly.
In this political situation, two possible combinations

for political success were available.1^

The country could be

united solidly against the city, or, as was more likely, the

^Reynolds, o p . jslt## p# 19^»
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city could be organized and victory achieved with some seg
ments of the country vote*

The Choctaws, as well as the "re-

formers11 In opposition to the machine* utilized the latter
combination.
cousin.

Planter and rural town elite combined with city

It was the old story of the dominant minority which

maintained its political ascendancy*

Machine candidates or

reform candidates, it made little positive difference which
won, none of them manifestly represented the interests of the
"people* of Louisiana.
The "chance" that consensus might be found among farmer
and laborer, as a group, was great, for there had been oppor
tunity for significant societal tendencies to have been es
tablished .

Such an analysis might not be able to produce

objective, quantitative demonstration of the presence of a
class struggle in Louisiana, however.

Yet, the results of

elections of a "crisis" nature have indicated the presence
of a latent consensus which might lead to group action.

The

peculiar institution of "gentleman rule" in Louisiana po
litics could generate an opposition among the masses, the
numerical majority.

Events might force a dormant conscious

ness of group solidarity into action against the status jgu&.
So long as the avenue of political expression remained free,
the farmer, as a group, voiced his opposition.

Protest had

been registered concerning the actions leading to Secession.
A reaction of political solidarity occurred among the farmers
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of the hills in the 1880*s.

the farmer found voice to pro*

test his frustrations in the Populist movement* during the
economically depressed 1890's, and even flirted with Socialism
in the 1910's.
Historically* then* so long as the procedures of democ
racy remained in force* the frustrations of the ^have-nots*1
might find release through the utilisation of the suffrage*
The people might make known desires and interests through
the ballot* and while this channel of expression was opened*
the effects of privation and frustration were blunted* and
the probability of latent consensus becoming manifest was
that much slighter*

"Misery loves company*" the old adage

goes; but so long as lip-service was paid to the cult of de
mocracy* the opposition of serious group action was averted*
However* the actions of the dominant minority In taking
away the ballot from the Negro, and in so doing from the poor
and white* might well have spelled its political doom*
Democracy in Louisiana had become perverted• A plutocracy
struggled amongst itself for the plums of political victory.
With the traditional channels of expression closed* group
frustration might lead to group action*

With the right com

bination, the dominant minority could yet be overthrown.
"people" needed merely to be drawn out*

The

The farmer of the

hills would most certainly respond to the political appeals
of one of his own*
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The advent of Longism in Louisiana, then, was the cul
mination of long-time tendencies.

There had always been the

possibility of a "peopled” party gaining ascendancy in Loui
siana; up until Huey Long appeared, all actual attempts had
been frustrated by the dominating elite. The evidence that
Longism was a political phenomenon explainable in terms of
the support of social groupings lies in analysis of voting
> behavior.

Definite political tendencies emerge and have*

since 192V, remained relatively constant.

Attention has all

too often been focused upon the organisational apparatus of
Long machines, upon the personal appeal and ability of Huey
Long, or upon the corruptions of Longism; far more important
is the sociological basis of Longism.
The social situation existing by the turn of the cen
tury made it certain that it was only a matter of time before
the people would have been heard» Huey Long *s appearance
upon the political scene in the 1920’s was merely a happy
circumstance —

despite our personal predilections.

Huey

Long upset the nice arithmetic established by the Bourbons,
came to power with the vote of the "people,*1 and established
a political algebra of his own.
Huey talked the language of the people;* whether he was
aware of his choice of analogy or not, Long*® famed
"Evangeline Oak" speech hit home with the "rednecks" and
"cajuns" of hill or bayou*

^
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... It is here under this oak where Evangeline waited
for her lover Gabriel, who never came. This oak Is an
immortal spot, made so by Longfellow1© poem, but
Evangeline is not the only one who has waited here in
disappointment.
Where are the schools that you have waited for your
children to have, that have never come? Where are the
roads and highways that you send your money to build,
that are no nearer now than ever before? Where are the
institutions to care for the sick and disabled?
Evangeline wept bitter tears in her disappointment, but
it lasted only one lifetime* Your tears in this country,
around this oak, have lasted for generations* Give me OA
the chance to dry the eyes of those who still weep here I ^
The people had waited a long time for someone to do something
for them.

With Longism, there emerged a pattern of appeal,

support, and political program which has set the opposing
pattern of all subsequent attempts at reform within the state.
The election of 192*4- indicated the pattern of voting
support which was to emerge in producing Longism In Louisiana,
(See Figure 32.)

Against the machine's candidate, Fuqua, and

the candidate who was Governor Parker's personal choice, Huey
Long gained more than fifty per cent of the vote in twentyone parishes.

Except for three, these parishes clustered In

north Louisiana;

St. Helena, Livingston, and Washington, in

the Floridas, were also areas where the farmer was predomi
nant.

The significance of the pattern was that it cut across

the "country" quite broadly.

While still limited to north

Louisiana hill parishes and some cut-over areas of the
Florida parishes, Longism had a class appeal.

While his

20H. P. Long, Every Man 4 King (New Orleanss National
Book Co., Inc., 1933)* P* 99*
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opponents had fought the election on the Klan issue with its
religious overtones, Huey Long spread his name and record
among the "people."

Were Long to extend his country support

into French Louisiana in a subsequent election, next time he
would win*
There was a next time, and Huey Long did win*

In

1928, the area of support was extended to include most of the
country vote aside from the areas of planter domination in
both north and south Louisiana,

In fact, the opposition man-*

aged to gain pluralities in but seventeen of Louisiana^
sixty-four parishes*

Only the country parishes of the upper

Mississippi delta and the plantation parishes of the Fellelanas, with neighboring Pointe Coupee and St, Landry, with
stood the challenge of the "rural demagogue."
33*)

(See Figure

Urban parishes, among them Caddo, Ouachita, and East

Baton Rouge, and a cluster about New Orleans, showed antiLong predispositions.
The fact that St * Landry appeared in the Bourbon pat
tern was not a contradiction*

Although popularly thought of

as a "farmer" parish, actually St. Landry has characteristics
similar to planter dominated parishes..

The proportion of

Negroes residing In the parish Is close to 50 per cent, and
there Is an old layer of planter-commercial influence In
this, one of the original Louisiana parishes.

The pattern

of a high degree of farm tenancy here also gives
further similarity with planter areas*

8t « Landry

In 1930 two out of
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three white faro operator® were tenants * Parishes with such
factors have usually recorded a conservative vote, through
domination hy Its elite groups or through indifference on
the part of the poor and white*
To say that Huey Long failed to carry the cities ob
scured the influence of some of the “factors" which influence
Louisiana voting behavior*2^

There are social groupings la

the urban areas whose economic and political sympathies were
part of the old Bourbon complex» Anti-Long opposition has
consistently shown in the upper limits of the socio-economic
layers of the city populations.

Yet a clear differential in

urban voting behavior exists, reflecting the tendency among
the workers to support candidates with programs closer to
their interests than Bourbon ideologies.

As Long established

his machine and organised support in New Orleans and other
cities, Long support in working class districts became
clearly visible.
In 1928 the victory of Huey Long was complete, sup
ported as he was by the great solidarity of th© farmer groups
in both north and south Louisiana.
op
therefore no political accident.

Th© rise of Huey Long was
Long, as well as other

^ B . Heberle and A. L. Bertrand, "Factors Motivating
Voting Behavior in a One-Party State," Social Forges. Vol. 27,
No. b (May, 19**9).
22P. H. Howard, % M Political fifiBlftgy q£ ____
(unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State university,
1951).
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southern politicians of the period, had his origin among
lower class whites hut gained his support from a wider ap~
peal.

His rise to power, likewise, was a result not so much

of an uprising of poorer whites as of a rising tide of oppo
sition to intolerable economic and social conditions.2^
It is more than a coincidence that Winn Parish, the
boyhood home of Huey Long, should have been the center of
Populist and Socialist support, and a later stronghold of
Longism.

Vith the rise of Huey Long the political balance

in Louisiana tipped in favor of the farmer class*

If exten

sion of appeal and organization has reached other groupings,
such as urban workers, and gained their support, the core of
the strength of Longism remained among the farmers.

Moder

ately strong coefficients of correlation have been computed
between the parish support of Huey Long in 1928, and the sup
port of Socialism and Populism previously.

Rank-order coef

ficients of correlation of </.621 and </*kOO have been computed
between the parish support of Long in 1928 and of Populism in
1896 and Socialism In 1912, respectively#214. Statistically
these coefficients may not be "highly significant,1* but they
indicate a continuity in the geographical pattern of a po
litical tendency which found expression In these election®.
The state had suffered an arrested socio-economic

^Heberle and Bertrand,
toward,

clt.T p. 3 ^ *

clt.r p. 133 ff •

development which had flavored the political climate, estab
lishing the potentiality of political group action among
farmers and workers*

For it was the farroer-lumber worker

element which contributed to the continuity of support in
these elections*

In Populism and the appeal of Huey hong

the "people” of the uplands and the French lowlands believed
they had found deliverance from the domination of the Bourbon
classes♦

One portion of the population enjoyed the fruits

of a way of life guaranteed by their political domination*
By 1928 Louisiana was found to be neither Inherently solid
one-party nor completely right wing.

The latent possibility

of opposition to the Bourbon Democrat, which had been dormant
for more than a quarter century, had become manifest*

Huey

Long's election ended single-class political domination In
Louisiana*
As if to demonstrate that other factors were being
felt, the results of the 1928 presidential election in Loui
siana did not follow the general pattern which V* 0* Key has
found for the South as a whole*2^

f0 be sure, the sixteen

parishes with a Negro population outnumbering the white gave
Alfred Smith a majority in maintaining the solid front of the
Bourbon*

But Smith polled a majority in every parish!

And

there were parishes with fewer Negroes which gave Smith an
even greater majority over Herbert Hoover*

The lowest

z<h . 0. Key, Jr., Southern pfrUfrlfig (He* Yorkt Alfred
A. Knopf, 19^9), P* 317 ff.
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Democratic support m s found In parishes where the farmer pre
dominated # The significant aspect of the Louisiana Smith
wot© was that the parishes of south* Catholic Louisiana con
tributed the greatest majorities#

Hence it seems more realis

tic to say that the issue was religious rather than racial.2^
The results of this election showed there were cracks in the
Bourbon solid front.
Huey Long was a master politician! significant was the
way in which he entered the political arena in the first

place* as B&ilroad Commissioner in 1918* and later Public
Service Commissioner as the agency changed names#

His po

litical ideology, if Long had one* was in th© tradition of
Populism as it had been experienced in his native hills#
Intentionally or otherwise, Huey Long mad® corporate domirn- .
tlon his constant target.

Once having scored victories for

the "people” he demonstrated his political acumen by his con
troversial activities which kept his name constantly on the
lips of Louisianans. Long had successfully opposed vested
corporate interests and could run on his record.
Long became governor of Louisiana in 1928 on an "anti”
platform; but it was not the old anti-Ring, anti-corruption
and inefficiency in government platform which mad© him so
popular and gave Long his support with the people.

The hill

26D. K. Walker, Louisiana & & Jjfee
of 1928 (unpublished term paper for Sociology 161, on file in
Sociology Department, Louisiana State University)#
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folk from whose ranks Huey himself emerged might not he aware
~ Of the theoretical and legal subtleties behind the exploita
tion by corporate interests*

But a politically frustrated

and economically destitute farmer-worker class could under
stand what the championing of Huey long was all about when
he demanded protection of the "people’s” rights and the e$tablishment of public utility rates and tax relief designed
to put more money in their pockets*

Bong chose his opponents

carefully in his political fights against the domination of
vested interests*

Just say that Huey was fighting the

Bourbons and absentee corporate interests, and the farmer of
the hills knew what long was doing*
The ideology of "share our wealth” was perhaps illogi
cal and economically unworkable.

But the simple program of

330 per month Old Age Pension for clti sens over sixty years
of age, the limitation of poverty and working hours, a bal
anced agricultural production which prevented price-lowering
surpluses, and the taxation program which would reduce big
fortunes was something the lower classes in Louisiana and
elsewhere could readily appreciate.

The appeal was disarm

ing, since Long buttressed his talks with liberal quotations
07

from the Bible and from great leaders of all times. ' Huey
Long had a record of stepping on the toes of vested inter
ests, and there was no reason for the people to believe he

27H. p . Long, Sharp j2jj£ Wealth (Washington, D.C.,

1935?).

would not successfully make "every man a king" If he were
elected governor*
Lack of legislative support might stand in the way of
Huey Long carrying out his program*

However, Long had ob

served the traditional maneuvers used to assure success*

If

the legislator votes right, he receives the plums of patron
age at the governor1s disposal, with which the legislator
must satisfy the constituents back home*
through and penalised the opposition.

Long got his program

He likewise faced the

problem of gaining control of the decentralized boards and
commissions*

Again he was successful*

His enemies and the

intellectual articulates were severely critical of Long13
methods, but Carleton Beals, one of those who deplored Long’s
"dictatorship," justified his actions in this situations
Hot Huey, but the political system, was to be blamed.
Theoretically the various boards had previously been
taken out of politics. But as a single party and a sin
gle machine had dominated Louisiana for decades, all
governmental agencies were an integral part of the cor
rupt system* Non-poliiicallzing the board In effect had
merely permitted Ring henchmen to enjoy perfect immunity,
creating foci of permanent political power* Though not
subject to the spoils system of each governor, the boards
were all part of a complicated powerful regime of a vi
cious political clique tied up with large corporations
and the underworld. Huey had to do exactly what Im did,
or else be another meek corporation and underworld puppet
like his predecessors* Whether his purposes were genuine,
whether the reforms he espoused Wire worthy and important
are separate questions entirely

28C * Beals, £&& Story
Huey £* Long (Philadelphia
J* p* Lipplncott Co., 193577 P* 92.
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Huey Long ensured the establishment of his program
for the state, and no Louisiana governor since 1928 has felt
it expedient or wise to throw out the general pattern of
governmental functions of Longism*

He made a public record

to which his partisans pointed with pride
ments were reduced by some 20 per cent*

Property assess**

Huey Long distributed

free school books in the amount of 600,000*

At free night

schools 175,000 illiterates over twenty^one years of age had
learned to read and write*

Long established L* 8* U. as an

institution with an A-l rating $ enrollment was increased from
1.500 to 5,000*

The Long highway program was responsible for

2.500 miles of new paved roads, 6,000 miles of new gravel
roads, and numerous new bridges.

He built the $5,000,000

State Capitol, the $150,000 executive mansion, and the State
University’s School of Medicine in Hew Orleans*

The charity

hospital program had been Increased to care for some 1,800
patients per day, and mental hospitals generally improved*
Regardless of the cost and who was to pay, Huey Long estab
lished a record of achievement which was tangible and durable*
The politics of Louisiana have been called bifactional, v
since the rise of Longism. 3°

It is true that since 1900 only

the Democratic party has been preeminently effective at the
polls.

The Democrats managed this, however, with the suppression

iftpazlnc. October 3, 1932*
3< W , OKJatt.! A. p. Slndler,

PoU

Q& Impl

ant*L, 1^20-1952
t920-19*32 (inipublished
lunpUDxisnea ra*w.
Ph.D. uxssyi-i>«.i>Ion,
dissertation, Harvard uni-*
versity,
►sity, I953T •
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ef legitimate portions of the electorate» faking the long
view, the era of "one-party* politics was transitory*

For

the tradition and economics of two-party politics have been
present in long standing*^

Becent politics could just as

readily be viewed as the on-going struggle between the haves
and the have-nots •
Longism had become one brand of party in this historical
process; and the haves, since 19W, manifest a strong desire
to revolt against the party they had made supreme*

By 1952

it had become apparent that the Long faction inclined to
follow the "real* Democratic party In platform and outlook*
The main Long tendency built up over a twenty-year period has
shown a remarkable consistency, and in the last two extremely
important presidential elections in Louisiana, the coalition
which had been strong in support of Longism has likewise
stood firm for the Democratic party.

Emergent elements in

the social structure had created the possibility of Longism,
and in consequence it was discovered that national and state
wide political behavior paralleled one another again*
Longism, as the Hew Deal, brought more people to the ^
polls than had ever voted previously? in Louisiana, the in
creased turnout was immediately apparent*

In 192^ there were

nearly 100,000 more votes counted than in 1920, and four

c* Havard, Jr*, "Louisiana and the Two-Party Sys
tem," Proceedings of the Louisiana Academy of Sciences, Vol*
XVI (1953).
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y e a l a t e r the total vote of 1920 had been doubled*

At the

s u e time | during the census decade of 1920«*3G, the popula
tion of the state Increased by%&y>l6*9 per cent#

The ap

peal of Huey Long brought out the electorate to the polls,
and the Long faction got the larger part of this increase In
ballots#

Long, as Franklin D* Roosevelt nationally, mas

doing something for the "people,” and regardless of how much
it was costing, and who was going to pay, the people regis
tered their satisfaction upon election day#

By the election

ef 1936, not only had the tradition of Longism become estab
lished, the people had registered their strongest approval#
Governor Leche had been given over two-thirds of the record
total vote of over one-half millions the same year, President
Roosevelt gained the electoral votes of every state but Maine
and Vermont.
Then came the crash, when, it was thought, the house
that Hney built had come tumbling down*

let the lower

classes had not forgotten what Longism had done for them*
In the hotly disputed election of 19*+0, the "reform” faction
barely managed to secure victory*

The social stratification

of Louisiana about 19M) was not such that a candidate more
"conservative” in outlook had a de a r opportunity of break
ing the domination of Longism*

The middle class elements so

crucial in the influence of the outcome of the elections of
the next decade were still in emergence#

The traditional

farmer-planter cleavage remained in the agricultural economy,

and of course the class of number, composed of farmer groups,
had manifested their strong predisposition to support the
candidates of Longism*
Prevalence of a plantation economy establishes social
relationships similar to those present where M g business
prevails*

Both planter and businessman held such economic

Influence that a sizable opposition to Longism might be mus
tered within the electorate,

let the growing Industrial capa

city of Louisiana was bringing not only class elements whose
political tendencies augmented the old Bourbon complex and
at the same time created a new power base, but also an in
creasing labor force which might naturally manifest a politi
cal support more sympathetic to Longism*

Labor organization

had not made appreciable inroads on Louisiana; even so, a
large potential block vote was present*

Farmer and laborer

apparently voted for Earl Long in such number that Longism
was almost perpetuated.

He received a vote of over a quarter

of a million, representing

per cent of the total.

Many groups, despite the cost to their tax pocketbooks,
had registered satisfaction concerning the increased state
services which Longism had provided.

v

No “reform" group could

take this away and still hope to be supported at the polls.
In 19*f0, Sam Jones could only attempt to clean up corruption
and administer the bureaucracy more efficiently*32

Sam Jones,

3 % . H. Weaver, Administrative
M Louisi
ana (Baton Rouge: Bureau of Government Research, Louisiana
State University, 1951 )> Ch*
p. 31*- ff*

a lawyer from Lake Charles, had defeated the forces of Longism,
and although his campaign bespoke the urgency of Hcleaning up
the mess in Baton Rouge,” at the same time it was apparent to
the politically observant that Jones was also the representstive of the new big business groups*
The old Bourbon dominant minority had been forced to
use extreme measures in their ascendancy after 1896 through
the vehicle of the great disenfranchisement; this was an
error which must be recognized*

Just because the "people”

tired of the old order had found a champion who would estab
lish something new was no indication that they were correct
in their action*

The corruptions of Longism would never have

occurred if "liberals” like Sam Jones had been around in 1928$
the wrongs of the past would have been rectified to the
greater glory of the Bourbon-corporate Interests*

But let

Sam Jones explain in his own words, taken from his first leg
islative message on May 20, 19^0s
1 occupy a unique position in Louisiana political
life* I am a liberal who has consistently opposed the
out-going regime because of its tendency towards dictator
ship; because of unconstitutional and undemocratic methods
used, and because of the many flagrant vices evident in
the system used by it* To me these were paramount issues
because the methods used were destructive of democracy
itself. But, I believe in benefits and services on a
safe and sane basis* I have had the audacity to say that
the regime which commenced in 1928 came about as a result
of the faults, defects, and omissions of the administra
tions which preceded it*
The principal reason for the revolutionary changes of
1928 was that the great masses of the people were being
forgotten. In opening my campaign on September 21,

1939* 1 said*

X am mot unmindful of the causes and effects In the
political world, and of the affairs of the state. The
present regime- at Its Inception, was ushered in be
cause of the sins and faults and defects of a pre
existing group* Many thousands of Louisianians were
ready for a change which would dig up by the roots the
power then entrenched and give it to the people — the
benefits to which they were justly entitled. Among these
were many thousands as honest, sincere, and conscientious
as can be found in the state of Louisiana. Among these
was my own father, who hated ..with holy fervor, all that
smacked of corrupt politics.^
The administration of Sam Jones did show some degree of re
sponsibility for the needs of the “people,” through the estab
lishment of Civil Service and of "blue ribbon*1 boards.
But as election time came in 19^-, the actions of the
faction which Jones represented revealed more clearly the
nature of its outlook.

A candidate must be found to fill the

position of governor until Jones could be eligible to run
again in 19W .

“Jimmie” Davis appeared to be a safe choice.

Strumming his guitar, he need not make a stand on any political
issue*

Davis was, as the farmer would say in northeast Loui

siana where Jimmie was raised, rfa good ole country boy**1 It
did not seem to matter that quite obviously oil money was
backing Davis, and apparently was found in large quantity in
the Jonas faction.
In 19+8, the Long faction made a decided comeback, >
with Bari Long running for governor, supported and aided by
his nephew Russell, Huey's son and heir to the political magic

33LQu%slam Senate JQj&ml, 19**0.
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of the name Long.^

Karl was thought to be a politician

close to the lower classes —

at least he posed as a "man of

the people.** Three other candidates had entered the race,
although it was widely believed that in the «run-off« the
struggle would be between Long and Sam Jones , his erstwhile
opponent.

"Jimmie*1 Morrison, congressman from the Florida

parishes, was running again for the third straight time.
Robert Kennon was a "dark horse."

Politically unknown at

this date, the Webster Parish judge posed as a veterans*
candidate and appealed to anti-Long people who opposed "High
^
\
tot" Sam Jones* close connection with big business *0^& )
Jones had the advantage of being the administration
candidate, but the fact that he had, by and large, the sup
port of Industrial Interests counted against him with the
broad layers of the lower classes.

The welfare program pro

posed by Huey’s brother Sari was quite ambitious; but if it
had been fostered with hopes of political perpetuation, the
aspiration was blunted after Long’s victory by quarrels within
the Long faction itself.

Earl’s endorsement at the polls had

been strong, for he beat Jones with 65 per cent of the vote
cast and gained majorities in all but two parishes.
The results of the first primary had forecast clearly
who the ultimate winner would be.

Long gained heavy support

in almost all of the hill parishes of north Louisiana, and in

^Heberle and Bertrand, &£•

P* 3*4-9.

I8*f
tight of the south Louisiana French parishes#

His strongest

opposition was seated In the urban parishes, such as Bast
Baton Bouge, Calcasieu, Orleans, and Gaddo*

Likewise certain

of the Mississippi delta parishes showed considerable opposltion to Earl Long#

let here, analysis on the ward level has

shown that increased populations in Mbackwater" settlements
during the thirties had swelled the farmer vote and that the
Long candidate got many of them.35

Jones, weak in his home

parish of Calcasieu, found his main backing in the urban
areas about Hew Orleans and Baton Bouge*

Kennon*s support

was generally seated about Shreveport, Monroe, and the hill
parishes near his native Webster*

However, Kennon did show

surprisingly strong gains In Lake Charles and Baton Bouge and
in the southern portions of the sugar country? this was per
haps a forecast of things to come#

Morrison scored heavily

in his native Florida parishes, as he had consistently done#
With Long,s strong initial support, and the decided shift of
Morrlsonfs support in his favor, Long had no trouble In the
second "run-offw primary#
The main tendencies which constitute the Long faction,
placed in geographical setting, provide the opportunity for >
isolating certain elements of the electorate#

It is then

possible to check further the expressions of these same ele
ments in regard to political issues of the national scene#

3^Howard, o p

#

clt ** p. 130#
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On© crucial issue which the Louisiana electorate faced was
the Dixiecrat revolt of 19^3*

The action of the "haves" and

the "have-nots," the Longs and the anti-Longs, is quite in
structive of the emerging political situation of the "new"
Louisiana*

For, although Longism and the Hew Deal had done

much for Louisiana, yet they had done little for the political A
aspirations of the Bourbons.
means assured.

Rule of the "people" was by no

There was little labor organisation in 19**8,

very few Negroes had been given the privilege of registering
for suffrage, and party control was still oligarchic*
At first glance, the distribution of pro^Long senti
ment among the parishes for the two decade period, 1928-W,
suggests a pattern similar to the old Whig-Jacksonl&n cleav
age*

(See Figure 3^*)

At least the strongest Long support

is found in the northern hills where the Jacksonian farmer
had made his political choice in favor of the Democracy! and
the area where the faction was least popular falls generally
in south Louisiana*

However, the composition of th© elec

torate in Louisiana parishes had changed over the years, and
it is the parishes retaining a predominant fanner population
which manifest this political tendency.

In general terms,

the fundamental farmer-planter cleavage with roots in the pre
ceding century still exists, modified in time by identifica
tion of farm group and labor groups with Longism and of
planter and industrial Interests within opposing factions.

LONG TENDENCIES FOR SELECTED
ELECTIONS - 192^, 1940 SECOND
PRIMARY, 194^ FIRST PRIMARY
SUPPORT ABOVE STATE AVERAGE
BY PARISHES
>1

None
One
Two

BBS

All Three

MAP

Compilation of Primary Election Returns
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948
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There have been eighteen parishes which have consis
tently supported Long candidates#

These have been pro-Long

from the beginning9 have withstood the storm of the scandals
of 19**09 and found favor with Earl Long again in 1S&8.

The

majority of these parishes cut across north Louisiana, of
course, and contain farmers and workers of low income groups
residing in the rural towns * The three parishes along liteeon
Kidge in the northeast corner of the state stick out as Long
territory! these parishes, West Carroll, Richland, and
Franklin, among the largest cotton producers of the state,
are largely given over to the family farm, where both white
and colored are farmers.

Both St, Bernard and Plaquemines

have registered Long sentiment, but in both of these parishes
there has been evidence of bossism,
Special attention must be given to the situation in
the Florida parishes, for some of them have voter groups who
have supported Longism.

The political career of favorite

son Congressman Morrison has required support for his candi
dacy in many gubernatorial primaries.

Personal appeal has

ruled the first primary, but in the "run-offsw the farmers
and laborers of the KLorldas have voted for th© Long faction.
An example of the vote in Tangipahoa is typical of electoral
behavior.

In 19V8, Morrison and Kennon were eliminated in

the first primary, leaving Earl Long and Jones in th© run
off.

Even though Morrison pledged his support to Jones, his

change to the candidate of big business failed to change the
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political tendencies of his constituents.
Calculations reveal that combination of the Long and
Morrison percentages of the first primary will total remark
ably d o s e to the Long percentage of the second primary*
This holds for the parish total as well as for ward totals.
The entire parish vote for Earl Long and Morrison in the first
primary was 9*979? in the second primary, Long received 9*550,
The fact that the same holds true for the vote of the more
conservative candidates reenforces th© proposition that in
the Florida parishes the farmer and laborer will vote in sup
port of Longisa.

It is only where plantation influence in

the hills of the Felicianas or AInfluences in Baton Bouge pre
vail that the Long following is diminished.
Of course there are farmers in south Louisiana, scat
tered throughout the sugar country.

The Initial appeal of

Loogisa found favor in nearly all of the sugar parishes.
Tet, it was here that the first conservatism in Louisiana po
litics was seated, and the old Whig tendency has not died
out.

There has been a steady drift toward Longism in the

eastern section of the sugar country, whereas the western
portion has crystallised a conservative opposition.

In gen

eral, the parishes to the east of th© Atchafalaya basin have
manifested the development of a different social situation
than exists in the parishes on the western edge*
In searching for a clue which would explain this dif
ferential, the primary Influence would seem to be th© greater

189
industrial development in the parishes along the Mississippi
between Baton Rouge and New Orleans*

Oil and sugar refiner-

leay and sawmills located in the area have produced a situa
tion in the small towns where the majority of the resident
labor force are workers*

The plantation economy remains a

force 9 but the other Influence may be said to be more tell
ing 9 if for no other reason than the greater proportions of
Negro registration occurring in these parishes 5 to date, the
registration of Negroes has been primarily an urban phenome
non*

A cluster of six parishes strung along the Mississippi

River have revealed a recent tendency to Longlsm*^

These

are Iberville, Ascension, Assumption, St. James, St* John,
and 6t • Charles • the combined Negro registration in these
parishes for 1952 was over 10 per cent of the state total*
The alignment of Negro and white laborer comprises an element
of the electorate in majority strength within these parishes,
as the election results have indicated*
The numerical strength of anti-Long support has been
drawn from the urban parishes of Louisiana*

Of course, these

parishes are the seats of the new industrialism which has
changed the Louisiana society*

The cities had likewise been

the home bases of the older commercial interests tied to the
rural conservatives.

Election returns from the urban-industrial

H e b e r l e , G. Hillery, Jr., and F. Lovrich, "Con
tinuity and Change in Voting Behavior in the 1952 Primaries
in Louisiana." The floathweatflga S S S M
Smatit&tiLZ*
Vol. XXXII, U953T.
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parishes have been consistently below the state average of
the candidates of Longisau

Xet the bong forces could expect

to poll some one^third of the vote in these parishes due to
the fact that by and large the laborer has found in bongism
a platform more amenable to his interests.

The events of th©

elections of 1952, to be discussed in the next chapter, will
indicate that the growing tendency is that the vote in the
city will break even, with the conservative elements, perhaps,
prevailing.
The problem must now be solved concerning what happens
to tendencies toward Longlsm when transferred from the arena
of state politics to that of national politics.

The issues

of I f W are chosen because they are tied to the attempt of
the conservatives to regain political ascendancy.

As Key has

pointed out ,37 the black belt was the seat of Bixiecrat agi~
tat ions.

The shadow of the Negro fs presence remained to

haunt the conscience of the Bourbon Democrat.

The Negro was

no longer a threat to political dominance, ©o long as he knew
his place; events on the national scene, however, rubbed the
Bourbon prejudice the wrong way.

The threat of "Trumanism**

set the Bourbons to mending political fences.

The political

climate in Louisiana, however, had been modified by Longlsm,
and the Democratic party, of all things, tended toward the
parallel of the national organisation.

37Key, stS., fiUfc,

There was nothing
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left tat for the conservatives to bolt the party*

A genera

tion or two before, the presence of the Negro had guaranteed
the successful domination of Louisiana by a minority group.
In 19**8, the presence of th© Negro served as an index depict
ing which areas of the state were most susceptible to the
appeal of States' Bights,
The Lllywhite, the Bourbon Democrat, had established
white supremacy by intimidating, and eventually, disenfran
chising the Negro*

Bourbon political prejudice would show

most strongly in those areas where the Negro's presence had
meant Republican polities*

This minority group, though

economically strong, would need political allies*

The farmer

of the hills, Democrat by tradition, was the most obvious
ally*

Yet, the Bourbon had most assuredly alienated the

farmer's affections, in the ©vents of the turn of the century;
and the emergence of Longlsm had assured the former ruling
class that other groups than farmer and labor must identify
with their political and social philosophy if they were to
attain once more the absolute certainty of domination which
had once been the glory of the Bourbon's past*
In which parishes was the support for th© Dlxiecrats
greatest?

Without referring to the election results, it would

be possible to ascertain the parishes with populations com
prised of high proportions of Negroes, and spot these for th©
Dlxiecrats*

In the top sixteen States' Rights parishes, only

three showed percentages of Negroes lower than the state
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TABLE II
HIGHEST AHD LOWEST QUARTILES OF DIXIECRAT VOTE IN 19>+8
AND PER CENT NEGRO, 1950, BY SELECTED PARISHES*
Highest
Quarter
Dixieorat

Per Cent
Jfesro

Madison
Tensas
Concordia
Avoyelles
Evangeline
St* Landry
Pte. Coupee
E* Feliciana
St* Martin
St* Bernard
Plaquemines
DeSoto
Red River
Bienville
Claiborne
Lincoln
•Source«

66.1
6*+,8
59.1
26.0
23.8
w .6
53.6
58.2
36.9
1^.5
38.3
56.6
%.9
*+9.2
51.6
W.l

Lowest
Quarter
Dixieorat

Ouachita
Caldwell
Beauregard
Allen
Calcasieu
Jeff* Davis
Cameron
Iberia
Terrebonne
Iberville
We Baton Rouge —
E« Baton Rouge
Livingston
St. James
St. John
Orleans

Per Cent
Hesro

32.9
28.5
17.0
23.2
22.9
19.1
9.3
38.0
20.3
*+8.7
53.1
33.O
1$.7
50.2 <
*+9.8
31.8

Report of Secretary of State, 19*+8j Sixteenth
Census of U. S., 1950.

average of 35*9 per cent Negro.

Seven Dixieorat parishes

vere predominantly Negro, and in two, the per cent Negro was
between **9 and 5© per cent • At the same time, inspection of
the lowest quarter of Dixieorat parishes will Indicate that
in only two were the whites outnumbered*

It is instructive

to note that in those two parishes, West Baton Rouge and St.
James, the Negro had been allowed to register for the vote,
in 1952*
The Dlxleerats polled **9.8 per cent of th© total pre
sidential vote in 19^8 and the impression would be gained
that the revolt had wide appeal, as nearly every parish of
north Louisiana registered strong support.

Yet, in the light

of the diseusslon preceding, to hold this position would seem
unreasonable. The contention may be made that the Dixieorat
vote was double-pronged; half of the 11revolt” was a protest
on the part of the farmer against the Truman administration.
In 19*& a vote of from a quarter to a third of a parish total
was registered in favor of the Republican candidate In north
Louisiana among many normally Democratic parishes.

It is

maintained that this was a protest vote against administra
tion policies, in an area with a tradition of protest.

For

where did this portion of the vote go in 19^8?
Taking those parishes which registered a vote for the
Republican candidate above the state average of 19 per cent
in 19Mf, it should be possible to trace the direction this
tendency took in the 19M3 presidential election.

Of these

TABLE III

CONTINUITY OF POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN GROUPS OF PARISHES
PARISH PERCENTAGE ABOVE STATE AVERAGE*
l?Mf

Reoublican

l?w
States' RiehtB

Webster
Winn
Grant
Sabine
Vernon
Morehouse
W* Carroll
Richland
Catahoula
Assumption

Webster
Winn
Grant
Sabine
Vernon
Morehouse
W. Carroll
Richland
Catahoula
Assumption

Red River

Red River
Natchitoches
LaSalle
E* Carroll
E. Feliciana
Tangipahoa

Natchitoches

LaSalle
B* Carroll
E. Feliciana
Tangipahoa

19kB
Truman
Webster
Winn
Grant
Sabine
Vernon
Morehouse
w* Carroll
Richland
Catahoula

Beauregard
Calcasieu
Caldwell
Franklin

Beauregard
Calcasieu
Caldwell
Franklin
Union
Ouachita
Iberia

Uhion

DeSoto
Caddo
Bossier
Bienville
Claiborne
Lincoln
Madison
Tensas
W. Feliciana
Jeff* Davis

DeSoto
Caddo
Bossier
Bienville
Claiborne
Lincoln
Madison
Tensas
W. Feliciana

Ouachita

♦Source* Report of Secretary of State,

Jeff* Davis
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thirty-three parishes* nearly all shewed up In the Dixiecrat
column* but with one striking difference*

In some the Dixie-

erat percentage was extremely high, while In more the States*
Rights and the Truman percentages were above the state aver
ages*

It is this differential which belies the unity of the

19M* Republican vote.

While for the electorate of some par

ishes It was a protest vote against the national Democratic
party* in others the 19Mf vote was a protest not against
party but against policy*

In one group of parishes the po

litical climate was such that the revolt was to carry over
into the 19?2 elections* while th© rest were to remain de
voted to Longism and the Democratic party.
There were ten parishes of the 19Mf group which regis
tered percentages favoring the Dlxlecrats in l$k8 with about
two-thirds of the vote.

Here* the leading tendency was ap

parent as the geographical distribution of these parishes
would reveal*

They fringed the heart of the Louisiana hills*

but in none was the traditional farmer vote a dominating ten
dency*

They were planter parishes or those among which the

farmer class was generally more prosperous. To anticipate
clinch the contention that these parishes belonged to th©
conservatives* it will be found that in all ten of these par
ishes the 19?2 Republican percentages were above the state
average•
On the other side of the political center* there were
ten parishes of the 1?M+ group which registered Dixieorat
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proportions above fifty per cent*

Th© support could be no

mere, for the Truman candidacy was also favored by around onethird of the electorate*

The geographic distribution of

these parishes stretches from Macon Ridge, across th© hills,
to the parishes of the Texas border*

Within this area was

seated the old-time traditional farmer vote, a political ten
dency favoring th© Democratic party and long ism*

In 1952 every

ona of these parishes registered majorities for the candidate
of the Democratic party*

There very definitely has been de

lineated here a cleavage and a continuity of basic political
tendencies*
There were, in between the extremes, four parishes of
the 19Mf group which failed to register Dixiecrat percentages
above the state average, while the votes for Truman reached
proportions of from 10 to 15 per cent above the state aver
age of 31.2 for his party.

One of these is Calcasieu, which

of course contained a sizable worker class vote.

On the

other hand, Beauregard, Caldwell, and Franklin are areas
where the tradition of the farmer was predominant,
The remaining three parishes of the group which in
19Mf registered Republican percentages above the state aver
age, Union, Ouachita, and Iberia, had little in common except
the 19Mf vote and the near equal split in the 1952 vote be
tween Republican and Democrat.

Iberia belonged to the group

of parishes of the southern part of th© state traditionally
Whig-Republican. Ouachita is on© of the urban-industrial

centers of the state whose class stratification is scrambled,
with an older plater-commercial layer# farmer groups# a
considerable laboring group, and a middle class of some pro
portion*

In Union there is apparently a Bepublican tendency

of a number evenly matched against the opposing tendency
toward the Democratic party.
The north Louisiana parishes which did not fit the
extremes in voting behavior of the 19k& election tend to
traditional position In support of the Democratic party and
of the Long faction*

The farmer had learned that a protest

might bring results, but he also recognized from whence came
his political bread and butter*
The general pattern, then, in the continuity of protest
since 19Mt is the cleavage in the geographical distribution
of the tendency in north Louisiana*

The fact that the cleav

age follows quite generally the outlines of Long country
would suggest that the differential follows the line between
the '‘haves” and the "have-nots,” and that it is the "haves”
which have revolted, this time*

For of the group of ten par

ishes highlighting the political trend on each extreme, the
control factor, the support of Longlsm, is clearly apparent
only in the group tending Democratic.
ceptions do not upset th© rule.

In each group the ex

Using the three key Long

elections as an index, in the Democratic group the average
support for Longism is 2*5 times, whereas In the DixiecratRepublican group, the average support is only 1*5, with three
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parishes, Caddo, Madison, and West Feliciana “anti* all three
times.
The conservative-liberal cleavage discovered in north
Louisiana is carried over in south Louisiana.

It might be

expected that in the sugar country, the home of Louisiana
conservatism, a consensus of political opinion still existed*
However, this area was no less immune to the Influences which
shaped present day Louisiana society.

Here, too one may

look for differentials in political outlook as expressed in
the ballot*

Xet, the outlet for conservatism might be ex

pected in a different direction than in north Louisiana, since
the tradition of Whig-Republicanism had remained influential*
The conservatism of the sugar country contained more of an
enlightened self-interest than the ideological concern of the
north Louisiana Bourbon*
The year 1920 was one peculiarly sensitive for Repub
lican opinion in Louisiana#

The Progressive-Republican,

Parker, had been elected governor with staunch backing from
south Louisiana, and in the presidential election Harding had
been favored in fourteen parishes, with a Republican vote of
nearly 75 P©** cent having been recorded in Iberia*
ure 35.)

(See Fig

Ten of these parishes were in sugar country*

In

1920 only the “solid South* carried for the Democrats in the
electoral college.

The Democratic candidate had stood on

the Wilson record, and the war-weary electorate defeated him*
There was no alternative candidate, for as one Journalist

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1920
REPUBLICAN SUPPORT IN
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|y
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observed, Harding had been elected ?lby disgust*^®

In the

backgroundf releasing the old Whig concern for self-interest
in sugar country was the subtle question of tariff*

Hot long

after gaining office, the Republicans repudiated Democratic
concern for trade with exhausted Europe and in 1922 estab
lished tariff rates higher than ever before in our history*^9
There had been good reason for the sugar interests to exhum©
and reassert old tendencies*
In 19W, after another “Democratic War,** the sugar
country once again registered strong Republican sympathies*
The tendency had been nurtured over the years, although by
this time the numerical support was not what it once had been*
Every one of the ten sugar parishes which had registered Re
publican majorities in 1920 had, in 19**8, recorded Republican
percentages above the state average of 17*5 per cent.
Figure 3 6 .)

(See

Still, there was no consensus of political

opinion within the sugar country, and the remaining propor
tions of the vote were divided between Dixiecrat and Truman
sentiments*
Iberia showed the leading tendency for th© cluster of
sugar parishes west of the great AtehafaXaya drainage basin.
Here the Republican candidate received a plurality, th©

38J. d . Hicks, Ihe American Ha.tl.on (Bostons Houghton
Mifflin Co., 19^?)» p.y+7.

39g. e . Morrison and H. S. Commager, X&£ Growth of iba
ArmT-innn BarmhUc (Hew Yorks Oxford University Press, 1937),
Vol. II, p. 532.
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returns being b7 per cent in favor of Dewey,

the parishes

grouped on either side of Iberia registered Republican per
centages above the state average, but In these the plurali
ties were gained by the Dixiecrais.

Perhaps there was a

feeling among the conservatives that a States9 Rights vote
would do more in 19^8, but at any rate, the fact remains that
in these parishes almost three-quarters of the electorate had
cast conservative ballots.

Oil was more prevalent here*

The differential is clearly apparent between these DixiecratRepublican parishes and those to the east of the Atchafalaya.
The Republican candidate received the traditional propor
tions, but the balance of the vote In Iberville, St. James,
and St. John was decidedly liberal and pluralities were re
corded for the Truman candidacy.
Within the sugar country, as in cotton country, there
is indication of a political cleavage, in the so&MSim^part
of the state aided by the changing attitude toward Negro suf
frage.

Yet, this is not so surprising when It Is recalled

that in some of these parishes the old Whig tradition had
been strong, and that here the tradition of Negro voting had
been nurtured longest.
If the sugar parishes along the Mississippi between
Raton Rouge and New Orleans have shown a definite Democratic
tendency, they have also been more sympathetic to th© appeal
of Longlsm.

The two tendencies seem to go together.

Lafayette, Iberia, and St* Mary registered Long support in
1928, but have been conspicuous by their absence in the Long
columns since that time; and although some parishes in the
eastern side of sugar country have been slow in accepting
the appeals of Longism, they have steadily demonstrated a
drift in that direction*

Actually, the breakthrough was to

occur in the elections of 1952*

The parishes of the middle

ground, such as St. Martin, Assumption, Lafourche, and Terre
bonne, have recorded rather strong support for Longism, al
though in the latter two parishes the climate of opinion
became more conservative*

The voting records provide ample

evidence that if an economic unit, the sugar country is no
longer unified on political opinion,

let, it is to be sug

gested that the cleavage existent here does not reflect quite
the same ideological background that can be found in north
Louisiana*

After all, the home of conservatism In Louisiana

is in south Louisiana; the Bourbon ideology was fostered under
more trying circumstances and hence carried perhaps a bit
more compulsion and a little less feeling for responsibility.
Finally, It is necessary to devote a few lines to the
tendencies of labor groupings in Louisiana

Baton Rouge is

representative of the recent urban-industrial developments
within the state; quite obviously the development had brought

^ P * H. Howard. wVoting Behavior in Baton Rouge," Proof th© Louisiana Academy of Sciences, Vol. IV,
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aa increased population among which wore elements with an ef~
fact on voting behavior*

At the same time these processes

brought, on the higher socio-economic layers, a population
with a "conservative" vote, there has been a growing worker
class with tendencies to vote "progressive."

As expressed in

the vote, the former groups have backed anti-Long candidates
and in presidential elections Republican candidates or the
"defection® within the Democratic party*

The worker class,

in Baton Rouge at least, has not been strong in support of
Longism, bat will tend to support a Long candidate when
clearly there is no other choice on the basis of fundamental
economic issues; and in presidential elections the workers,
although not organized with definite ties with national un
ions, will parallel the national tendency of supporting th®
Democratic party.

The phenomenon of voting behavior in Baton

Rouge will be pursued further in the next chapter.
Investigation has proceeded to the point which war
rants, in summation, a discussion of generalizations which
may be entertained concerning the significance of one-party
politics and the rise of Longism.

To do so will establish

the relationship which exists between the events of the past
and the situation in which the elections of 1952 were carried
out.

One conclusion Is foremost, that Louisiana politics

may be understood, but only against the background of the his*
terieai circumstances which helped make th® present what it
is.

Class support has been hidden behind party or factional
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labels poorly understood* and further* the labels themselves
may be shifted*

Yet* basic tendencies of political expres

sion may remain consistent*
Political behavior may not always appear reasonable*
In Louisiana politics, significance lies not in the elec
torate's rational choices of Long or anti-Long candidates
but in the tendencies behind the unceasing struggle for power*
Opposing parties or factions are representative of differing
philosophies of government, with traditional backgrounds In
Louisiana political experience*

Yet the social situation had

changed and political outlook must be adjusted in some manner
to the present reality*

In 1952 talk arose concerning the

possibility of two-party politics in Louisiana*

Had not

there always been present at least the necessary ingredients
for party politics, if not the actual opposition of genuine
political parties?
The electorate which voted for the Democratic candi
dates, after 1900, scarcely had an alternative choice*
Those who were able to vote were also fortunate that their
situation was such they met the suffrage requirements#

Such

people might be expected to have an, interest in the party
struggle*

As industrial plants became more prevalent, as the

economic situation bettered, the level of living was raised,
and educational opportunities were afforded, then, the voice
of the people was heard again*

An aspiration for a share of

the realisable potential in Louisiana’s economy, coupled with
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the pent-up frustration of the masses would produce a con
sensus among the very group which if united represented a
majority of Louisiana *s electorate*
Moreover, the history of Louisiana9s political ex
perience might well stress the strong role of the executive
in the state government,

the legislature, throughout most

of the state's history, has been secondary to the governor*
it was expected of the governor to do things when elected.
On the local level, especially in south Louisiana, the poli
ticians, lawyers, sheriffs, and the priests acted as the
spokesmen for the people, who, speaking French, were inar
ticulate of their interests and needs.

Against such a back

ground, is It so surprising that a Huey Long could rise to
political power, and acting the role of the strong man, per
petuate his political program?

The Whig philosophy that the

people should be ruled merged with the Jacksonian belief that
the people should rule.

In Longism the people had everything

to gain.
Yet, if traditionally, the role of the executive was
a major one in Louisiana government, the dogmas, if not the
spirit, of Jacksonian Democracy were perpetuated.

kl

The ex

panding function® of government were scattered among numerous
holders of fragment® of the executive power at th© very time
that rising industrialism made demands of a stronger or more

^Prothro,

cit.t p. 99#
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centralized executive*

Cnee this had happened9 who could

gather again the pieces of executive authority except th©
strong man?

Government by bureaucracy became th© accepted

pattern, and the electorate decided whether direction would
be through their representative, the governor, or through
the action of boards*

Opinion was split on this decision*

Implicit in the political philosophy of the Louisiana
conservative, if his dogma may be so dignified, was the feel
ing for states1 rights and vested interests*14*2

In the first

state constitution, "property” was the basic concern of gov
ernmental activity.

The old Whig had protected his interests

in voting for internal improvements, the banks, and for high
tariff.

Yet at the same time the Whig governed with respon

sibility, for theirs was an articulate major premise.

Th©

cotton planters likewise could find sympathy for the Whig con
cern for vested Interests; but the Calhounian doctrines of
states1 rights, which in the end the cotton planter embraced
In Justifying the Secession, was a doctrine of another shad
ing*

Embodied in the dogmas of the Democratic party which

became the dominating party in Louisiana politics, it remained
an inarticulate major premise*
The dogmas of th© Democratic party were mixed, however,
and although the dominating elite could be guided by th© con
cerns of states1 rights and vested interests, the people,

J. Harris, "States* Rights and Vested Interests,"
Journal of Politics* Vol. 15 (19?3)*
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following the traditions of the Jacksonian past, would nur
ture a more liberal outlook*

For th© Calhounian doctrine

“reserved liberty exclusively to the ruling class, rejected
the egalitarian doctrines of the Declaration of Independence,
denied generally the doctrine of natural rights in its tradi
tional context, and converted the principle of states’ rights
into an instrumentality primarily for the protection of
property rights*"^
If on the national scene the Jeffersonian and Jackson
ian liberalism, and the economic and social legislation re
quested by the Populists, had become part of th© program of
the Democratic party culminating in the Hew Deal, then in
Louisiana a similar spirit might prevail in the Democratic
factional program of Longism*

The electoral support of farmer

and laborer given to Long candidates would suggest this con
clusion*

Objectively viewed, the actions of the opposing

conservative faction, since its ascendancy in 1900, and par
ticularly since 19^8, suggest an attitude of cynicism*

let

subjectively the spokesmen and principal actors In the Bourbon
camp most likely are motivated by genuine attitudes of concern*
The most recent anti-Long governor of Louisiana, for example,
has worked day and night for the cause of states® rights and
I
yet often describes himself as a Jeffersonian Democrat*

^ I b i d .. p. *4-59•
C o r n i n g Advocate. Baton Houge, Nov. 22, 1953.
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He might more accurately be labeled a Calhounian.
The rise of Longism in Louisiana was made possible
by the rather severe domination of the populace by one party
controlled by a dominant minority*

The people, frustrated

beyond endurance, found their champion in Huey Long, and
quite conscious of their position in society and aware of
what should be done about it, supported and established the
reign of Longism.

As on the national scene, most of the

latent class conflict of th© thirties was averted through
political action in Louisiana, and a generation of small
farmers and portions of the working class learned to favor
Longism.

Its program was satisfactory for the period for

which It was meant, but by 1950 the records of the United
States Census showed that economic and demographic influ
ences had transformed Louisiana society*

CHAPTER V
THE ELECTIONS OF* 1952 ARP THE FUTURE OF LOUISIANA POLITICS
•We were told fop a half century that if the
people In the South even thought of voting
Republican, grandfather would turn over in his
grave. Well, no noise was heard from the cemeteries••. • last November•Gov. James F. Byrnes

A. Demography and Polities. The good governor of South
Carolina, in speaking of Hepublloanism in the South of 1952,
forgot to make clear that those were representatives of the
very politically dominant minority of which he is a member
who had exhorted Democratic solidarity.

This is no anachro

nism, either, for the governor meant what he said.

It ap

peared "safe," In 1952, for the conservatives of the South
to give strong electoral support in behalf of the Republican
candidate.

More than being safe, however, it can be demon

strated that this move was but an inevitable consequence of
the demographic factors which influenced the establishment
of, and reflect the existence of, the "New South."

Para

doxical events transpired In the Louisiana portion of this
new South, events which could not be clearly understood
through sole use of old formulae.

The demographic indices

of social structure in Louisiana will be employed to show
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that Louisiana politics, after 1952, will never be quite the
same as traditionally conceived.
Demographic characteristics, such as the composition
of the population, have of course always influenced politics.
The old antagonism between Creole and American, the gradual
outnumbering of Whigs by Jacksonians, and the importance of
the Negro vote during Reconstruction, all these and more have
worked their effects upon Louisiana politics.

If, in the

past, migration peopled the state with a farmer class, it
was also to work In transforming the social structure of the
aid-twentieth century.

The small farmer groups of the hills

and "cut-over** parishes developed a class solidarity and be
came the backbone of support of Longism.

The industrial

labor force present in the Louisiana of 1952 might become
supporters of a politics of another sort.

The tabulation of

the Federal Census of 1950 Indicated that Louisiana was no
longer to be characterized as rural, but had become pre
dominantly urban.

There is also an accompanying industrial

growth which will remake the structure of the formerly agri
cultural society.
The former traditions, the political symbols of th©
past, must somehow be adapted to changed conditions.

In the

1950 fs there were new sources of power and of electoral sup
port.

There would be combinations established and tried in

the ceaseless struggle to man the machinery of government.
The Louisiana of 1950 reflected demographic characteristics

more similar to national trends than to her own past.
The demographic tendencies or trends hinted at were
observable by 19*+0 and have been evaluated elsewhere.*

In

the next decade, more of the same is dlscernabl® and leading
features of the trend to industrial urbanity will be pre
sently discussed.

The population growth and distribution in

Louisiana shows an Increase of people in the cities.

The

urban centers have become the key to political success if for
no other reason than the sheer number of voters who reside
there.

Industrialization has afforded a host of job oppor

tunities, and since manufacturing plants have been concen
trated in but seven of Louisiana's sixty-four parishes, the
resulting voting labor force Is not only concentrated but also
tends to outnumber other groups within the electorate.

The

trend to industrial urbanity developed in Louisiana a situa
tion parallel to national experience, the shift in the class
structure.
It was a generation ago that Professor Holcombe ob
served that the old geographic sectionalism in American

LP. H. Howard, She Political Ecology s i teBlataaft
(unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State University,
1951)} B. Heberle, Jhg Labor Force In Louisiana (Baton Rouges
Louisiana State University Press, lyw)} T» L» Smith and H.
L. Hitt, JEts People of Louisiana (Baton Rouges Louisiana
State University Press, 1952).
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politics m s giving m y or being modified by a rising urbanity.2
there m s sectionalism in Louisiana politics, but class cleav
age, also, as the rise of Long ism demonstrated! now this would
be changed.

As C. Wright Mills has shown, of the three broad

strata comprising present day society, it has been the "mid
dle class" which has grown steadily In proportion to the
whole.3

it could be assumed, in the case of Louisiana, with

industrial urbanity a rather sudden event, that the very
population aggregating in the cities would be quite middle
class in the new sense*

Of course the industrial labor force

would be comprised of a large share of working class people,
but nonetheless the proportion of people falling into the
middle income brackets would be appreciable.
As the industrial base of Louisiana Increased within
the last decade, its influence was felt in the social class
structure*

For the nation, Mills has shown how the decline

in the older, independent sectors of the middle class was
accompanied by the numerical rise of the newer groups of sal
aried employees A

This trend is striking for Louisiana, even

when using but two census compilations for comparisons*

The

A . N* Holcombe, Sis fl§E forty Politics (New fork*
Harper and Bros*, 1933>5 also Holcombe, 1 M Mj&fllg
la
American Politics (Cambridge* Harvard university Press, 19 w;
^c, W. Mills, White Collar (New York* Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1953)* pp. o3-6pT
^Ibld.. p. 65.
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proportion of self-employed had dropped from 27*7 to 19*2 per
eent since 19**0, whereas there was an accompanying rise in
the proportion of private wage and salaried workers from 58*9
to 67*9 per cent*

Moreoverf the gain within the major occu

pational groups of professionals, managers and officials,
clerical, and sales people, generally falling into the sal
aried middle class, was proportionately 8*W per cent more in
1950 than in the previous count.
A word of caution must be given, however, in the in
terpretation of these percentages*

For the newer industrial

base has been placed over the older agricultural base of
Louisiana economy*

Yet, even agriculture has not remained

unaffected by recent changes*

The farmer was considered a

part of the older middle classes, but his place, numerically,
in the new order has dwindled.

Part of the decrease in self-

employed persons and the increase in wage and salaried em
ployees may be a direct consequence of the proportionately
fewer farmers in the Louisiana labor force.

In 19**0 farmers

made up 18.3 per cent of the total labor force, but by 1950
this group comprised only 10*3 per cent of the total*

At the

same time, farm laborers also made up less of the labor force?
the proportion was 13*6 per cent in 19*+0 and only 6.6 per
cent a decade later.
The rural sociologist will point out that much of this
decrease in the number of farmers is a direct consequence of
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the mechanisation of agriculture,5

it is true that owner-

operated farms are increasing, while sharecroppers and
laborers are on the wane*

At the same time we are told that

the number of farms is decreasing*

There are fewer farms and

those that remain are increasing in size*

This has meant a

decrease in the rural population, and this helps explain the
facts concerning composition of the Louisiana labor force*
With no work in the country, even more people have migrated
to the urban areas*

The mechanisation of agriculture takes

a sectional differentiation.

Least mechanized, generally

speaking, are the parishes Included In the north and central
Louisiana hill and cut-over areas*

Along with mechanization

there has been an increase in the total value of farm pro
ducts; this has meant generally a higher level of living*
Hence even as the industrial-urban trend has helped change
the class structure of Louisiana society, so also mechaniza
tion has affected the composition of the farmer class within
the system of stratification*
The population, elements of which will fill the economic
class positions described above, was characterized as predomi
nantly urban in 1950, for the first time in Louisiana's census
history*
total.

The urban population made up 5 W 3 per cent of the
The population as a whole had increased 13*5 per cent

?A. L. Bertrand, Agricultural IMfifaM&a-Uaa S M iSSlal
Chance in Rural Louisiana. Louisiana State University Experi
ment Station Bulletin, No * M>8 (1951)•
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ever 19*^0, but spectacular gains were mad® in the urbanindustrial parishes.

The census computations Indicate, for

example, that almost two-thirds of the population Increase
In the state was accounted for by Orleans, East Baton Rouge,
and Jefferson parishes.

East Baton Rouge continued its rapid

expansion with an increase of 79#0 per cent, while in Jeffer
son Parish the population had increased by 106 per cent.
Such is obvious, for when driving to New Orleans from the
northwest, it is difficult to discern when one leaves Jeffer
son and enters Orleans Parish.

Jefferson Is rapidly becoming

industrialized and portions of the parish have become the
residential suburbs for New Orleans.

With Jefferson as the

latest addition to the group of urban-industrial parishes,
there are now seven whose population represents ^7*2 per cent
£
of the Louisiana total.
The residents of these seven parishes make up an im
portant segment of the Louisiana electorate.

Nearly half the

people of the state live there, making up WJ.l per cent of
the total registered voters in 1952.

At the same time it is

revealing of the urbanward migration of Louisiana Negroes
that in 19?0 over two-fifths of the state total resided in
these seven urban-industrial parishes.

And in 19?2, the

colored voters there represented 62*9 P®r cent of the total
who had registered in such large number.

The colored

^Jefferson, Orleans. East Baton Rouge, Calcasieu,
Rapides, Caddo, and Ouachita.

residents made up close to a third of the population in most
of these parishes,
Even though the Negro was also becoming urbanised,
there were still fourteen parishes, in 1950, where the white
population was outnumbered by the colored,

These parishes

follow down the Mississippi, border part of the Floridas,
and cluster about the northwest corner of the state.

In gen

eral pattern, the rural Negro population follows the seats of
the former plantation economy still, after all these years,
W. J. Cash had called the Negro the ^Proto-Dorian bond of
the Democratic p a r t y , a n d with his heavy voting registra
tion in the urban parishes it is Instructive that little or
no Negro registration was allowed In the rural parishes
where in 1952 the conservative vote was so high.

The Negro

had generally found a new freedom but it would b© slow in
spreading back from the urban centers into the rural hinter
land •
As a substitute for the lack of a better index of the
relative Incidence of "capital" and "labor" within the par
ishes, a ratio has been computed showing the proportion of
wage and salary workers to those self-employed In each parish
(See Figure 37.)

As expected, the large worker ratio occurs

clustered about the urban centers.

The areas where agricul

ture Is primary stand out with low ratios.

7W. J. Cash, X M Mind g£
A. Knopf, 1951)? P* 213*

In the hills

South (New tforkt Alfred
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RATIO OF PRIVATE WAGE AND
SALARY WORKERS TO SELF-EMPLOYED
1950 BY PARISHE3
1st quarter:
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-
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2nd quarter:
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-
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3rd quarter:

.449 -

4 th quarter:

.680 - 2.486

.666

• /A * # ’

Source:

Seventeenth Census of the United States^ 1950
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between Rapides and Ouachita, the agricultural pattern is
broken due to the relatively high worker ratios resulting
from the presence of lumber industries which draw from farmer
groups for a labor force*

Southwest from Rapides, until Cal

casieu is reached, there is likewise a cluster similar In
characteristics to the hill parishes*

The distribution of

high ratios within the sugar bowl probably reveals the asso
ciation of labor with the processing end of the sugar indus
try.

There are also scattered lumber, seafood, oil, and

chemical industries In the small towns and cities of south
Louisiana*
The more concentrated distribution of high worker
ratios in south Louisiana results from the greater density
of population in that area of the state where the older
layer of agriculture, industry, and commerce had flourished*
Yet the parishes close or adjacent to the Mississippi Elver,
such as Assumption, St* James, St* John, and St* Charles
have in each considerably smaller populations than Iberia
and St* Mary parishes farther west, beyond the Atchafalaya
basin* (See Table IV.)

In the former areas, any substantial

increase in the number of industrial establishments would be
felt in the composition of the labor force.

Moreover, in

this area there are no large cities or towns*

Iberia, St.

Mary, Terrebonne and Lafourche, on the other hand, contain
in each a city with more than 7,000 population.

Her© addi

tions to the labor force in the categories of wage and salary

TABLE IV

DIFFERENTIALS i n s e l e c t e d r a t i o of c o m p o s i t i o n o f l a b o r f o r c e
IN CERTAIN SUGAR PARISHES AND POPULATION OF LARGEST
CITY OR TOWN ABOVE 2,^99 IN 1950*
Population of
Largest City
or Town
Above 2 fk99

Parish

Ratios of Managers, Officials,
and Proprietors**
to Craftsmen, Operatives and
...
Kindred Workers

St* John
St* Charles
St* James
Assumption
Ascension
Iberville

.132
.182
*161
•l*fl
.198
.300

5,737

St. Mary
Iberia
Terrebonne
Lafourche

.302
.2bb
.211
.2k6

h?P
16A60
11,W0
7,733

♦Source:

Seventeenth Census of the U. 3., 1950.

♦♦Farmers Excluded.

******
******
******
m**m
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workers would be counterbalanced by other elements of the
population already present*

However, in the eastern parishes

worker groups would tend to outnumber the older layers of
planter and commercial groups and associated classes*

While

in Iberia and St. Mary parishes from 10 to 15 per cent of
the population was engaged In manufacturing in 1950, in St*
James and St. John the proportions were from 22 to 36 per
cent.

Likewise, the ratios In the accompanying table clearly

reveal the relatively greater Importance of worker groups In
the parishes along the Mississippi.

Moreover, as has been

shown above, there are many more Negroes In these parishes
who have gained the suffrage*

All these factors work to pro

duce a voting potential different in kind from that which
exists in the western parishes of the sugar country.
The politician must make different appeals and seek
different combinations of electoral support in this new Loui
siana.

Cleavages of classes and Interests cut across the

former alignments.

It would no longer be possible to unite

country against New Orleans, or the latter with a portion of
the former.

The increase of population In urban centers has

created a new middle class whose favor at the polls must be
won.

Likewise, the class structure of the rural parishes

has shifted.

The farmers of today are generally more secure,

better educated, and more prosperous than previously.

If

the class position of the rural or urban dweller had been
altered and generally improved, so the subtle process of
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identification might work in the direction of alliance with
the older statue groups of prestige and power*

Surely the

predispositions of the old Bourbon Democrat might remain in
force, reenforced through the aspirations of social mobility
among the members of the new emergent middle class*
With the establishment of television stations in
Louisiana cities, a virtual revolution might take place on
the farm*

The values and attitudes standard for the urbanite

would find their way to alter the rural mind*

In recognition

of the potentials of this phenomenon a farmer recently told
the writer than in the next elections the candidate who most
efficiently utilized the channels of television could be the
governor of Louisiana*

On the national scene elections cost

more and more money because of the expenses Involved in
using the mass

media of

surely be felt

quite soon in Louisiana politics*

B.

communication*This trend must

Rise Qf j&£ "Independent" s

PMmariftg. of

the ninegubernatorial candidates in the Demo

cratic primary

of 1952, only five weregiven serious consid

eration, although Dudley LeBlanc counted himself in the
running, also*

The results of the election indicated that

Louisiana politics could still be understood in terms of the
Long and anti-Long cleavage.8

let the campaign brought out

8H. Heberle, G. Hillery, Jr., and F* Lovrich, "Con
tinuity and Change in Voting Behavior in the 1952 Primaries
in Louisiana," T M Southwestern gafij&L SSiSSm M X l S Z l Z ,
Vo. XXXII (1953TT
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dearly the fact that more than the old political battle with
the former symbols was involved
In the first place, every leading candidate considered
himself an independent*

Even Judge Spaht denied that he was

Charley McCarthy to Earl Long’s Edgar Bergen; he was dedi
cated to the program of Longism but pledged himself to admin
ister it with efficiency and humaneness*

McLemore held that

the "Long-Long" team of Spaht and Boggs was a plot of
Governor Bari Long and Senator Russell Long to perpetuate
Longism*

However,

task: of explaining

each leading contender set himself to the
to the electorate what was new and differ

ent about his program and why he was the ’’Independent'1 candi
date best suited for the position of governor*

The very

actions of the candidates themselves, then, in 1952 indicate
that the politicians of the new Louisiana were on uncertain
ground and had to feel their way, to play safe and be indepen
dent.

The problem was one of who should be appealed to, to

attempt to be all things to all groups of voters.
The leading

political philosophies and slogans which

were present on the national scene were voiced by the inde
pendents during the campaign, adapted of course for home con
sumption.

A brief analysis of the platforms of the leading

candidates will make it possible to ascertain the ways in
which the politicians reached what they thought to be Important

9ffew Orleans Item. This paper ran weekly columns
printing views and reports of the candidates.
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segments of electoral support.

At the same time It will be

possible to isolate some of the reasons why groups of voters
had supported one candidate rather than another,

the ©lec

tion was to be a meeting ground between the old and the new.
Although the "reform" administrations of 19*f0 and
19^f had left much of the bureaucracy of Longisia intact, the
administration of Bari Long proved to be four years of high
taxes and heavy spending

"Welfare statlsm" was given its

greatest boost in Louisiana at the same time the national
trend was to take a rather drastic turn away from the dangers
of "creeping socialism,"

the observant politician might de

tect that the new middle class was among those most receptive
of this idea.

In the spring of I9V8 the Long administration

Increased the tax collections by 63 per cent#

The welfare

state would cost money, and In the first year of Longfs ad
ministration the tax take was slightly more than $200 million.
The other side of the tax coin m s spending.

Whereas the

state total of the last year of Davis1 administration amounted
to $170 million, spending rose to $336 million during the
1951-52 fiscal year.

Long attempted several power grabs,

and In so doing alienated the respect of his nephew Russell,
Bari was of the old school of Longism, but Russell seems cut
of a different cloth.

The truth may lie in the remarks of a

10New Orleans Item, May 11, 19521 Mr. Edward Stagg
summarized the "Long Regime,"

225
columnist who pointed to Russell’s good standing in the
Senate and of the cynical summation of a wag who felt that
"education is the ruin of a demagogue."^

At any rate, the

Bari Long administration was going out of office» but b e n e 
fits" seemed to be here to stay*

The independents of 1952

would be expected to take some stand on these matters*
This study has focused upon the presence of groups
and groupings within Louisiana, of factors which influence
the development of "climates of political opinion" manifested
in voting behavior*

In 1952, with such a large number of

"Independent" candidates with an eye on the governorship, it
might be difficult to untangle elements of support unless the
various appeals of the candidates are known*

Pronouncements

of "political philosophies" during a campaign are not to be
taken too seriously, but on the other hand they are about the
only source of ideological factors available*

Nevertheless,

whether the quintessence of the politicians' "ideology" can
be distilled from campaign speeches and circulars» there is
no doubt that the intention of the candidate is to touch sym
pathetic tendencies of the voter and draw them out in his
favor*

It is with this word of qualification that the fol

lowing analysis of the gubernatorial election of 1952 is made*
Dudley J. LeBlanc's appearance in the 1952 gubernatorial
race certainly fitted the temper of the year.

Although an

11New Orleans Item. July 25, 1952; Doris Fleeson,
syndicated columnist.
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early supporter of the program ©f Longism, LeBlanc had be
come a successful manufacturer of Hadacol*
would be that of the business man’s.

His approach

His idea was to sell

Louisiana to the manufacturing world by offering Inducements
more attractive than those of neighboring states*

LeBlane

pledged a business man’s government and summed up his plat*
form in these words t
Political and economic opportunists like political
termites are boring into the very foundation of our
financial structure of government for their own selfish
aggrandisement* It is time to call a halt to all this.
It is time to elect a businessman to run the biggest
business of them all, the government of the state of
Louisiana.
Dudley said he was the man for the job and that If elected
he would get new industry to offset the unemployment that was
resulting from the agricultural mechanization in the state*
The campaign platform of Bill Dodd, the estranged
lieutenant-governor of the Long administration, seemed gen
erally to accept the program of Longism*

He would fight the

power grab, and having had governmental experience, his elec
tion would insure a smooth transfer of office*

He had coop

erated fully with the undertaking designed to help the people
and had openly fought the attempted grabs of lari Long.
Dodd remarked that he had "... always been independent, yet*...
tried to cooperate with.... friends to carry out the programs

^ffew Orleans Item. Oct. 28, 1951» P» 20.
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designed to help the general welfare of our state

Dodd

felt that taxes could be reduced even under the type of ad
ministration the people were now enduring*

^odd had many

friends in the state, especially among labor unions*

Tet

in his campaign reports the impression was gained that he
often talked to convince himself that he was the man to beat*
The candidate who proved to have the most conspicuous
class appeal was James McLemore» The election results showed
that his support was definitely drawn from plantation areas.
A businessman, McLemore was an avowed independent, by his
own admission the only "real" independent in the field*

His

campaign headquarters Initiated a "Citizens’ Revolt" akin to
the "Crusade" which was called later the same year.

Toward

the end McLemore declared the other so-called Independents
were worried over the swing to McLemore, and the count of the
vote indicated that there definitely had been a swing,
McLemore appealed widely among the prestige and power groups
and the new middle class, too*

His line was that the revolt

against the "Trumanism-Socialism" debacle in Washington and
the political machine was red hot*
state spending lowered.

Taxes must be reduced and

However, McLemore was careful to

state that he was not against welfare,
would get assistance —

Kvery needy citizen

the political padding would go, and

the state would save money.

McLemore was also the heir

13Ibld.. Sept. 16, 1951, p. 2»t.

apparent to the I9W
statesf rights.

Dixie erat movement, for he was openly

McLemore could sum up his position in this

maimer«
From this point forward we must have a governor who
has integrity, who is a fearless fighter, who is an ex
perienced administrator who knows, from experience, the
problems of both business and agriculture. We must have
a governor who firmly believes in states1 rights and is
willing and able to fight a stern campaign to win back
those wrested from us, and to defend those the federal
government is steadily encroaching upon.1
In the new Louisiana the feeling that it was "time for
a change" was widespread.

It was discernible in the opposi

tion candidates were voicing to the Truman machine or the
Long machine.

The attempt to lump the candidacy of Hale Boggs

within the endorsement of the Long machine is an example of
the tendency.

The campaigning of Boggs with the aid of

Bussell Long was an impressive combination of political tal
ent, for both were highly regarded In the House of Represen
tatives and in the Senate, respectively.

The senator*s

charge that his Uncle Bari had "mansionitls" was sincere on
his part.

The break within the Long faction was definite.

Even the conservative Shreveport Times denounced the talk of
a double entry and openly endorsed Hale Boggs for governor.
Boggs recognized the traditional power of the governor
in Louisiana when he asked that the legislature be utilized
for more than a rubber stamp.

"In Louisiana," Boggs declared,

"the Legislature has too often been the political football

ll|tIbld.. Nov. llf 1951* p. 8.
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of the executive branch*

In thl® state, the governor has

exercised great powers over legislation —

powers too potent,

weakening that branch, destroying its integrity, debilitating
its character*
dictatorship*"^

Such a hold is the first step toward complete
In this, Boggs too revealed his opposition

to Earl Long, but neither would he throw out all aspects of
Longism along with the present administration.

His platform

called for an improved old age pension program $ a cost of
living raise for school teachers? the modernisation and im
provement of all public institutions? rebuilt, widened high
ways? flood control and drainage? and the attraction of
commerce and industry to Louisiana.

Under his program It

would be "Louisiana First."
Carlos Spaht was the choice of Bari Long to succeed to
the governorship? Spaht was chosen only after Long had tried
other persuasions in vain, however.

The Long candidate would

stand on the Long program, of course*

Spaht pointed out that

most of the opposition said they would retain all benefits
of the present state administration and at the same time pro
mise multiple tax reductions.
trick if it could be done.

This was said to be a good

Briefly, Spaht pledged the fol

lowing
To carry out the constructive and humanitarian program
of the present state administration.

15IbM*, Nov. 11, 1951, p. 8.
l6Ibid.. Sept. 16, 1951, p. Sk.
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Not to Increase and wherever possible to decrease
taxes and operating expenses*
To maintain the old-age pension and welfare programs.
Continue to expand and improve state roads.
Preserve and advance wherever possible hospital,
dental, and health programs*
Better conditions at Angola and other state institu
tions through employment of outstanding doctors, penolo
gists and administrators*
Protect communities and observe home rule*
Safeguard oil, gas and timber, and other natural re
sources •
Maintain and improve educational program*
Establishment of a Governor’s Advisory Council.
Constitutional civil service*
The Spaht platform pledges were so similar to those of Kennon
that it is difficult to decide whether the Long forces did
the copying, feeling that camouflage was needed, or whether
Kennon copied Spaht*

At any rate, it was clear that no in

dependent could start completely from scratch.
Robert Kennon claimed throughout the campaign that
his was the first announced platform and that the other can
didates had borrowed from it as they found that Kennon was
gaining such favor with the people*

Whate%rer the case, the

Judge from linden had a twelve-point platform which included
these pledges*^
Continuance of $50-a-month old-age assistance.

17Ne» Orleans Tlmea-Plcayone. Jan. 17, 1952, p. 1.
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Businesslike administration of affairs of highway
commission through establishment of a board .
Repeal two cents additional gasoline tax enacted in
19W.
Improvement of public health.
Removal of state Institutions from political control
by creating boards*
Prison reform.
A modern.parole system.
Preserve home rule. J

f

Constitutional civil service*
?oting machines made available in every voting precinct *
Bring new industry to Louisiana.
Encourage agriculture and make an effective team of
farmer, businessman, and banker*
Were there common elements which tied the platforms of these
candidates together?

And were there essential differences

between the platforms of the 1952 gubernatorial candidates?
Taking the two candidates who entered the "run~off,"
Kennon and Spahts

their platforms had much in common*

If

it were true that Spaht ran on the Long program, then what
was Kennon doing with a similar program?

Kennon might well

have considered himself the heir to the Mreform" administra
tions of 19*f0 and 19Mf, for his platform, like those, could
not be radically different from that of the administration
in office*

Wo wholesale removal of any Long endorsed prac

tice was suggested.

Welfare aid was to be continued, the

institutions were to be furthered, Angola was to be improved,
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Louisiana highways were a key problem, and home rule was to
be preserved. The difference was that Kennon was going to
continue services and at the same time cut taxes*

Being an

independent with no previous record in government, Kennon
eould more easily make his promises sound legitimate*

Kennon

was clearly in line with the traditions of "reform** in his
endorsement of government by boards, and in his backing of
civil service*
The essential difference between the programs of Spaht
and Kennon appeared to be that Kennon presented his platform
with the promise of a businesslike administration.

Louisiana

was experiencing an unprecedented prosperity, and who but
the businessmen had made this possible?

Spaht was dedicated

to the task of carrying on the program of Longism*
smacked of corruption and machine politics*

But this

This sort of

government would parallel "TruiBanism” on the national scene*
Against this Kennon proffered an administration whose virtue
would be self-righteousness and whose watchword would be ef
ficiency.

Maybe the Kennon program was not so different from

past reforms, after all.

Yet Robert Kennon made his strong

est appeals In the urban areas of the state, and did not
make the effort that other candidates did in the rural areas
of the state.
know-how.

Kennon, it appeared, was up on his political

The people of Louisiana had come to accept the

good of Longism as an inevitable function of modern govern
ment.

No one dared take it away*

Kennon, then, gave the
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Impression that he was a man of the people, the people of
the 1950*s| he posed as the middle class*s Huey Long*
Whether Earl Long and his political henchmen, or Spaht
and his personal friends, composed the Long platform of 19?2,
it was written in such a way as to meet the challenges of the
opposition*

It too would he carried out constructively, and

with the humanitarian touch traditional of Longism*

Lest

there be any danger at all of any more power grabs, Spaht
endorsed the establishment of an advisory council In order to
make the new Long administration the most incorruptible and
productive*
The program endorsed by Congressman Boggs read more
like something the national Democratic party might back on
the local level*

Perhaps this is why McLemore labeled Boggs

the Truman candidate*

Yet the congressional record of Mr*

Boggs Indicated that he was quite middle-of-the-road concern
ing domestic policies.

The Impression gained from studying

the platform of Boggs was that here was a candidate willing
to carry on the gains of the past twenty years, and to do so
with the efficiency and understanding of an administrator
aware that functions of government work to the people*s good*
The "independent,1* McLemore, was not the independent
representative of the good of Longism or of anti-Longism*
His candidacy, consciously or not, represented the assertion
of the older Bourbon Democratic faction, adapting its contin
uing revolt to the situation of 1952*

Truman had beat out
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the Dixiecrats, and now they had ample ammunition to hurl at
the Democratic party*

McLemore, as suggested above, picked

up a groundswell of support as the campaign drew to a close*
He was not supposed to have a real chance, and yet he ended
up fourth and ran ahead of Bill Dodd*
Pick up any copy of Mad.py.lS filmjL and there may be
found journalistically undigested slogans and slurs opposing
the Democratic status

quo

*

Free enterprise and "rugged"

individualism were proposed as the traditional American answer
to the evils of ’'creeping socialism1* and "mink coat1* corrup
tion*

Therein may be found the essence of McLemore1s plat

form and appeal*

It was conservative, with a touch of

nostalgic reaction*

The political climate was such that a

platform like that one, if clearly perceived, would find
broad favor within the electorate among all groups Involved
in the insecurity of the "status panic" or disposed to lean
to the political right of center.

Since more than fourteen

papers, Including the Times-Plcayune* endorsed McLemore, It
Is not surprising that the "citizens' revolt*' should have
ended with a sizable following*

It was a select following,

too, composed of the leading economic and status groups of
city and country*
Longism had been the champion of the small people, the
farmer, the worker, and the small businessman, whose tradi
tional support was firmly seated*

In 195^j the die-hards,

the farmers of the hills, remained loyal to the tradition?
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bat even here the area of support had shrunk.*®

The clearcut

differential of farmer class opposed to planter and business
interests was blurred.

Take Macon Hidge, for example.

The

cotton farmers of the parishes located here, many of whom
had come from the hills, supported Spaht in the first pri
mary bat endorsed Kennon in the 11run-off11 with between 52
and 58 per cent of the total vote.
was divided.

The farmer class itself

Good times had brought the farmer security and

a newly found status, and he looked further up the class
ladder for his identification.

A natural social-psychological

process had worked its influence.
Spaht1s support had come primarily from the country.
LeBl&nc and &odd turned out to be "favorite son" candidates
and failed to gain much support outside their home territor
ies.

The crucial battle of the 1952 elections was fought in

the urban parishes.

Kennon proved the candidate with the best

organization, and his city vote made the difference.

He had

claimed that with thirty thousand Hew Orleans votes in the
first primary victory would be hisj more than thirty-three
thousand Kennon votes were counted.

In the second primary*

the urban appeal of Kennon was overwhelming* for In the seven
urban-industrial parishes the electorate had favored his can
didacy with 65.2 per cent of the parish totals.

Moreover, the

contribution of these seven parishes to the total state vote

*®Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrlch,
1 and 2.

clt.. figures
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of Kennon was *+9*8, almost one-half of the entire Kennon
support*

Spaht, on the other hand, gained but **2*2 per cent

of his second primary support in the urban areas*
Recently an attempt was made to identify the six lead
ing candidates of the gubernatorial elections in terras of
traditional Long and anti-Long support*^

Computations of

rank-order coefficients of correlation indicated that whereas
the combined "anti-Longw group of Kennon, McLemore, and
LeBlanc was given support from similar geographic areas and
social strata, the combined "Long* group of Spaht, Dodd, and
Boggs was given no such unity of support*

The conclusion

was drawn that Kennon not only picked up McLemore and LeBlanc
support in the second primary, he also gained some support
from first primary Long candidates*

It may be contended that

the reason for this was the blurring of the traditional
Long-anti-Long struggle.

Political differences were expressed

in other terms.
Compilations of election results by wards have been
made available since the Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrleh study
was published*
for two reasons*

They have been utilized in the present study
In the first place, it was felt that a study

of the relationships of voting support by wards might cancel
out regional variations and more clearly indicate rural-urban
and socio-economic differences*

Secondly, since the number

^Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrich,
tables, p. 336.

op

* cit*f correlation
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of wards is so much greater than the sixty-four parishes, it
would he possible to use a more refined correlation formula.
Computed on the basis of returns in the 532 wards, Pearsonian
product-moment coefficients of correlation for grouped data
between the support of the candidates have been established.^

TABLE V
PRODUCT -MOMENT COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN KENNON
SECOND PRIMARY SUPPORT AND THAT OF LEADING CANDIDATES
IN THE FIRST PRIMARY, BY WARDS*
McLemore

Kennon

LeBlanc

Boggs

Dodd

-**.106

-**.039

-.136

----- JasfijL. ____
Kennon Second

**.Mf3

^#319

Spaht

EA&sl
-.7^8

♦Source* Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana,
1952.

Only one of these coefficients approaches the range of
very much significance, yet they are of relative importance
in the comparison of electoral support of the candidates.
It was discovered that correlations on the ward level, in
this election at least, do not differ much from those com
puted on the parish level.

The primary reason Is a resultant

of the clustering of support on a regional basis.

Each can

didate tended to pull his highest vote percentages in differ
ent parts of the state.

The favorite son effect was felt.

20r . C. White, Social Statistics (New York* Harper
and Bros., 1933).
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Furthermore, the large number of candidates also was a factor
of importance In this connection*
fragments of support*

The vote was split into

These correlations ar® still valuable,

however, in documenting the types and shifts of support
found in 1952*
It will be noted that Kennon*s second primary support
was in closer relationship with that of McLemore than with
his own first primary support*
stable is significant.

That Kennon* s support was not

Whereas his highest first primary

support had been noticeable in the Florida parishes, in the
second primary, the followers of McLemore in the north Louisl«
a.

and Bourbon Democrat areas were more
for the candidacy of Judge Kennon#

highly enthusiastic

Kennon did maintain a

good deal of his own first primary support, and it will be
asserted that this came from the urban areas of the state*
Where a ward registered a high first primary vote for
McLemore, it tended to Kennon in the second primary in equal
proportions*

There was a political relationship between the

appeals and support of Kennon and McLemore*
Weak but positive coefficients correlate the support
of LeBlanc and Boggs in the direction of the "right1* side of
the political ledger.

Whereas the second primary shift of

Boggs* support was noticeable as was that of the relationship
of Kennon support with LeBlanc, yet the almost complete lack
of correlation would indicate that Boggs, as Kennon, was
gaining strong support in urban areas#

The Boggs candidacy
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found greater favor in the middle class than did that of other
"Long1* candidates*
The Dodd support correlated negatively with Kennon
support t clearly indicative that he was more a candidate of
Long ism.

In fact, the Dodd strength was clustered west of

Rapides within the "cut-over" parishes*

It was here that a

goodly portion of traditional Long support was seated and
where Spaht maintained majorities in the second primary*
Spaht tended to run second to Dodd in this area in the first
primary*
The fact that the relation between Kennon second pri
mary support and Spaht first primary support did not produce
a completely negative coefficient of correlation deserves
mention*

On the extremes the differential was clear*

Where

Kennon was given strong support, Spaht was weak, and vice
versa * In wards where Kennon obtained from kO to 60 per cent
of the vote in the second primary, Spaht received between 20
and 50 per cent of the vote in the first primary*

It would

appear plausible that In such wards the contraction of tra
ditional Long support was felt, but not to the extent that
Kennonfs gain was too detrimental to the chances of Spaht*
For farmers in rural areas and workers in the cities,
the appeal of Long ism was not so attractive as formerly.
Once again the evidence points to the conclusion that in
1952 the election was conducted in view of gaining a some
what different combination of electoral support than formerly.

2kC

Likewise, the electorate itself was interpreting self inter
est from other premises than in the past.

The independents

were independently representing recognisable tendencies and
trends which had begun to dominate the Louisiana political
scene.
The most significant phenomenon in 1952 was the in
creased Negro participation in the political battle
Registered in large numbers in the urban areas, the Negro
became once more an important factor in political success.
Since the Negro, as a class group, tended to support Longism, his appearance may be a crucial one in the attempt to
perpetuate that political program.

For as the contraction

of the area traditionally "Long country" occurred in the
rural parishes, the addition of new support from the Negro
would be useful.

The new factor of the Negro in politics be

comes another of the indices which point up the city as a key
to future Louisiana politics.
The hypothesis that the urban areas of the state have
become an important key to the understanding of Louisiana
voting behavior must be further substantiated.

It is neces

sary to identify the "factors" within the social structure
which influence the political tendencies present in the cities.
One previous study of urban voting behavior has been published

21Heberie, Hillery, and Lovrlch,

olt.
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using Baton Rouge as a crucial

c a s e . 22

jt will prove useful

to summarise the findings presented there and to project the
analysis to voting behavior in the 1952 elections.
Census tracts have not been established as yet in
Baton Rouge, so it is not possible to make computations of
socio-economic characteristics of a statistical nature.
However, the city does lend itself to a delineation of social
"ecological” areas.

It is "common knowledge" that within the

city "natural areas," in the terminology of urban ecologists,
exist, setting apart sections of the city on a residential
basis as predominantly "worker" or "business~professional"
areas.

The ecological pattern of Baton Rouge residence is

quite clear and affords the opportunity to draw conclusions
concerning the voting behavior of various class elements of
the population, within the bounds of the political units,
the precincts.
In the 19*t8 elections it was found that Earl long was
an "also ran" In the first primary, due to the fact that
Baton Rouge had developed an antipathy towards Longism through
the earlier episodes of Huey Long's fight with Standard Oil.
Baton Rouge business would have been hurt as much as Standard
Oil had Huey's threatened action driven the company from the
city.

Jimmie Morrison had polled strong support in "worker"

precincts, while Robert Kennon and Sam Jones had found

22p. H. Howard, "Voting Behavior in Baton Rouge,"
proceedings of the Louisiana Academy of Sciences, Vol. XV
(1952n
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support in th© "business” precincts*

In fact, Kennon was a

strong second choice in both "worker** and "business" pre
cincts —

a forecast of 1952, perhaps*

In the second pri

mary, the "worker" precincts shifted to support of Long,
whereas Jones gained large majorities in th© areas of busi
ness class predominance.

It was believed that In the show

down, the workers preferred Long as the minor evil in preference
to the businessmans candidate, Jones*

The same basic tenden

cies of class support were found to hold in the presidential
election of that year, when Truman carried the "worker” pre
cincts and Thurmond and Dewey shared the support of the
"business” precincts*
Workers at the Standard Oil refinery and part of those
at the Ethyl plant are organised in a form of company union
with no statewide or national affiliation*

Although workers

might be expected to share the general outlook of their em
ployers, yet they live in separate residential areas clearly
identified as the home of the working man, with commercial
enterprises catering to their needs*

An older layer of com

mercial and professional classes resides in or near the old
"core” city by the Mississippi River and downtown, though of
course numbers of these groups have moved into the more
recently developed residential subdivisions, also*

In these

latter-named areas, however, there are found many persons as
sociated with business and Industry who come from the Midwest
and Atlantic Coast regions, with a traditional Republican vote.
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Likewise* University personnel are mixed with these groups in
the newer residential areas.
The analysis of the results of the 1952 elections may
be approached in two ways.

The situation can be investigated

as was done above through checking the support given to the
various candidates.

On the other hand* the situation can be

approached from the social classes, that is, to ascertain how
white labor or the businessmen voted as groups.
approaches will be utilized.

Here both

(See Tables VI and VII.)

The Negro had little or no voice in the election of
19**3, but now it will be necessary to isolate this element
of voters in making a class analysis of voting behavior.

The

precincts have been lumped into three general categories,
based upon the predominance of some residential grouping. ,
Not all Negroes are workers, but the majority who live in
distinctly Negro areas are wage earners ? and of course there
are even Negroes who live in predominantly white precinets.
Analysis will proceed with the investigation of the tenden
cies of the "Negro worker class," the "whit© worker class,"
awd the "business-professional-white-collar class."

It must

be remembered at all times that these categories are not
mutually exclusive.
In the first 1952 primary, the Negro group of precincts
clearly showed a preference for "Long" candidates? Kennon and
McLemore together were the choice of only 16.7 per cent of
the Negro voters.

At the other end of the social pyramid,

TABLE VI
DISTRIBUTION OP VOTING PERCENTAGES IN ECOLOGICAL AREAS OP
BATON ROUGE, BY CANDIDATES, 1952*
FIRST PRIMARY

I

CLASS 1
|R3BA
Negro
Worker
White
Worker
Business*ProfessionalWhite Collar

§pm

MeLEMORB

K i m

TOTAL

38.5

15.0 29.8

13.9

2.8

100

13 A

16.6 12.8

51.9

6.3

100

21.2

17.2

38.9

13.9

100

8.8

SBCOWD PRIMARY:
SP.MX

ssa&ss

75 A

2^.6

100

White
Worker

26.1

73.9

100

BusinessProfessionalWhite Collar

33.7

66.3

100

QUASJLAm.
Negro
Worker

S O U

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:
DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLICAN

Negro
Worker

80.9

19.1

100

White
Worker

61.3

38.7

100

BusinessProfessionalWhite Collar

36.5

63.5

100

.mk

♦Source* Compilation of Primary Election Returns,
Louisiana, 1952.
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TABLE VII
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTING PERCENTAGES FOR CANDIDATES BY
ECOLOGICAL AREAS OF BATON ROUGE, 1952*
FIRST PRIMARYI
CLASS AREA
Negro
Worker
White
Worker
Business*
ProfessionalWhite Collar

SPAHT

TOTALS

BOQqS

DODD

KENNON

McLEMORE

22A

10.6

28.

2*f,3

36.8

35.1

*f7.1

23.8

53.3

52.6

36.5

W.9

72.8

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

^.0

3A

100.0

SECOND PRIMARY t
CLASS AREA
Hegro
Worker
White
Worker
BusinessProfessionalWhite Collar
TOTALS

m

32.6

if.6

29.2

^5.5

38.2

**9.9

100.0

100.0

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION*
CLASS AREA
Negro
Worker
White Worker
BosinessProfessionalWhite Collar
TOTALS

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLICAN

20.7
M+.9

5.3
30A
6»f.3

100.0

♦Source* Compilation of Primary Election Returns,
Louisiana, 1952*

100.0
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the business-professional group showed a much greater pro
portion of support for these two candidates*

Even so* the

three 11Long11 candidates shared **7*2 per cent of the choices
of this block of voters*

Here it may be contended that the

lower ranges of the group* the white collar class* tended to
show a more decided tendency toward the "Long" candidates.
The white worker group gave its heaviest support to the can
didacy of Kennon* 51.9 per cent* with the other candidates
splitting the remaining votes between them.
What choices were made between the candidacy of Spaht
and Kennon in the "run-off" election?

In the second primary,

as in 19*+$* it might be expected that the vote would be
drawn on basic issues and interests* within each of the class
groupings*

The Negro group demonstrated again its predomi

nant preference for the Long candidate* although Kennon was
given more support by this group in the second primary than
the combined Kennon-McLemore vote of the first*

The fact

that the groupings are not mutually exclusive might be raised
in explanation of this slight shift.

Many people within the

business group who had supported "Long" candidates in the
first primary must surely have given Kennon their votes in
the second primary* for he was the choice of 66.3 P©r cent of
the group.

Whereas the Kennon percentage was raised by over

20 per cent in the second primary, Spaht1s percentage changed
from 21.2 per cent to 33*7 per cent.

The most surprising

class support was given to Kennon in th© white worker group.

The second primary choice of nearly

75 per cent of this group

there can be no doubt that Kennon had made a strong impression on the workers.

Yet it was pointed out that in 1 9 W

only in the second primary did the long candidate gain worker
rotes in any number.

But Kennon did not have the same iden

tification with big business as the public had made for Jones
Moreover, Kennon was known to have made personal visits to
Standard Oil for campaign purposes, and company feeling had
been pointed in his direction.
Approached from another standpoint, it is possible to
indicate the proportionate amount of support each candidate
had gained from the three groups in the overall number of
votes cast for him.

Table VII shows that McLemore was most

certainly gaining his greatest support from the business*
professional elements.

Both Boggs and Kennon emerge as can

didates with business and worker but little Hegro support*
Dodd's following approximated more closely the proportions
of Spaht support, marking him as more the r,Longfl type of can
didate,

In the second primary Spaht appeared to draw sup

port from each class grouping in nearly equal proportion.
Of course Spaht had a surprisingly large proportion of his
followers among business-professional people because he has
many social connections In these areas,

Still, he obtained

only about one-fifth of the vote cast in these precincts in
the first primary.

One striking conclusion which might be

made is that the Negro support tended to act as an index of
the old Long, anti-Long identification of the candidates.
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Without wanting to anticipate the following section
devoted to analysis of the 1952 presidential election, it is
nevertheless instructive to show at this time the rather clear
class support given presidential candidates, and the similari
ties with the support of the state Democratic factions*

The

class group preferences clearly indicate the worker and Negro
bias for the Democratic candidate*

Likewise, the similarity

of support for both national Democratic candidate and Long
candidate is revealed, even if the worker class finds a
greater sympathy for the national party than for Long ism.
On the other hand, the business-professional classes tend to
be much more willing to vote for the national Republican
party and for candidates a bit to the right of Longlsm*
The present discussion, then, amply emphasises the
fact that the ballot in present-day Louisiana is a vehicle
of class expression*

Undoubtedly It always was, but it Is

hoped that the shifting support of different social classes
has been demonstrated.

In 1952 it was apparent that the sup

port of the more conservative candidates rested further down
from the top of the class pyramid than previously had been
the ease.
C. Louisiana Republicanism la I s A s m

Louisiana

was to help choose a president a few months after the excite
ment of the gubernatorial elections had subsided.

The student

of voting behavior would be afforded an excellent opportunity
to check the consistency of political tendencies.

It appeared
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that Governor Kennon felt he could gauge political opinion,
also, for as th© presidential campaign approached, he stepped
closer to the political right.
Part of the support of the conservative candidate in
the second primary had come from initial hackers of LeBlanc
and McLemore.

This added a decidedly more upper class at

mosphere to the Kennon camp.

Added support for Kennon had

come from the conservative western sugar country and the rice
country of the prairies which had backed local son LeBlanc.
Likewise, Kennon gained the support of the Mississippi delta
plantation parishes and the conservative northwestern parishes
about Caddo.

These had been outspokenly In support of

McLemore in the first primary.

Moreover, it was within the

parishes which fell in the highest quartile of second primary
Kennon support that the strongest Dixleorat sentiment had
been found in 1 9 W *
Recalling the "revolt of the haves" which brought the
DIxiecrat defection from the Democratic camp, it is not sur
prising that Governor Kennon should have joined the movement
in 1952.

In the second primary he had found great favor from

the very groups who had endorsed and supported the DIxiecrats.
Maybe the decisive win over the Long forces led Kennon to
believe that he could shake off any disguise of liberal tinge.
At any rate, the National Democratic Convention was to become
the stage upon which "real" Democratic support and hidden
Republican sympathies would be presented*

2?0
LongIsm was not dead, as Bussell Long Joined the ranks
of the young liberal Southern Democrats and spoke out in
favor of th© common man#

Kennon, by his actions, Joined the

ranks of anti-Long and cloaked himself in the old Bourbon
Democrat mantle#

In such alignments, of course, th© "people11

would outnumber the dominating minority, but as traditionally
th© Bourbons were adept at manipulations*

Action at the con*

vention revealed th© continuing power struggle as the Bour
bons Jockeyed to recapture or to hold their favorable
position in the state party organisations•
If Kennon had thought he could take party and support
along with him in the "safe11 shift from liberal to conserva
tive banners, he made his calculations without reference to
the emerging leader of Longism, young Bussell#

The election

results definitely showed the strength of the new middle
class with its prevailing conservative climate of opinion in
1952.

Likewise, however, the count showed that the traditional

Long support of farmer and portions of laborer groups could
combine with a solid Negro vote to outnumber the party bolters.
Governor Kennon had won the fight against the loyalty
oath pledge which was to have made it mandatory that conven
tion delegates accept the choice of a candidate made at
Chicago, and the Louisiana delegation was seated.
matter of principle," Kennon said.

"It was a

The conservatives of

Louisiana had always stood on principle —

white supremacy

and disenfranchisement had likewise been a matter of principle

among th© members of the old dominant minority#

The action

of Senator Long made it certain that the Democratic party,
£§£ £&» would be In the presidential race backing the choice
of candidate made at the Chicago convention#

Long had said

he would make his stand against the "walkout" of the Louisiana
delegation "no matter what it cost me

personally*"2^

Politically, it was a smart move, putting Long assuredly on
the side of the "people" back home and labeling him one of
the "symbols of the new South."

He could be hurt politically

on neither count#
So the campaign settled in Louisiana between the "real"
Democrats and the "Democrats for Elsenhower •"

The Stevenson

ticket ran practically unaided by the official party organisationp
ally.

the Elsenhower backers had money and used it liber

But the Democrats had the endorsement of most liberals

who had ever been associated with Longism and whose political
names were respected by the Louisiana electorate*

That the

coming election would result In a vote cast on class lines
was clearly evident as one Inspected the difference In finan
cial backing and in the choice of local party headquarters
throughout the state#

The sub-deb might be found at an Ike

rally, whereas a newsboy or Industrial laborer would choose
a meeting of "Volunteers for Stevenson."

And of course

2^SSS Orleans States* July 25, 1952, p#
2Sr. C. Havard, Jr., "Louisiana and the Two-Party
System." Proceedings of the Louisiana Academy of Sciences,
Vol. XVI (1953)*
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intellectuals rallied in large number to Democratic meetings#
In reviewing the election results, giving the Demo
cratic candidate 53 per cent of the statewide vote, it is
plain that predominant farmer parishes strongly supported
the candidacy of Stevenson; these same parishes formed the
core of the support for Longisra.

(See Figure 38*)

^®t, the

crucial point was found to be within the cities of Louisiana.
The support for the two presidential candidates tended to
"break even" In urban areas, and the urban Negro vote, in
the end, proved to be the deciding factor in giving the Demo*
crats a bare majority.
Over 100,000 Negroes had registered prior to the
November presidential election, and all Indications point to
a unified Negro vote, and with a high participation.

Where

predominantly Negro precincts can be spotted, the Democratic
support is found to be overwhelming.

A "colored box" in

Merryville, Beauregard Parish, near the Texas border, contained
116 ballots favoring Stevenson and two for Eisenhower.

This

overwhelming differential could be found wherever the Negro
voters predominated a precinct*

Two such precincts in Baton

Rouge registered votes of more than 90 per cent in favor of
the Democrats.

In the urban areas, then, the Negro was again

a crucial factor in Louisiana politics; only, time and circum
stance had worked a reversal In the direction of his support.
The ballot count on the ward level allows analysis to
proceed In finding significant areas of support for the two
presidential candidates as well as layers in the social
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class structure of the electorate.

It ©an be shown that the

vote in the seven urban-industrial parishes broke even, with
the Democratic candidate favored by only ?0*9 per cent.
Since nearly half the state vote was cast in these urban par
ishes, it might be feasible to begin the ward analysis by in
vestigating the distribution of the vote in the wards in
which are found urban places —
or more population.

cities and towns with 2,500

(See Table VIII.)

Seventy-two such

cities and towns have been utilised, containing eighty-five
wards.

Hew Orleans makes up seventeen wards of the total*

Here the vote was evenly split, with the Democratic candidate
barely in the lead.

On the other hand, the total Republican

vote, in the sixteen wards containing the other cities with
a population of 10,000 or more, was 52*1 per cent.
In the larger cities of Louisiana, there was a regional
difference in the support given the Republican candidate*
Cities located in the parishes listed in the Republican col
umn recorded a high Eisenhower vote.

Where the parish went

Democratic, as in Calcasieu, Rapides, and last Baton Rouge,
the city vote of Lake Charles, Alexandria, and Baton Rouge,
respectively, was higher in support of the Republican party
than the parish average*

At the other extreme, as in north

west Louisiana, where factors of oil, planter or commercial
interests were more influential, Shreveport in Caddo Parish
and nearby Bossier City in Bossier Parish voted Republican
by over 60 per cent.

In each case, the city per cent of
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TABLE VIII
THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE OP WARDS CONTAINING URBAN PLACES1*'
WARDS

REPUBLICAN 70TB

areas

DEMOCRATIC 70TB

%

No.
17

85,572

>+8.7

89,999

51.3

16

87,133

52.1

79,916

W7.9

2,500-9,999

52

^+9,629

1+6.1*

57,21+5

53.6

Regaining
Rural Wards

M+7

8»f,591

1+6 .1*

97,867

53.6

STATE TOTAL

532

306,925

1+7.0

325,027

53.0

In

Orleans

Urban Places
over 10t000
Urban Places

♦Sources Seventeenth Census of the U* S., 19505 Unpublished
Election Returns, Office Secretary of State, 1952*

Republican votes was some points above the parish average.
The same holds true for cities in south Louisiana where the
parish vote was Republican.

Opelousas In St. Landry, the

city of Lafayette, Morgan City in St. Mary, and Houma in
Terrebonne all registered a Republican vote In such number
as to influence the parish total In favor of the Republican
candidate.
It was the strong conservative tendency in the cities
which put the percentages for the larger Louisiana cities in
the Republican column.

Labor groups were numerous, but so
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wore the older layers of commercial groups and the newer resi
dents representing Industrial interests, business men, pro*
fessionals, and white collar personnel*

Even so, regional

differences, which will be discussed below, played a heavier
influence on urban

climates of opinion*"

Otherwise, the

situation may have been closer to that of the smaller cities,
where total ward counts gave the Democratic candidate 53*6
per cent of the vote*

It was thought perhaps the larger in

this group of cities or towns may have been more inclined to
the Republican than the Democratic candidate, but when
ranked according to size of population there was no telling
difference.

There was still somewhat of a tendency for these

urban wards to register a higher Republican vote than the
surrounding rural wards, but the lack of a numerous middle
and upper class population and the presence of more small
business men and laborers with close ties to the farmers of
the hinterland all worked as factors strengthening the Demo*
cratic support*
The Democratic percentage for the remaining b$0 rural
wards was the same as for the wards containing small urban
places*

There was consistently more Democratic support away

from the larger urban places, indicative perhaps of the pres
ence of the political tendency of the farmer class.

These

factors of urban and rural influences upon the voting be
havior In the 1952 presidential election can be brought into
sharper relief through a delineation of the voter support
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by wards•
As was true for the voting In the gubernatorial elec
tions, if the presidential candidate gained a parish majority,
the wards of that parish tended to be uniformly Republican
or Democratic*

A glance at Figure 39 indicate® the broad

clusterings of the ward support for the Democratic party, en
compassing in many instances complete parishes*

In the heart

of the hills cutting diagonally across north Louisiana, down
the southwest corner of the state, through the eastern
Florida parishes, and along the Mississippi liver to the
south, the ward distribution of Democratic support spreads
almost unbroken*

Only the influence of country towns, pockets

of plantation domination, and urban-industrial centers dis
turb the general pattern.

The second and third quartlles of

Eisenhower support were purposely cut on either side of 50
per cent so that the break of the vote with the incidence of
these Influences might be emphasized •
The wards in parishes where the predominant element
has been the small farmer class and where seats of Populist
and Long support were located continued in 1952 to show the
long-time Democratic prejudice*

In the parishes of central

and southwestern Louisiana and in the eastern Floridas, the
farmer classes evidently did not believe that by 1952 it was
"time for a change."
remained unchanged•

An ancient "climate of opinion" had
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The cleavage between farmer and planter In rural areas*
however, has likewise represented an influential traditional
tendency*

If the voters in the strictly "farmer" parishes

had swelled the Democratic support, it is also essential to
learn what happened in the wards of the parishes with ves
tiges of planter domination.

In the parishes of the northwest

corner of the state, along the Red River, up th© Mississippi
delta, and through the Ouachita River valley in Morehouse
and Ouachita parishes, planter activity remains in force.
Here there are observed pockets of high Republican percent
ages, reflecting the political sympathies of the planter class.
Plantation wards the entire length of the Bed River in the
parishes of Caddo and Bossier, and extending into Red River
Parish, all registered Eisenhower votes of 56 per cent or
above.

Likewise, in the tier of delta parishes a string of

wards can be found with high Republican support recorded.

The

same is true In the area between Monroe and Bastrop along the
Ouachita River.
In striking contrast, In the wards removed from the
Mississippi River the low Republican percentages are indica
tive of the presence of fanners In the "backwater** settlements
and along the length of Macon Ridge, In West Carroll, Rich
land, and Franklin parishes.

In this delta area it Is only

where the plantation dominates the agricultural economy that
the Republican tendency was strong#

But th© planter element

in the cleavage between it and farmer groups is reenforced

by the presence of associates in the country towns*

After

all, the planter is somewhat of a business man, a capitalist
in his agricultural operations, and the identification of
his Interests with the commercial elite of the country towns
has been of long standing.
There seem to be several blocks of voters taking sides
in the farmer-planter cleavage*

Town laborers may tend to

vote as the farmers do, whereas the merchants, the lawyers,
and other "business class" people in the country towns tend
to vote with the planters.

With planter support, the factor

of the country town seems to be more telling In the river
bottom areas than in the hill parishes,

in these small, non-

industrial towns the planter-merchant groups tend to be more
Influential, the "working class" consisting largely of
Negroes or being split by the "color line" —

and these planter-

merchant groups tend to determine the election results.

This

is demonstrated by the Republican vote in the towns along
Macon Ridge.

Oak Grove in East Carroll Parish, Delhi in

Richland, and Winnsboro in Franklin all registered a more de
cided tendency to support Eisenhower than did the wards of the
surrounding countryside.

Even down in Avoyelles Parish, the

ward containing the planter-merchant town of Bunkie follows
the pattern.
A revealing situation has emerged in Tensas Parish,
deserving of mention.

There are two adjacent wards in which

are located the towns of St. Joseph and Waterproof.

In the

former, the Republican tendency was strong, while in the
latter the reverse was true*

In St* Joseph the planter-

merchant influence is deep-rooted, and with the young people
tending to move away as they attain adulthood th© remaining
population manifests the traditional conservative prejudice*
On the other hand, Waterproof's population consists of oil
workers from the nearby fields of operation and her© the
traditional tendency is altered.

Moreover, a similar pattern

exists in Concordia, where the parish seat of Vidalia voted
Democratic while surrounding wards in one of which is the old
town of Ferrlday recorded Republican sympathies*

Across the

river from Batches, Mississippi, Vidalia has become a boom
town, a residential suburb of the neighboring city*

Many

worker families have settled here and apparently in such
number that a Democratic majority was assured.
Northwest Louisiana manifested a solidarity In voting
Republican which was intense, broken only by defection of
Webster Parish,

Previously McLemore and Kennon, the native

son, had scored heavy support in this area, as had the Dixiecrat candidate in 19*f8.

Undoubtedly the dominance of Shreve

port in th© area together with the presence of planter groups
as well as white farmer groups with relatively high levels
of living are deciding factors.

Shreveport, an old commer

cial city and the oil capital for northwest Louisiana and
adjacent counties of Bast Texas, is a wealthy city.

It Is

more Western” in outlook than other Louisiana cities $ that

is, it is more like Dallas, Texas.

Nearby DeSoto Parish has

developed quite a dairying Industry in recent years.

Such

farming is capitalistic and provides a reenforcement for the
older layer of cotton planter domination.

Webster Parish has

proportionately more people in the worker groups than sur
rounding parishes.

Here a Federal ammunition plant at Minden

and a paper mill at Sprlnghlll support a labor force which
apparently still found favor for the Democratic party.
The contrast of Republican West Feliciana, together
with adjacent wards of Points Coupee Parish, with urban Bast
Baton Rouge is marked.

The traditional conservatism of the

plantation past had been carried forward.

The traditional

Republican tendency farther south in sugar country appeared
diminished, if the whole of south Louisiana is viewed.

Yet

there were numerous pockets of Republican support which in
dicated that the traditional Influences still existed.

This

was particularly true of the line of parishes from St. Landry
south to the Gulf in Terrebonne.

Within the string of wards

in this area there exist small town after small town.

Here

the same sorts of factors which influenced voting in north
Louisiana have been present.

There are likewise cities of

some size like Lafayette, New Iberia, and Morgan City, all of
which registered an exceptionally high urban Republican vote.
In the back country on either side of this «conservative line"
the support of the Democratic candidate was more decided.
Parenthetically, together with the plantation and urban
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factors within the Republican areas of northwest and south
Louisiana, there was also present the subtle factor of the
"tideland11 oil issue*

On© could pass through sugar country

along the old Spanish Trail between Hew Orleans and Lafayette,
for example, and view huge billboards advertising the presi
dential campaign in terms of awful determination of the Beraoeratic administration in Washington to take the tidelands
away from the people of Louisiana.

This appeal probably

worked; it also indicated the amount of money the Republicans
had at their disposal in attempting to win the Louisiana
presidential vote.
On the ward level, it is apparent that the Florida par
ishes still showed the old Bemoeratlc leaning.

Of course

wards within the Feliclanas, where the plantation economy was
present, registered Republican majorities.

Likewise, the

ward in which the parish seat of St. Helena is located sup
ported Eisenhower.

The rural towns of Kentwood and Tangipahoa

in ward one of Tangipahoa Parish were listed in the Republican
column.

To the south the ward with urban Hammond and Poncha-

toula and the wards of the "gold coast" along Lake Pontchartrain were also counted in favor of the Republican candidate*
The majority of Jimmie Morrison's Sixth Congressional District,
however, followed his lead in support of the Democratic party.
Having extended the discussion of presidential voting
tendencies to an analysis on the ward level, it is now possible
to take one step further in the isolation of leading tendencies

through a presentation of a correlation table showing the
relationships between Republican support and that of certain
other elections*

Previously, analysis of the relationships

between the support of various gubernatorial aspirants had
pointed up the similarities and differences resulting from
the Identification with regional and socio-economic groups#
How, with an understanding of these tendencies, any correla
tions existing between presidential support and gubernatorial
support can be more concisely revealed*

Besides the presenta

tion of coefficients of correlation based on ward data, some
rank-order computations have been made of parish support for
a series of elections in which the emergent revolt of the
"haves19 was a significant factor*
The tables here presented give clear indication that
for 1952, at least, the relationship between voting in state
and national elections was a close one*

This is particularly

true for what may be called the more conservative groups of
voters*

The general leading tendencies of groups within the

electorate show stability in expression of voter choices*
Moreover, the continuity of the Bourbon Democratic sentiment
is more clearly tied with the so-called revolt of the "haves”
from 19**8 on*

Very obviously some unified group within the

electorate shows a persistency revealing of a consciousness
of identity or aspiration among its members.
Once again the distributive pattern of McLemore sup
port provides the key to homogeneous relationships*

The
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coefficient of correlation between McLemor© and Eisenhower
support is relatively high because they were backed by the
same portions of the electorate*

With the exception of the

relationship with the Kennon second primary vote* itself
swelled by the votes of McLemore supporters* there is a gen
eral blurring of correlation of the support of gubernatorial
candidates and the Republican candidate*

The political ambi

valence of the middle class is reflected in the hesitation
to give wholesale support for one candidate or another*

The

members of the groupings supporting McLemore* ranging toward
the upper class limits* had no such difficulty shifting
political allegiance*
The Kennon supporters of the second primary have
better qualifications to emulate the political expressions
of the elite groups*

It consisted of McLemore followers and

similar voters bent on leaning away from the center toward
the political right.

For there is virtually no correlation

between the Eisenhower support and that for Kennon1s first
primary backing*

Kennon*s after-election climb onto the

Elsenhower bandwagon must have seemed a pleasing gesture among
the groups of Hhavesn and those who would find Identity with
the upper class.

There is safety in numbers, and the old

Bourbons were well aware of the exigencies of political com
binations *
Where the Republican support was high* corresponding
support for Longism tended to be low.

Comparisons with Long

TABLE IX
PRODUCT-MOMENT COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VOTE FOR EISENHOWER AND
LEADING GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES, BY WARD, 1952*
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♦Sources Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 1952; unpublished
election returns, Office of Secretary or State.

TABLE X
RANK-ORDER COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VOTE FOR EISENHOWER
AND SELECTS) CANDIDATES OR ELECTIONS, BY PARISH*
Kennon Second
Eisenhower

-/.61b-

McLemore
-/.518

Kennon First
-/.132
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*Source* Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 19521
Report of Secretary of State, 19^8f unpublished election
returns, Office of Secretary of State.
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support, however, resulted In no strong negative coefficients.
One of the major conclusions which must be forwarded, then,
is that there was a blurring of traditional lines of cleavage,
in the elections of 1952.
Rank-order computations did show on the parish level,
what has been suggested from ward level analysis, the line of
affinity of out«and*out Eisenhower support with the Kennon
and McLemore backing and with the Dixiecrat defection of
This traditional tendency, the unity of support for the domi
nant minority, remained strong.

Is it only coincidental that

some of the highest Republican support in Louisiana was found
within rural areas where the Negro tended to outnumber the
whites?

V. 0. Keyfs thesis, if valid, would require a strong

Democratic majority in these wards.^

But Key wrote before

1952, and it became clear during the campaign that the Dixiecrats of 19**B would find it expedient to make the jump into
the Republican party.

This was not a vote to ensure a solid

Democratic party in Louisiana, it was a revolt aimed at gain
ing complete ascendancy once more through a new political
vehicle.
Members of this privileged group in 1952 extended the
warm hand of welcome to all those who felt they could meet
the qualifications.

The most striking event of the presiden

tial election, then, was the subtle hint that perhaps

25v . 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New Yorks Alfred
A. Knopf, 19*^9J•
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political control might be enhanced and perpetuated if the
Bourbon should don the cloak of the modern Republicans.
Articulated in terms of a "crusade," Republicanism in modern
garb was fitting vehicle to be used by the unreconstructed
elite»
But members of the very groups against whom the Bour
bon erected the bulwark of "white supremacy" and one-party
rule voted in large enough number to thwart aspirations of
Republican victory.

The Negro tenant or farmer in Bourbon

country appeared a mute reminder of the plantation pastf his
city cousins helped turn the Republican tide of 1952 by mak
ing a shift from his previous voting tendencies I
D.

The Future of Louisiana Politics

If it be cor

rect that Louisiana experiences in the recent elections found
counterparts in national politics, then the phenomena desribed
by Samuel Lubell as requiring a new theory of political par
ties must have been present and influential in the molding of
Louisiana polities.2^

Changes in the social structure have

produced within the American party system a break with the
traditions and continuity of the past.

The former political

ideologies and party labels may remain, but it does not nec
essarily follow that today's politicians are the heirs of

Future

2^With apologies and appreciation for S. Lubell, The
American Politics (New York* Harper and Bros.,
27Ibld.. p.

2 Q h ft.
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earlier political movements*

It is important, then, to in

vestigate the presence of different groups who may find it
convenient to speak in terms of the same ideological concepts
and to isolate the specific voting elements with whom the
appeals and slogans find favor#
The pattern of national political party struggle has
been one of alternations between one party or another, of
the success of a dominant majority party so long as it has
managed to hold together the support of groupings of the
electorate.

In this process each new majority party brings

with it an opposition of its own and succeeds through the
timeliness of its appeal.

Therefore, if the theory is valid,

"the key to the political warfare of any particular period
will be found in the conflict among the clashing elements in
the majority party."2®

A resume of the 1952 elections may

substantiate the thesis of Mr. Lubell, and will most certainly
provide an understanding of the leading trends of presentday Louisiana and possible pathways to the future.
The espousal of "independence" by the gubernatorial
candidates in 1952 was indicative that the politician was
feeling his way to new alignments of voter elements drawn
from the Louisiana society which now manifested such change
in the direction of industrial urbanity.

Just as on the

national scene there was doubt that the old Roosevelt-Truman

28Ibld.. p. 20^
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coalition of voter elements would “stick*1 and guarantee an
other Democratic victory, so in Louisiana it appeared that
new appeals must be made*

Of course, the success of the Dixie-

crat revolt of 19b8 must have convinced the anti-Longs, or the
conservative candidates, that there were appreciably strong
groups of voters ready to make their political choices in
other than Long— anti-Long terms*
In the gubernatorial primaries the issues were cast
In a liberal-conservative language, although all candidates
were Democrats*

In the late summer as the presidential cam

paign became intense, however, the emergence of a two-party
situation was noted, even though the choice was said to be
for the “real” Democrats or the “Democrats for Eisenhower.**
The latter was a contradiction in terms, but was a safe slogan
for the Bourbons to muster behind; then, if the Republican
candidate should lose, the one-party struggle could be com
menced again.

The “haves” wanted their cake and to eat it too.

To win these contests it would be necessary to get out
the electoral siIde-rule and make some calculations in po
litical arithmetic.

What were the groupings in the new Loui

siana, and what were their desires?

Parmer groups remained

a numerically important element of the electorate.

In gen

eral it was found that this group continued to be Influenced
by traditional Democratic tendencies and the support of
Longism.

However, the presence of previous consensus of

opinion among the farmers was missing.

There was a “defection*1
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In the farmer vote inasmuch as many who had found prosperity
under Democratic and Long administrations were now naturally
inclined to make identification with groups and classes who
manifested a more conservative leaning*

Since they had "never

had it so good," farmers might want to conserve their gains
with an "independent" administration on the state level and
a Republican one in Washington.
Members of planter groups might still think of themselves as part of the Louisiana elite* and their political
tendencies in 1952 would remain conservative.

But whereas

the traditional Republicanism of the south Louisiana sugar
planters would insure their participation in the Independent
and Eisenhower causes* the logic for the support of the Bour
bon cotton planters started from a different premise.

The

Bourbon was seeking a safe bet in backing the conservative
candidates.

States* rights was the dogma which had replaced

White Supremacy* though in either case the end result was the
quest for political domination.
Yet the key to the elections of 1952 lay in aligning
the support of elements of the new "urban frontier."

It was

the votes of labor and the middle classes which swung the
vote conservative or liberal.

The re-emergence of the Negro

in Louisiana politics was also an urban phenomenon* and al
though his number was relatively small* it represented a
block vote large enough to influence the outcome of the elec
tions.

The Negro* as generally the worker* had made the
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observation that it was the Democratic party nationally which
had furthered his interests*

The middle classes showed no

such certainty of where support should be placed, although
again this paralleled national experience, and in 1952 the
mood of the middle class appeared to be a conservative one*
The year 1952 takes on meaning in retrospect —
two-party politics was an objective fact even if in the elections of that year the people had subjectively denied it*
In the new Louisiana the values and symbols of past politics
are in the process of adjustment to present-day realities*
There are new groupings with interests demanding attention*
Louisiana has once more become a copy of American society —
middle class, urban, Industrial, with an acceptance of
welfare-lsm, and faced with the fact of emerging Negro freedom.
Yet the traditional tendencies have hung on.

Bqth

farmer whites and city colored have found Longism and the
national Democratic party can do something for them.

But per

haps the Republican party can provide solution for the prob
lems of the present day and become a force in the state*
The memory of past tendencies may remain an influence, but
in the emergent situation of the present will be found the
basis for the future of Louisiana politics.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

This study has analysed factors influencing voting be«
havior in Louisiana.

Move than that* using assumptions and

methodology of political ecology as a research tool, emphasis
has focused upon historical experiences, interests, and
social values which have influenced political choices.
Analysis of the geographic distribution of voting support
in a great number of elections has revealed the presence of
subregions within the state where existed different "politi
cal climates" of great persistence.
In the characterization of persistent climates of
opinion it has been necessary to demonstrate the relation
between "regional" and "class" factors in voting behavior.
Processes of social differentiation have worked to produce
a number of groups within Louisiana society, each of which
has sought to perpetuate its interests through the expression
of the ballot; in fact a striking aspect of political tenden
cies in Louisiana has been the actions of social groupings
In various areas of the state which have at different times
utilized the ballot to further particular interests and in
terpretations of the ends of society.
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Political attitudes
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were expressive of cumulative experiences* of developed ways
of life found in certain social strata*
Voting behavior has revealed the antagonisms as well
as the accomodations which different groups have experienced«
Since groups making up the social strata of Louisiana society
have tended to predominate certain regions of the state*
analysis through political ecology has been extremely useful*
A very striking differential might be expected between south
French-Catholic and north Anglo-Saxon-Protestant Louisiana*
an opposition in cultural backgrounds*

there has been found

antagonism* yes; but in south Louisiana assimilation has like
wise been active* producing a blending of Anglo-American and
German elements to French-Spanish society and culture*

this

is revealed most notably in the area of religion*
The reader might object* in fact* that this study has
in a one-sided way emphasised class differentials as influ
encing voting behavior to the neglect of religious factors*
But religion has been found to play a rather secondary role
in Louisiana politics*

With the minor exception of 1928*

when south Louisiana voted heavily Democratic in favor of the
Catholic* Alfred Smith* in the presidential election* the
analysis of voting behavior points more certainly in the direc
tion of socio-economic influences*

Political choices have

been made by social groupings in favor of very definite
economic interests* factors emergent from ecological processes.
From the beginning, Louisiana society had concern for
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and dedication to the continuance of aristocracy*

The planter

aristocracy, whether based on sugar in south Louisiana or on
cotton in north Louisiana, had vested Interests to protect*
And in alliance with men of commerce, the planters maintained
"gentleman rule."

There was found a circulation of the po

litical elite, only the circulation was generally within and
between the same dominating social groupings of certain re
gions of the state.

Here was a replica of Western European

soeiety of the nineteenth century.

The latter-day Louisiana

model might be watered down with the reception of the nouveauriche by the class of old wealth, but the predisposition to
play the role of the aristocrat has remained.
Xet, any aristocracy is by definition limited in member*
ship.

It would derive from those areas of the state where

plantation economy was employed in the utilisation of natural
resources.

But since Louisiana had embraced an Anglo-Saxon

type of representative government, the "people" of the society
—

and this meant specifically the farmer class and later the

worker class ~
superiority.

potentially at least would enjoy a numerical
And the ecology of Louisiana was such that it

is quite simple to demonstrate the political tendencies of
these societal groups when and where they practiced suffrage.
In the two decades before i860, planters of sugar and
cotton country, whether originally Whig or Democrat, tended
to find the ends of aristocracy more nearly achievable within
Whiggery.

However, the persistent migration of Democratic
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farmers and laborers into north and southwest Louisiana and
into Hew Orleans upset the basis for the planter domination*
The traditional appeal of Jacksonian Democracy was more timely
and received the die-hard support of those farmers and labor
ers who enjoyed suffrage —

and these were considerable

despite their manifest lack of party control*

The Democratic

party became dominant through the main factor of numbers and
because the Whig political philosophy found in general no
place for the "people*n
The sugar planters and the cotton planters of the
Mississippi delta country might find rapprochement within the
ranks of Whiggery*

Planters within the Florida parishes and

upper class elements of New Orleans might gain political as
cendancy through the Democratic party with the aid of the
vote of the farmer and the worker*

But the farmer from the

hills was voting Democratic from Jacksonian preference, whereas
the dominating members of the party had other interests to
forward*

Moreover, the Whig party became disorganized in the

fifties and former members found but short-lived respite in
the ranks of the American party*
The Issues of slavery, then, must be resolved within
the dominant Democratic party.

But factional strife was such

that the problems and possible answers were never met nor
solved*

Secession became inevitable as the traditional po

litical processes became ineffective*

The possibility of reso

lution or compromise was lost in the directionless drift to
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Secession.
At the end of the Civil war, the Republican party* was
to become dominant.

With the manipulations of political ad

venturers, whose success rested upon the vote of the Negro,
the Bourbons in emergence could point to a clearly untenable
situation and gain the support of the "people,11 the white
farmers and laborers.

Since domination shifted to the Bour

bons through their erection of the dogma of white supremacy
as the raison d yetre of the Democratic party, the numerical
potential of the Negro at the polls must be destroyed.
Whereas a voice of moderation might have been established in
the years between l86*f and 1868, when the Louisiana Unionists
attempted to reconstruct the Democratic party and forward the
rebuilding of the war-ravaged state, the ex-Conf©derates gave
short notice that the new should rest upon their interpreta
tion of the old.

The struggle for power became naked.

Again, as a generation previously, political processes
became ineffective.

The Bourbon-Lilywhites maneuvered to

diminish the Negro strength at the polls while at the same
time they encouraged the white farmers of the hills to support
the Cause.

And either through intimidation or the fact that

the dominant minority controlled the economic as well as the
political life of the state, the poor and white displayed a
remarkable solidarity in support of the Democratic party in
the decade of the 1880's.

However, just as the farmer fac

ing the crisis of Secession indicated that he concurred in a
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situation over which he had no control9 so now the threat of
economic ruin in the 1890*8 became more important than the
maintenance of white supremacy#
The farmers in north Louisiana in the parishes elustered about the central hills found a vehicle for protest,
this time.

The platform of the peoplefs party was timely and

in fusion with the Republican party enough voting strength
could be mustered to gain political power and avert financial
disaster.

It was now clear that the Issue was one ©f party

representation.

The farmer had supported the Democratic

party from tradition, without looking behind the label, and
events proved that the suffrage of the "people” had been a
privilege of little value.

In Populism, farmer groups in

Louisiana, whether in the hills of north Louisiana or in the
Florida parishes, in the prairies of southwest Louisiana, or
along the bayous of south Louisiana, could gain political
footing equal to that of the self-styled aristocrats.
The Populist "bubble” was burst, however, in bitterly
fought elections when the Bourbons barely gained majority sup
port over the Fusion*

The great two-party tradition of this

country had found ideological support in the opposing phil
osophies of Hamilton and Jefferson, but while there might be
differences of opinion, there was likewise consensus that
they should be resolved through resort to the suffrage, in
compliance with established rules of procedure.

The Bourbons

put aside the rules in gaining political ascendancy.

And
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their action was the more striking because it was within the
bounds of legality,

the Constitution of 1896 disenfranchised

the Negro all right , but also many thousand white farmers and
workers, whose vote a decade or so before had aided the
lourbon overthrow of the Republican party born of Reconstruc
tion,

In so doing, the great movement of the "people" was

averted,

The poor and white were expendable In the Bourbon

scheme of things; social problems would be resolved through
political action if, when, and how the Democratic minority
party decided,
After 1900 Louisiana was aptly labeled a "one-party
state.”

The Bourbon had created a situation where only one

party could possibly function without overthrowing the domi
nant minority.

Moreover, the Bourbon split with the past,

for he did not display the same sense of political responsi
bility which had been the Whigs’, nor the feeling for the
interests of the common man which had characterised the Jack
sonian,

In such a situation machine politics could flourish.

And even the "reforms" such as proposed by Governor Parker did
not strike at the root of the matter, for the one party re
mained dominant*

Yet the opposition created by the actions

of the Democratic elite was potentially explosive and numeri
cally strong,

For slightly more than one hundred years a

favored few had enjoyed the fruits of Louisiana society In
unequal proportions.
An analysis of the geographic distribution of voting
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tendencies over a period of more than a hundred years reveals
a continuity of ecological influences.

Farmer groups in the

bloc of parishes which gave near one hundred per cent support
to the Bourbons in the l890*s stiffered economic reversals and
deprivations never righted; here was motivation for a per
sistent solidarity*

The Democratic party was compelled to

gain ascendancy over the "Black" Republicans*

Perhaps more

emphasis than has previously been made should be pointed at
the extreme differential between farmer-laborers and plantercommercial-industrial interests, between the "have nots" and
the "haves."
Redress was finally achieved by socially and economi
cally deprived groups of Louisiana citisens within the oneparty state with the advent of Huey Long*

The assurance of

the emergence of a movement such as Longism was found in the
backing of farmer and labor groups which the Bourbons had sub
ordinated*

And precedents for strong«*armed political methods

were not lacking either.

Longism, whatever else may be said

of it, fulfilled the movement of the frustrated Populists,
held back for a quarter of a century.

The momentum of the

success of Long candidates with the lower classes was so great
that until 1952, at least, elections in Louisiana were the
scene of struggles between Long and "reform" factions, neither
willing to set a new pattern of action radically different
from traditions of the past.

The solid core of Long support

remains in the regions of the state where the farmer
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predominates and in urban areas where laborers are numerous#
As was true of the success of the "New Deal" on the
national level, Longism brought unprecedented numbers to the
polls and nearly all groups within society found a vehicle of
political expression whereby societal needs might be voiced*
By 1952 it was apparent that two-party politics was a fact,
in voting behavior if not in name.

Louisiana society had been

transformed under the Impact of industrialization, and po
liticians must attempt to gain the support of members of
social strata whose preferences were untested or unknown#
This phenomenon gave rise to the appearance of "independent"
candidates.
Analysis of the 1952 gubernatorial elections, however,
demonstrated that whereas the electorate displayed political
attitudes and was composed of elements similar to those of
the national scene, yet the tendencies and traditions of the
past were still influential#

Although a numerically increas

ing middle class had emerged in Louisiana, whose political
preference tended to the right of center, the farmer and the
worker showed continued adherence to the Long faction on the
local level and preference for the Democratic party on the
national scene#

Upper class groups of planters and business

men continued to vote anti—Long and anti—Democratic, looking
for a safe shift to more conservative associations#

The Negro

had once more become an important factor In Louisiana politics 5
Negro registration was another manifestation of the
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urbanisation of the state*
The result of the presidential ©lection of 19?2 made
it clear that citizens from all levels of the social strata
were making their political weight felt*

The nearly fifty

per cent split of the electorate and the identification of
the support of Republicans and Democrats indicated that objec
tively a two-party system in Louisiana is quite possible and
probable*

Factions within the state Democratic party, though

popularly identified by their leaders actually represent deepseated cleavage over interests and issues*

The traditional

solidarity of the Democratic one-party system is breaking
down as their socio-economic interests tend to draw the domi
nant minorities into the Republican fold.

The struggle for

power continues, and at the present time it appears that the
Louisiana experience with representative government, because
of or in spite of the influence of the past, will be more
genuinely democratic than ever before*
This study has adequately demonstrated, it is believed,
that voting tendencies which may be discovered in the analy
sis of crucial elections are rooted in persistent attitudes
and traditions of different groups of citizens whose political
choices further their interests.

The methodology of political

ecology enables the investigator to ascertain the multiplicity
of factors influential in voting behavior and through careful
selection to highlight the determinants of Louisiana politics*
The ideas and institutions, and cumulative experiences of
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Louisiana citizens have been discussed and the continuity of
leading political tendencies placed in historical perspective*
The significance of this study for political sociology
is fourfold*

In the first place* it has been demonstrated

that the methodology of political ecology is eminently satis
factory for the Investigation of the sociology of political
life*

Secondly* it has shown that whether analysis is made

of selected Hcrucial” elections or in historical depth* fac
tors of tradition as well as elements of change influence po
litical choices*

Thirdly* this study has demonstrated the

importance of placing emphasis on the process of social dif
ferentiation* on the groups and groupings within a society
which support parties or movements*

Finally, the importance

of social classes and the correspondence of differentials in
social strata and in voting behavior* even under a one-party
regime* have been emphasized*

The struggle for political

power is real* and the political sociologist through ecologi
cal analysis gains an Insight into this important social
process•
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